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PREFACE
The expression "critical psychology" can be inter-
preted in a number of different ways. What unites all
the schools of this name, however, is the common con-
viction that empiricism is an unsatisfactory approach
to the problems to be dealt with in psychology; a
scientific theory of human behavior should at least
take into account the historical and social context of
that behavior. This call for the integration of an
historical-social and aa empirical approach appears,
however, to have found little response at all within
the behavioral sciences.
It is against the background of what is feit by
raany to be a crisis in psychology that we shall be
presenting three schools of critical psychology, whose
theoretical and tnethodological development have rightly
WOQ them a following. The oldest of these schools is
the "Cultural-Historical School", with which the name
of Vygotskij is associated. It was this school that
provided the historical and intellectual basis for the
"Berlin School of Critical Psychology", which arose
around the figure of Holzkamp. The Cultural-Historical
School also dealt with the same problems as "Dialecti-
cal Psychology", developed in the United States by
Riegel and others. We shall not only be describing
these three schools in fuil, but be investigating their
theoretical and methodological tenability as well.
Thls book is a completely revised edition of a
publication which first appeared in Dutch under the
title "Kritische Psychologie" ("Critical Psychology"),
published in 1981 by Ambo. To this original book we
have added several paragraphs and a closing chapter,
re-writing nearly all passages, in part based upon
information recently made available to us. Our collea-
gue Frits A. Goossens had an important share in the
Dutch version of the chapter on Dialectical Psychology,
but other obligations prevented him from contributing
to the revised edition. We are grateful for the mate-
rial hè made available to us in revising this particu-
lar chapter. We should like to acknowledge the encour-
agement and support of the specialist on Soviet psycho-
l°gy> professor Carel F. van Parreren. We should also
like to express gratitude to our Dutch-American col-
league Mare Schoen, whose thankless task it was to
translate the original text into English. We should
further like to thank our colleagues at the University
of Leiden for providing the stimulating intellectual
climate in which to work on this book and Cora Jongsma
for typing out the manuscript.
Marinus H. van Uzendoorn
René van der Veer
Leiden, August 1983
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INTRODUCTION
Psychologists seem to be a bit masochistic. At
least, this is the impression one gets wheo studying
recent essays on the structure, range and relevance of
psychological research. Time and again, psychologists
indulge in self-chastisement. Koch (1969), for exaraple,
speaks of the "pooled pseudo-knowledge that is rauch of
psychology". Kantor (1979) states that "in spite of all
the historical efforts to make psychology a science,
and the ambitions of psyehologists to convert psycholo-
gy to a science, this discipline cannot fully qualify
as a natura] science". But even researchers for whora
natural scientific research is not automatically the
standard for all scientific research have uttered
bitter sentiments as to the "state of the art".
One problera, for example, is the position of
theory in psychological research. It is as if many
researchers are possessed by one thought only: how can
I escape as quickly as possible the stage of theory and
hypothesis construction and get on with the "real
work", in other words, collecting data and testing
hypotheses. This attitude has several unfortunate
consequences. At times there seems to be hardly any
connection between theory and practical research; the
choice of research problems is arbitrary. As a result,
not ouly are probleras soroetimes solved incorrectly, but
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more often the wrong probleras are being solved. Know-
ledge is not being accumulated optiraally and experi-
mental research does not always lead to new insights.
It is this "empiricism" that has resulted in the view
of psychology as a science of trivialities.
A second problem is the validity of the results of
psychological research. In many cases, it is unclear
what factors are responsible for an effect uncovered in
an experiment. Often, the results of research into
human or animal behavior are, in fact, elicited by the
artificiality of the research situation (Rosenthal,
1976). Outside the laboratory, these results are mea-
ningless. Was Bertrand Russell perhaps right after all
when hè said: "One raay say broadly that all the animals
that have been carefully observed have behaved as to
confirra the philosophy in which the observer believed
before his observation began. May, more, they have all
displayed the national characteristics of the observer.
Animals studied by Araericans rush about frantically,
with an incredible display of hustle and pep, and at
last achieve the desired results by chance. Animals
observed by Germans sit still and think, and at last
evolve the solution out of their inner consciousness"?
(Russell, 1956, p.32-33). Even the seemingly most exact
aspect of psychological research, statistics, can find
no favour in the eyes of methodologists (Meehl, 1967).
They oppose equating Popper's principle of falsifica-
tion with statistically testing the null hypothesis.
There are then no adequate technical safeguards against
trivial and invalid research results. It is not at all
certain that in the Darwinian struggle of theories, the
fittest will survive.
These and other probleras have considerably eroded
the faith in traditional psychology. So much so that
there is talk of a "crisis", although not for the first
time in history of psychology (Boring, 1950). This
feeling of crisis is only reinforced by economie pro-
blems; the drying up of the financial sources for
social scientific research has, of course, not contri-
buted much to the mitigation of the internal probleras.
How did this crisis in psychology come about? We sus-
pect that unless the following three mutually related
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problems are taken seriously, psychology will not be
able to overcome the crisis within a short period of
time.
PROBLEMATIC PSYCHOLOGY
Firstly, there is the problem of unity. That
psychology is characterized by so rauch disjointedness
is feit by many researchers to be a considerable short-
coming. Numerous "roini"-theories exist side by side and
a more comprehensive theory is lacking altogether. -By
means of a Kuhnian analysis, some researchers have also
detnonstrated that there are several different paradigms
at vork in psychology (see Palermo, 1971, Markova,
1982). The problem is that in psychology, these para-
digms exist side by side, each oae enjoying the support
of a particular group of researchers. Time and again,
this unsatisfactory situation results in the call for a
"strong" theory or paradigm, which will bring "law and
order" into the chaos of psychological research. Some
see a redeeming role reserved for cognitive psychology.
Research into meta-cognition is very popular and cer-
tainly not only in neo-Piagetian circles. Others raake a
case for holism (Giorgi, 1976; Kitchener, 1982). They
suggest that some of the shortcomings of present-day
psychology are the result of a one-sided mechanistic
and atomistic approach. Still others respond by saying
that it is an illusion to think that uniformity in
psychology is possible. There is no theory that can
explain both the iconic meraory and the cause of aggres-
sion in large cities. It is in the nature of the human
being to be disjoiuted. Even if there were such a
theory, it would be so general as to be meaningless.
But perhaps it is possible to construct a sort of
middle-range-theory (Merton) which manages to avoid
both the Scylla of the "dataism" (Bunge) and the Cha-
rybdis of the empty cliché. In doing so, the Cultural-
Historical School (see chapter 1) could be a source of
inspiration.
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Secondly, there is the problem of choosing between
alteraative strategies for clarifying psychological
questions. We refer to the dilemma understanding versus
explanation which ha s existed as long as psychology
itself. Wundt had already created a special "Völker-
psychologie" for those problems difficult to clarify
experimentally. Recently, Cronbach (1975) made a plea
for idiographic case-studies, in addition to already
existing experiaental and correlational research. Tbis
approach is designed to produce a reconciliation of the
empirical-analytical with the hermeneutic approach.
Habermas (1973a) too, regards such a synthesis as a
necessary step in the direction of a critical social
science. Cronbach's plea is appealing, but because hè
appears unable to point to any good examples of a
succesful combination of "hard" and "soft" methods, it
is not very convincing. In the philosophy of the social
sciences, one reads frequently that the postulates of
erapirical-analytical science are such that they are
especially attuned to workings of nature but simply
create difficulties in studying human behavior. The
behavior of human beings is not only determined by
natural factors, but by cultural ones as well. Cultural
factors are by nature transitory and evaporate in the
light of an empirical approach. Cultural factors are
not fixed, causal detenninants iD the strict sense of
the words but the transitory context in which a real
understanding of human behavior is ultimately made
possible. If people are aware of the operation of
cultural "laws", these laws are at once dissoluble. The
Berlin School regards it as one of its tasks to bring
the results of research into cultural "laws" to the
attention of those involved and in doing so, increase
their freedom to choose between several options for
action (see chapter II).
Of course, human behavior undeniably possesses
natural as well as cultural facets, among them, for
example, all sorts of psycho-physiological reflexes.
Some believe that this "natural" aspect - the first
nature - can be explained along social scientific
lines. On the other hand, the "cultural" aspect - the
second aature - can only be hermeneutically described
and understood (see for example, De Boer, 1983). It is
INTRODUCTION
still very mucfa in question, however, whether each
aspect of huntan behavior requires lts own means of
interpretation. As we shall see ia chapter l, the
Cultural-Historical School rejects this approach. It is
also in this connection that the distinction between
"behavior" and "actions" is at times put forward. Beha-
vior and action are the two extremes of a continuüm
that runs from natural reflexes (behavior) to inten-
tional, potentially conscious actions. Ultimalely,
actions become automatisms and habits. The advantage of
this is that they can be executed quickly and with
little efforts. A disadvantage is that the subject is
no longer capable of easily changing those actions. We
are then dealing with "petrified regularity" (Habermas)
or "fossilized behavior" (Vygotskij) which can only be
made intentional again through conscious insight. It is
characteristic of behavioral processes {for example
psycho-physiological reflexes) that the individual is
not usually considered responsible for them. At times,
however, it is possible to have the individual gain
conscious control of these seemingly autonomous proces-
ses, for example through bio-feedback. Throughout the
entire continuüm, first nature ("behavior") and second
nature ("actions") are indissolubly intertwined.
The above is closely related to the third problem,
the problem of human capacity for change. Critical
psychologists attempt to demonstrate that much seeming-
ly "fossilized" behavior can, in fact, be altered. If
individuals are only conscious of their status, such
behavior can once again be made intentional. It is as
yet unclear how far it is possible to move along the
continuüm in the direction of (seemingly) biologically
determined forms of behavior in exposing them as "cul-
tural actions". The three schools to be discussed in
this book are quite optimistic in this regard. And it
must be said that in view of the large variations in
culture uncovered by cross-cultural research, this
optimism ha s yet to be refuted. The problem, however,
is that the above does not necessarily mean that it is
easy for a single individual to change. One need only
be reminded of the wolf-children to realize how vari-
able, but also irreversible human behavior can be. Both
the Cultural-Historical School (chapter I) and the
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Berlin School (chapter II) have been intensely occupied
with the questioii of the human "biological and cultural
inheritance".
THE IKFLUENCE OF CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Ia the preceding paragraphs, we have mentioned a
number of psychology's major problems. We also rcention-
ed a nuraber of the critical-psychological positioas on
these matters. Remarkably, however, these critical
schools have yet to play a significant role in the
discussion on the crisis in psychology. As yet, a full
account has never been given of the possibilities and
the limits of critical psychology in finding a solution
to the crisis. The work of Riegel (see chapter III)
provides an important initiative In this regard, but
the account of this American psychologist of critical
schools outside the United States is very brief indeed.
In the one reference hè rnakes to Holzkamp, and then in
a footnote (1978, p.243), Riegel cites the language
barrier as the probable cause for this general neglect,
in particular for hardly devoting any attention at all
to the representatives of the Cultural-Historical
School. One would almost erroneously assume that such
European philosophers and psychologists as Sève, Loren-
zer, Habermas, Holzkamp and Vygotskij had little to
contribute to the combating of the crisis in contempo-
rary psychology. This disregard for the critical ap-
proach is, however, partially the result of the rela-
tively esoteric style of the abovementioned researchers.
It is also partially based on the caricature people
have of critical psychology. It is equated with a
primitive form of "vulgar Marxism", in which slogans
take the place of any scientific approach. It is pre-
sumed that a dialectical psychology would devote exclu-
sive attention to the material foundations of society,
reducing the human being to a tooi of economie forces.
In this book, we hope to show that this is a distorted
view of the matter. We believe that despite all the
qualifications that can and should hè made with respect
to the views expressed in critical psychology, there is
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no justificatioa for the fact that they have been
almost entirely ignored in the discussion on the uni-
versally feit need for a reorientation in psychology.
Obviously, critical psychology cannot provide any
well-tested means of combating the crisis; too few of
its ideas have been brought into practice. But the
critical schools do attempt to systematically analyze
the causes of the present crisis, and their suggestions
for solving the crisis merit at least serious atten-
tion. However, the idea that progress is only possible
through constructive criticism applies to critical
psychology as well, and we have made no attempt to
conceal such criticism when appropriate.
As we said earlier, there are various critical
schools in European psychology. We mentioned Sève's
French school. We also referred to Lorenzer's psycho-
analytically inspired school and Habermas' Frankfurt
School, which more and more has begun to complement its
sociological approach with a psychological one. There
is more, then, to critical psychology than just a
discussion of Vygotskij's Cultural-Historical School,
Holzkamp's Berlin School and Riegel's Dialectical
Psychology. We chose to discuss these three schools,
however, because they have demonstrated what the con-
sequences are of their theoretical points of view in
terras of concrete psychological research. In addition,
these points of view are expressed in the statistical
analysis (see chapter II), and the experimental design
(see chapter III) of their studies as well. To what
extent these ideas have lasting value is a subject we
shall be discussing in the chapters in question. In
contrast, the schools taking shape around the work of
Sève, Lorenzer and Haberraas still appear to be liager-
ing in the stage of purely theoretical reorientation.
They have not yet reached the stage of concrete appli-
cations into experimental designs or statistical ana-
lyses. We therefore believe at this point, a critical
analysis of the work of Vygotskij, Holzkamp and Riegel
is by far the most interesting for psychologists.
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THREE MAIN CURRENTS
In closing this introduction, we shall briefly go
into a number of facets of these three schools. It is
appropriate to begin a book on critical psychology with
a chapter on the oldest and most extensive critical-
psychological school, the Cultural-Historical School.
Tuis school arose in the Soviet Union as a reaction to
the dilemma "understanding" versus "explanation" raging
in psychology at the beginning of this century. Dissa-
tisfied with a division of labor in which lower, re-
flexive behavior was studied by psychologists oriented
towards the natural sciences and the higher processes
(creativity, thought, problem-solving, etc.) by psycho-
logists with a phenomenological orientation, Vygotskij
preached the third approach of a causal, i.e. "natural
scientific" analysis of the higher psychological pro-
cesses as well, This, then, would be a way of mending
the rift in psychology. Central to this analysis was
the notion that higher psychological processes are
developed through culture and that therefore, their
origins and developraent can be followed and analyzed
each time anew. Vygotskij's analyses of the origins of
higher functions in human history have produced inter-
esting viewpoints on the organization of the brain,
early cognitive development, education, intelligence,
consriousness etc. In this connection, it is also of
interest to investigate, from a methodological point of
view, how the Cultural-Historical School conducted
their research. In doing so, we can see that in parti-
cular, Holzkamp's Critical Psychology has considerably
expanded upon the Cultural-Historical School's methodo-
logical arsenal.
In the last decade, the Berlin School of Critical
Psychology has undergone a tumultueus development. In
the United States, Brandt (1979), in particular, has
devoted some attention to the early critical and con-
structivistic work of Klaus Holzkamp. In the seventies,
however, Holzkamp's enormous productivity and enthou-
siaste quickly raised this Berlin School above the level
of pure criticism of traditional theories and methodo-
logy. Inspired by the Cultural-Historical School, in
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particular the work of A.N. Leont'ev, hè and his asso-
ciates have worked on a comprehensive raethodology for
psychological research, in which the formulation of
theories and hypotheses is subjected to methodological
criteria. Traditional psychology lacks an inductive
logic of the context of discovery, so that in the very
decisive, initial stage of the research process, metho-
dology leaves the researcher to his own devices. In
research practice, this bas resulted in an almost
anarchistic "accuomlation" of scientific knowledge,
which in and of itself may be regarded as one of the
most important causes of the present crisis. By raeans
of the fuactional-historical method, the Berlin School
proposes to meet the researcher's detnands for a more
regimented means of formulating theories and concepts.
In addition, this school has also had a great deal to
say about the stage in which theories and hypotheses
are tested, for which (somewhat adapted) empirical
methods as the experiment, action research and statis-
tical techniques play a vital role.
As did Berlin Critical Psychology, Dialectical
Psychology also linked up (via Rubinstejn) with the
ideas of the CulturaI-Historical School. The important
initiator of this American variant of Critical Psycho-
logy was Klaus Riegel. Based upon the work of Rubin-
stejn, and in contrast to that of Piaget, hè attempted
to design a developroental psychology covering every
phase of life. Development is interpreted dialectically
as the result of conflicts or asynchronisms between the
four most important aspects of human existence, i.e.
the internal-biophysical, the individual-psychological,
the cultural-social and the external-physical aspects.
Dialectical Psychology wishes to understand the chang-
ing individual in a changing society and, in the area
of methodology, calls for a subject-subject relation-
ship between researchers and the participants in their
experiments. But in contrast to Berlin Critical Psycho-
logy, this does not result in an uuequivocal preference
for action research. The dialecticians do, however,
agree on the importance of a sociology of psychological
knowledge, in this case an approach through ideology-
critique, in which an investigation is made of the
historical and sccial context of psychological theo-
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ries. To our mind, the dialectical ideas are not, in
all instanees, formulated with equal clarity aor de-
veloped in equal detail. But they have drawn such
enthousiastic reactions in the United States that a
further inspection of these ideas would appear desi-
rable. The most important merit of this school is
without doubt that it has resulted in a renewed in-
terest in the study of the philosophical and methodo-
logical foundations of psychology.
PART I
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CRITICAL
PSYCHOIOGY
Chapter I: The Cultural-Historical School
INTRODUCTION
Lev Semenovic Vygotskij may be regarded as the
foundet of the cultural-historical theory. He was of
the saaie gene ra t ion as the Swiss Jean Piaget, but
unlike the latter has yet to achieve a place in most
introductory textbooks. There are several reasons for
this. Firstly, of course, there is the language pro-
blem. Only very few Western psychologists can read
Russian and but a fraction of Vygotskij's work has been
translated into English. His best known work is, of
course, "Language and Thought". Onfortunately, this is
a drastically abridged version of the original, in
which nearly all references to its philosophical (Mar-
xist) backgrounds have been deleted. The serious stu-
dent raust therefore rely upon the original o r other
translations (see Vygotskij, 1982b, 1977a). A lot of
the literature published in English caa be found in
Vygotskij (1978). Recently, Wertsch in particular has
done much to clarify and propagate Vygotskij's legacy
(Wertsch, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981a, 1981b). A second
complication in evaluating Vygotskij is the volume of
his collected works. In approximately ten years, Vy-
gotskij wrote some two hundred articles and books on
the snost diverse subjects. Even in the Soviet Union,
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all his work has not yet been published. Only when his
collected works have been published in their entirety
will it be possible to make a balanced evaluation of
Vygotskij's contribution to psychology. For this chap-
ter, only three (Vygotskij 1982a, 1982b, 1983) of a
total of six volumes were available to us. Finally, a
correct evaluation of Vygotskij's significance to
psychology is hindered by the fact that his work is
closely interwoven with a philosophical background
relatively unknown in the West. Vygotskij was not ouly
a psychologist, but a methodologist and a philosopher
as well. He atterapted to chart out a new vision of psy-
chology with a foundation in Marxist-Leninist thought.
Some knowledge of the work of Hegel, Marx, Engels en
Lenin is therefore indispensable when reading Vygots-
kij's work.
In this chapter, we shall expound upon the main
theses of the Cultural-Historical School, based upon
the euipirical research and ideas of the men who inau-
gurated this psychological school: Vygotskij, Lurija
and Leont'ev. Most attention by far will be devoted to
the figure of Vygotskij, being the great theoretician
and inspirer of the three. In the 20's and 30's cer-
tainly, the merit of Leont'ev and Lurija was more in
their conducting competent empirical research than in
constructing new theoretical conceptions. Only later
did Lurija (see Cole, 1978) and Leont'ev (see Wertsch,
1981b) set out on their own courses and in fact, it is
still being investigated how the three researchers
influenced one another (Radzichovskij and Chomskaja,
1981). In discussing the Cultural-Historical School, it
is our assumption that it is incorrect to separate the
psychological ideas of this school from its philosophi-
cal background. Although these ideas are quite valuable
on their own, many of the epistemological and methodo-
logical notions bound up in Vygotskij's work would be
missed if their philosophical background were ignored.
But we are not attempting to provide a more or less
complete description of the socio-economic, ideological
and political circumstances under which the Cultural-
Historical School developed. Such an externalistic
description is beyond both our competence and the scope
of this book. For this, the reader may consult, for
CU1TURAL-HISTORICAL SCHOOL 15
example, Bauer (1952), McLeish (1975), Kolakowski
(1981) or Joravsky (1961). Our main objective here is
to exhibit the viability of the ideas of Vygotskij and
hls associates, However, for a better understanding of
his ideas, we shall devote the first part of this
chapter to a rather extensive look at their historical
background.
L.S. VYGOTSKIJ. PERIODS IN HIS WORK
It is beyond question that Lev Seraeaovic Vygotskij
made an unforgettable impression upoti his contempora-
ries. Those associated with him in the 20's and 30's
speak of hira in almost lyrical terms, even decades
afterward. Zaporozec, who met Vygotskij as a student
and was later associated with him at the Second State
University of Moscow and at the Krupskaja Academy for
Communist Education, compared Vygotskij to a "fire-
spitting smelt-oven", continually emitting new ideas,
new conceptions, new hypotheses, new original experi-
mental plans (Zaporozec, 1966, p.180). Lurija is, if
possible, even more laudatory and calls Vygotskij a
genius: "Through more than five decades in science I
never again met a person who even approached his clear-
ness of raind, his ability to lay bare the essential
structure of complex problems, his breadth of knowledge
in many fields, and his ability to foresee the future
development of his science" (Lurija, 1979b, p.38).
Apart frotn this, it is clear that Vygotskij was an
extremely versatile thinker and enormously energetic.
Vygotskij was born on November 5th, 1896 at Orsja, a
village in White Russia northeast of Minsk. He attended
the Gymnasium at Gomel, graduating in 1913 with a gold
medallion. After this, hè studied law, literature,
philosophy and psychology in Moscow. In 1917 hè gradu-
ated with a specialization in literary science and very
quickly began to publish. In order to see Vygotskij's
publications in the proper light, it is important to
realize that hè underwent a pronounced development in
which four more or less clearly delineable periods can
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be distinguished. In discussing a number of themes from
Vygotskij's work in the rest of this chapter, we shall
also have to take into account the period in which
these themes were dealt with.
The first period, running from approximately 1917
to 1924, is marked by the book "The Psychology of Art"
(1971). The second period runs from 1924 to 1927. In
this period, Vygotskij attempts to develop an objective
psychology. To this end, hè analyzes, among others,
fundamentally differing psychological schools of that
period, resulting in the marvelous essay "The Histori-
cal Significance of the Psychological Crisis" (Vygots-
kij, 1927: in Vygotskij, 1982a). In the third period,
which can be estimated from approximately 1927 tot
1930/31, Vygotskij developed his famous cultural-histo-
rical theory of the development of the higher psycholo-
gical functions. And finally, in 1930/31, Vygotskij
shifts his attention to the problems surrounding
thought and speech and the development of these proces-
ses during child development. This research culminated
in his 'unfinished', the well-known "Thought and Lan-
guage" (1962). Only this last book has been exteasively
studied in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is therefore not
surprising that this last, fourth period is regarded as
his most important one by Western (but also some So-
viet) researchers, also because in "Thought and Lan-
guage" there are a number of interesting changes in
Vygotskij's research. For example, Vygotskij shifted
his attention from the cognitive factors in children's
thought and speech to the emotional and rootivational
factors and began to concentrate his research upon the
meaning (znacenie) of words instead of the words as
such.
The third period is also geuerally acknowledged as
being very important, as in this period Vygotskij
formulated his famous cultural-historical theory (see
below). It is the cultural-historical theory that is
still regarded as the most important psychological and
educational theory in the Soviet Union. At present, the
cultural-historical theory's influence is mostly feit
through Leoat'ev's theory of activity (dejatel'nostnyj
podchod). For some time, there has been a debate on the
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differences between the theories and their respective
merits (see, among other, Asmolow, 1982; Davydov and
Radzichovskij, 19BOatb, 1981; Davydov, Zincenko and
Talyzina, 1982; Radzichovskij, 1982; Luckov and Pevzner,
1981; Wertsch, 1981b). A controversial question, for
example, is whether Leont'ev's concept of activity
should be regarded as an important complement to and
correction of Vygotskij's theory (A.A. Leont'ev) or
whether the notion of "activity" is one Vygotskij may
never have mentioned but, in essence, had already dealt
with (V.V. Davydov). Though it is therefore logical to
regard the third and fourth phases of Vygotskij's work
as the most important ones, it is now also beginning to
be realized that a correct evaluation of bis work is
impossible without thoroughly investigating the first
two phases. We shall therefore now provide some infor-
mation on these first two periods of Vygotskij's work.
The First Period
Several authors, for example Hydén (1978, 1980),
Mecacci (1976), Jarosevskij and Gurgenidze (1977; 1981,
1982) and Leont'ev (1982) place the first phase of
Vygotskij's scientific development at about 1917 to
January 1924, when hè began to worfc at the Moscow
Institute of Psychology under the directioa of Kornilov
(see Lurija, 1979b for background). At that point,
Vygotskij's career begins as a psychologist in the
strict sense of the word. Not a great deal is known
about this first period. We do know (Leont'ev, 1982;
Lurija, 1979b) that Vygotskij studied law and philoso-
phy. He was also interested in theatrical sciences and
wrote reviews of theatrical performances, ïn addition,
hè taught at a teacher's college at Gomel and spoke at
seminars on political economy. He founded the literary
magazine "Verask" in which hè published his first
literary-psychological studies. His main theme was to
study the classics of world literature, for example the
works of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Shakespeare. In doing
so, his primary objective was to uncover the psycholo-
18 CRITICA! PSYCHOLOGY
gical laws at the basis of the aesthetic experience a
reader has when enjoying a good book. As we know, this
study resulted in his "The Psychology of Art" (1925).
It would seem that this literary period in Vygotskij's
work is not of particularly great importance to psycho-
logy and education. Yet this is not the case. The
important role language (signs) plays in Vygotskij's
cultural-historical theory can, in part, be explained
through his literary studies. "All the basic systeras of
psychological functions are dependent upon the level
the child has reached in the developraent of word mean-
ings", Vygotskij writes in 1932 (in Vygotskij, 1982b,
p.415). A book such as "Thought and Language" could not
have been written without this literary schooling.
Several of the ideas expressed in this book are now
traced to the work of the Russian linguist Potebnja.
Among other things, this researcher from the Humboldt
school had already expressed the idea of the various
historical origins of thought and speech (as discussed
by Vygotskij in chapter 4 of his "Thought and Langua-
ge") and expounded the notion that the word or sign
should be seen as a tooi or instrument of thought (see
Potebnja, 1922 and Piskun and Tkacenko, 1981). More
than once, Wertsch has also pointed to the importance
of the semiotic aspect of Vygotskij's work (Wertsch,
1979, 1980, 1981a).
In addition to this linguistic influence, the
first period in Vygotskij's work is of particular
importance in that hè made acquaintance with classical
German philosophy and with Marxist writings. We shall
later see how this acquaintance influenced his cul-
tural-historical theory. Finally, Vygotskij absorbed
himself in this period in the work of Descartes and
Spinoza. As we know, hè wrote an essay on the signifi-
cance of the work of these two philosophers for psycho-
logy, which will be published in the last volume of the
Collected Works. In particular, Vygotskij saw Descartes
as the founder of dualism in psychology and education.
The division between a descriptive (Verstehende) ap-
proach, examining the higher processes of the human
psyche, and an objective approach, dealing with the
lower processes, has its origin in Descartes' division
between the res cagitans and the res extensa (see
.
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below). Within Soviet psychology, this analysis has
also been endorsed by Rubinstejn (see Payne, 1968). On
the other hand, Spinoza fascinated Vygotskij especially
because of his monistic and deterministic analysis of
the psychophysical problem (Vygotskij, 1970; Van der
Veer, 1983a).
The Second Period
The second period in Vygotskij's work is charac-
terized by the intensive study of the psychological and
educational literature of his age, among others psycho-
analysis, the available works of Piaget, Gestalt psycho-
logy» philosophical education etc. (see below). In this
period, it is striking how reflexological and reactolo-
gical Vygotskij's ideas still are. This influence is
also to be seen in his evaluation of the work of some-
one as Thorndike, whom Vygotskij extols, and in his
notion of what education is. In 1926, for example, hè
still wrote; "That is why the psychologist is quick to
define education as a process of the accumulation and
elaboration of conditional reactions, a process of the
adaptation of inherited behavior to environmental
conditions, a process of the creation of new relation-
ships betueen organisra and environment, that is, a
process determined at every point" (in: Vygotskij,
1982a, p.192). About 1930, Vygotskij would have very
different things to say about education. "Education can
be defined as the artificial development of the child.
Education influences not only one or another develop-
mental process, it also restructures all behavioral
functions in the most fundamental way" (in: Vygotskij,
1982a, p.107). Despite the great differences between
the two quotations, it is true that they have as coromon
element the regulatory influence of the environment.
And it is this underscoring of the social determination
of education that prevented Vygotskij from becoming a
complete reactologist, reflexologist or behaviorist. In
this second period, hè criticizes Thorndike for almost
entirely ignoring "the social aspect of education ... .
Education is directed from teacher to pupil, and is
always extremely individualistic and is reminiscent of
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... an educational duet between teacher and pupil"
(Vygotskij, 1926, in: Vygotskij, 1982a, p.180).
Finally, this period is concluded with an extreme-
ly interesting, approximately one hundred aad fifty
page essay entitled "The Historical Significance of the
Psychological Crisis. A Hethodological Study" (Vygots-
kij, 1927, in: Vygotskij, 1982a). In this study we
encounter Vygotskij as an accomplished philosopher of
science aad methodologist. Implicitly or explicitly
such burning questions as the relationship between
theory and practice, the role of the experiment and
methodology, and the iriternalisra-externalism question
with respect to the development of a science are all
reviewed. And Vygotskij's treatment of these probleras
has a surprisingly up-to-date ring to it. His criti-
cism, for example, of the enjpiricist tendencies in
psychology is still defensible. While thousands of
miles away, Carnap and others we re laying the foun-
dations for logical-positivistn, Vygotskij was already
undermining a number of its suppositions. He argued,
for example, that in principle, an objective, atheo-
retical registration of pure facts is impossible.
Vygotskij: "In a very disguised fonn, and iraperceptibly
to researchers themselves, theoretical suppositions en-
tirely detennine the way empirical data are interpreted:
the interpretation of the facts obtained through obser-
vation in accordance with the theory one or another
author supports" (Vygotskij, 1927, in: Vygotskij,
1982a, p.342). Vygotskij also contests the notion that
such sciences as physics are concerned with a process
of objective registration, finished off by a blind
induction procedure. "The scientific study of facts
distinguishes itself from registration in that it is an
accumulation of concepts, transaction of concepts aad
facts with gains on the concept side" (o.c., p.317) and
"In this way, physics studies the very things that are
invisible to the eye ... But that is exactly the point,
that scientific knowledge and direct observation do not
coincide at all" (o.c., p.343). "It is usually said:
history interprets traces of the past, but with the
help of Instruments, physics observes the invisible as
directly as the eye. The instruraents are the extended
orgaas of the scientist: microscope, telescope, tele-
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phone, etc., make the indirect experience a research-
object and make the invisible visible: physics does not
interpret, it sees. But this notion is erroneous"
(o.c., p,345).
Later, hè posits that there is no fundantental
difference between the use of instruments in physics
and interpretation in psychology. The use of a certain
instrument means the endorsement of a certain theory of
perception, we would say today (see chapter II). As
does the eye, the instrument selects certain phenomena
"... both are selective organs ... So that scientific
knowledge's overstepping the boundaries of the obser-
vation is rooted in the psychological essence of ob-
taining knowledge itself." (Vygotskij, 1982a, p.348).
Vygotskij is conviaced that a registration-induction
procedure can never lead to scientific knowledge, that
we are dealing here with a fiction. Firstly, this
"registration" is always a selection based upon theore-
tical notions already available. Secondly, Vygotskij
posits that the origin of a certain phenomenon can only
be understood through an analysis, a reconstruction of
ideas after the fact. Here, hè even inclines at tiraes
towards a constructivistic notion of science. "How do
the sciences act in studying that which is not directly
evident to us?", Vygotskij vonders. "Generally speak-
ing, they construct, create the object of study by the
method of explalning or interpreting its influence, in
other words indirectly" (o.c., p.344). It is also
interesting to note the role Vygotskij reserves for the
experiment in this (re)construction. Though we know
that hè was sharply critical of the experiment as it
was then conducted (Van der Veer, 1983b), hè certainly
does not reject it. "It might appear that analysis,
like the experiment, distorts reality. Hence the de-
mands of authenticity and naturalness made upon the
experiment. If this idea goes farther than the techni-
cal requirement of not frightening off what we are
investigating, it leads to absurdity. The strength of
the analysis lies in the abstraction as the strength of
the experiment in artificiality" (o.c., p.406).
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In this essay, Vygotskij's notions conceruing the
role of observation and the instrument in particular
have an umnistakably modern ring to them. Many years
later, sirailar statements were made, for exaoiple by
Lakatos and Feyerabend (see chapter II). Acquaintance
with this study, then, is in itself quite interesting.
In addition, Vygotskij's methodological thesis has
influenced bis psychological research for the cultural-
historical theory. Later, as well, we see that Vygots-
kij confines and qualifies the role of observation in
psychological research, and emphasizes theory. Readers
at all familiar with the work of Marx and Engels will
have recognized many of Vygotskij's statements. In
their epistemology, there was, for example, also no
objective registration of data. Marx states that per-
ception is itself a component of man's practical rela-
tionship to the world, so that its object is not simply
"given" by indifferent nature (Kolakowski, 1981, p.142).
In the paragraphs to follow, the influence of Marx and
Engels on Vygotskij's work will be apparent many times.
First, however, we shall discuss Vygotskij's relation-
ship to the most important psychologists of his t i m e -
VYGOTSKIJ'S CONTEMPORARIES
"It is probably impossible to assess all the in-
fluences on us as we undertook a grand revision of
psychology back in early 1925 ..." writes Lurija in his
intellectual autobiography (Lurija, 1979b, p.41). An
exaraination of the crisis in psychology to be described
later in this chapter indicates that Vygotskij, Lurija
and Leont'ev read practically all the important publi-
cations in the area of philosophy and psychology. For
example, they were, of course, familiar with the ideas
of such thinkers from the objective school within
psychology as Wundt, Ebbinghaus and Fechner. On the
other hand, they were also very conversant with the
ideas of James and Dewey and with those of such pheno-
menological psychologists as Dilthey and Spranger. "I
wanted a psychology that would apply to real people as
they live their lives, not an intellectual abstraction
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in a laboratory ... I looked for alternatives in the
books of scholars who were critical of laboratory-based
psychology. Here I was influenced by the work of the
German neo-Kantians, men like Sickert, Windelband and
Dilthey." Lurija was particularly attracted to the
ideas of Dilthey concerning a realistic psychology, but
influenced by Rickert's criticism, hè later realized
that a descriptive approach in psychology is insuffi-
cient (Lurija, 1979b, p.22 ff).
Freud
One of the most important psychological schools of
that time was composed of adherents of the psychoana-
lytic theory of Freud, Jung and Adler. We know that
Vygotskij and Lurija assumed a rather balanced attitude
towards psychoanalysis. Originally, Lurija was enthou-
siastic: "Sigmund Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams
and several other of nis early books had been translat-
ed into Russian, and other writings of his, as well as
of Alfred Adler and G.C. Jung (including his Studies of
Oiagnostïc Association) were available in German. Many
of Freud's ideas seemed speculative and somewhat fan-
tastic to me, but the study of emotional conflicts and
complexes using the method of associatons seemed pro-
mising. Here, I thought, was a scientific approach that
combined a strongly deterministic explanation of con-
crete, individual behavior with an explanation of the
origins of complex huraan needs in terms of natural
science. Perhaps psychoanalysis could serve as the
basis for a scientific rea2e psychologie, one that
would overcome the nomothetic-idiographic distinction"
(Lurija, 1979b, p.23). Lurija even established a small
psychoanalytic circle and corresponded with Freud
himself. In the years that followed, Lurija's interest
led to a number of analyses of psychiatrie patients
with the aid of Jung1s method of free association. He
also wrote a number of articles on psychoanalysis and
started a book that would never be completed (Lurija,
1925, in: Cole, 1978). "But I finally concluded",
Lurija wrote, "that it was an error to assume that one
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eau deduce human behavior frora the biographical 'depths'
of asind, excluding its social 'heights'." (Lurija,
1979b, p.24).
Cole notes that this reversal was attributed to
two factors: firstly, Vygotskij's influence and second-
ly, the growing conviction that Marxism and psychoana-
lysis were uot compatible (Cole in: Lurija, 1979b,
p.203). And iadeed, Vygotskij's criticism was scathing.
He believed Marxism and psychoanalysis to be incompa-
tible and that enuraerating the fonnal logical simi-
larities of the two approaches, or combiaing them
eclectically was only possible by ignoring the essence
of both approaches. In 1927, hè makes a sarcastic
assault on the fragment of Lurija's book mentioned
above. In this study, entitled "Psychoanalysis as a
systera of monistic psychology", published in a volume
edited by Kornilov, Vygotskij accused Lurija of arrang-
ing the "coincidence" of the two approaches by means of
a series of "extremely naïve reforms." Vygotskij re-
proaches his associate for not having conducted a more
thorough methodological analysis and concluding that
psychoanalysis and Marxism coincided "without any
analysis of Freud's basic concepts, without a critical
weighing or examination of his suppositions and assump-
tions, without a critical elucidation of the origins of
his ideas, even without asking the simple question of
how hè himself conceived of the philosophical founda-
tions of his system, but by the simple forma! logical
accumulation of characteristics" (Vygotskij, 1927, in:
Vygotskij, 1982a, p.331).
This is not to say that Vygotskij's attitude to
psychoanalysis was entirely negative. He found Freud an
extremely interesting thinker and endorsed many of
Freud's discoveries, although regularly rejecting his
interpretations. Concerning the unconscious, for exam-
ple, Vygotskij writes: "and we therefore do uot believe
that in psychology it is entirely justified to speak of
the psychological conscious and the psychological
unconscious: the unconscious is the potentially cons-
cious" (1930, in: 1982a, p.146). In his interpretation
of the unconscious, however, Vygotskij tends towards
the notion of Watson. As we know, Watson had asserted
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that what Freud called the unconscious was essentially
non-verbal. We cannot remember occurrences from our
early childhood because language was not yet available
to us as an efficiënt method of storing experiences.
According to Watson, it is the weakness of psychoanaly-
sis that it attempts to exert influence upon non-verbal
processes with the aid of verbal expedients. As spe-
culative a notion as that of the death-wish is also
received favorably by Vygotskij. In a preface to one of
the approximately six books of Freud's translated into
Russian, hè defends the necessity of this uotion (p.16),
"In doing so, I did not declare Freud's solution to
this equation to be a main road in science, nor a road
everyone could follow, but to be an Alpine path above
the abysses for those unaffected by dizziness. I stated
that science also needs such books: they do not uncover
any truths, but accelerate the search for truths,
though as yet none have been found. I also stated reso-
lutely that the significance of this book is not depen-
dent upon the actual inspection of its validity. In
principle, the problem is posed correctly. And posing
such questions, I said, requires more creativity than
the subsequent observation according to the Standard
method of whatever science." (Vygotskij, 1927, in:
Vygotskij, 1982a, p.336). It is clear from these words
that it was not only Lurija that had a great apprecia-
tion of Freud.
So al though both lurija and Vygotskij were not
blind to the value of depth psychology, they were
ultimately convinced that the emphasis upon the biolo-
gical nature of the human being such as found in Freud's
work does not do justice to the phenomena in question.
Vygotskij, indeed, emphasized the social origin of
higher psychological processes. Apart from that, it is
remarkable that both Vygotskij and his great opponent
in the area of child development, Jean Piaget, were
influenced by Freud and that Vygotskij often criticizes
Freud's ideas through Piaget.
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Piaget
It is apparent that Vygotskij was impressed by the
importance of the work of the young Piaget, not oaly
because on several occasions hè extols Piaget directly,
but also by virtue of the fact that in reality, a large
portion of his "Thought and Language" consists of a
polemic with this Swiss researcher. Vygotskij had great
admiration for the precision with which Piaget uncover-
ed the singular nature of children's thought and for
the wealth of factual material this made available to
psychology. But hè did often interpret this factual
information in an entirely different fashion. The main
therae of the polemic between Piaget and Vygotskij
concerns the role of the biological and social aspects
of the child's psychological development. With respect
to Piaget's notion of the development of thougbt, for
example, Vygotskij writes as follows: "In this connec-
tion, Piaget's conception is utterly simple. Along with
the psychoanalysis of S. Freud and that of E. Bleuler
associated with him, Piaget assumes that the first
stage in the development of child thought is thought
guided by the pleasure principle. In other words, the
young child thinks with the same objective as lies
behind all its other activities, that is to obtain
pleasure. In this regard, Piaget, like Freud and Bleu-
ler, presents the thought of the young child as an
exclusively biological activity of a partly instinctive
nature, directed towards the obtainment of pleasure.
But the more the child develops, the more continual are
the conflicts with the social environment, demanding
adaptation to an adult's way of thinking. The interac-
tion of the child with its surroundings requires it to
understand the thought of others, to reply to that
thought, to communicate its own thought. From all these
types of social interaction develops the process Piaget
so expressively called the socialization of children's
thought. The process of the socialization of children's
thought is reminiscent of the process of the "sociali-
zation of private property". Child thought as something
belonging to the child, constituting its "private
property" as a particular biological individual, is
supplanted, replaced by modes of thought thrust upon it
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by its surroundings" (Vygotskij, 1932, in: Vygotskij,
1982b, p.403-404).
In a few sentences, Vygotskij here sketches the
Piagetian notion hè would also contest in "Thought and
Language". In his view, the child is not by nature a
biological individual later to be socialized under
pressure from its environment. In later paragraphs, we
shall see that to Vygotskij, the child is far sooner
social by nature, developing through interactions with
adults. He classifies the stage of a-social, primitive
biological development, encountered in Freud, Bleuler
and Piaget, as being within the realm of fiction. It
should be noted, of course, that Vygotskij's criticism
concerns Piaget's early work (Piaget, 1923, 1927, 1933;
see also Gulutsan, 1967).
Pavlov
To fiad a solid objective basis for psychology,
Vygotskij, Lurija and Leont'ev turned to Pavlov's
research into higher nervous activity. "The basic
structural units that produced adaptive adjustments to
the environment were then being studied by Pavlov and
his co-workers at their experimental station near
Leningrad. Pavloviaa psychophysiology provided a mate-
rialistic underpinning to our study of the mind."
(Lurija, 1979b, p.41). From the early writings of
Vygotskij and his co-workers, it is quite clear that
they were very impressed with Pavlov's research into
the conditioned reflex. In 1924, Vygotskij's view is
that acquired reactions (conditioned reflexes) develop
on the basis of innate reactions (unconditioned reflex-
es) and are themselves, in essence, also combinations
of innate reflexes. The composition of these combina-
tions are entirely dictated by the environment. Vygots-
kij: "It is the very organization of the environment
that also determines the conditions upon which the
formation of new associations depends, the foundation
of anima l behavior. In relation to each of us, the
environment plays the role of the laboratory, in which
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conditioned reflexes are taught to dogs, and which, by
combining and uniting stimuli (raeat, light, bread and
metronome) in a particular way, again and again superb-
ly organizes the animal's behavior. In this sense, the
mechanism of the conditioned reflex is a bridge joining
the biological laws concerning the development of
hereditary adaptations established by Darwin with the
sociological laws established by K. Marx" (1924, in
1982a, p.73). Pavlov's influence on Vygotskij would
last several years at least. It expresses itself, for
example, in the laudatory words hè dedicates in this
period to reflexology, reactology and behaviorism. As
late as 1926, in an introduction to the Russian trans-
lation of Thorndike's "Educational Psychology", hè con-
cludes "that behavior should be regarded as the total
sum of reactions" (1925, in 1982a, p.189). Gradually,
however, Vygotskij and his co-workers recognize more
and more limitations in Pavlov's research.
In the late 20's Vygotskij commented rather ex-
tensively ou the place of Pavlov's physiology in the
study of huraan behavior. He agrees with Pavlov that the
most general principles of higher nervous activity are
identical for huraan and higher animals. But as soon as
we move from the elementary to the complex forms of
higher nervous activity characteristic of human beings,
Vygotskij discerns two different methodological ap-
proaches to studying the features that distinguish
man's complex behavior. The first approach Vygotskij
discerns is that of investigating in humans the same
principles uncovered in studying animals. As does
Pavlov, hè believes that this method (comparative
psychology) should only be applied with the greatest of
caution. There is every likelihood, Vygotskij believes,
that the qualitative difference with animal behavior
will also be expressed in physiological research.
The second approach is actually psychological
research. Here the assumption is that there are speci-
fic forms of human behavior. The first specific aspect
of human behavior lies in its higher complexity and
development, the qualitative and quantitative perfec-
tion of the cerebral hemispheres. But according to
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Vygotskij, the most important difference lies ia the
f act that humans develop new ways of adaptation, dis-
tinguishing them from any animal. Pavlov believed that
the foundation of behavior is signalization. The most
general description of cerehral activity is that it is
signal activity, in other words, that conditioned
reflexes are the basis for the physiology of higher
nervous activity. Vygotskij: "But human behavior is
distinguished by the very fact that man creates arti-
ficial signal stimuli, among which is the 'great sig-
naling capacity' of speech, and thus masters the signal
activities of the cerebral hemispheres. The fundamental
and most general activity of the cerebral hemispheres
in bot h man and animals is signalization; but the
fundaraental and most general activity, distinguishing
man from animals, psychologically speaking, is signi-
fica ti on, i.e. the creation and use of signs" (1977b,
p.62). At this point we shall not go farther into the
distinction between signification and signalization, as
it will be discussed with Vygotskij's cultural-his-
torical theory. It is sufficient at this point to note
that in later years, Vygotskij qualifies the value of
Pavlov's physic logica l research, for it cannot explain
truly human behavior.
Gestalt Psychology
One of the ruost important psychological schools in
the first half of this century was Gestalt psychology,
with its representatives, among others, Koffka, Wert-
heimer, Lewin and Kohier. There was lively interest in
the Soviet Union as well and books and articles of
Kohier and Koffka were traaslated into Russian. Vygots-
kij 's most extensive reaction to the ideas of the
Gestalt psychologists appeared in 1934 as a preface to
the translation of Koffka's "Die Grundlagen der psychi-
schen Entwicklung". He is parti.cularly sympathetic to
Gestalt psychologist's attempts to bridge the methodo-
logical gap in psychology. In this regard, Kohier,
Koffka and others criticize both "mechanistic" and
"vitalistic" psychology. Koffka states that th«
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mechanists conceive of nature as a totality of machin-
es. Human behavior is also reducable to the operation
of a living machine. Ia opposition to the machine-model
of humanity and in opposition to a psychology that
explains the whole of huraan behavior by analyzing the
parts (elements) it is composed of, Koffka posits the
specific character of the totality. The whole is more
than the sum of its parts. The existence of so-called
emergent characteristics makes it impossible to reduce,
as the mechanists do, the complexity of human func-
tions.
From this vantage point, the Gestalt psychologists
also criticize the vitalistic, descriptive psycho-
logists, who also accept the mechanistic approach to
the physical reality, but do not consider it applicable
to human life. Their approach only exists by virtue of
an erroneous coneeption of a physical reality which
they accept with regard to nature but reject with
regard to human life, Vygotskij writes. He is very
sympathetic to this analysis of Gestalt psychology, but
believes that the psychologists of the Gestalt school
themselves have not eluded the evils of reductionism.
Although they reject the atomistic approach of reality
and the reduction erabodied in the machine-model of
humanity, they are guilty of another form of reduction,
namely that of reducing human behavior to animal be-
havior. The Gestalt psychologists saw no fundamental
transition between an animal's ability to solve pro-
blems and that of human beings. To refute this notion,
Vygotskij discusses Kohier's famous experiments design-
ed to determine a chimpanzee's ability to solve complex
problems. At some point in working on a problem, the
chimpanzees appeared to grasp the problem1s inner
relationship through insight. Kohier, however, showed
that in f act, the animals are the slaves of their
visual field. This is a fundamental difference with
human beings. When children are presented with Köhler-
type problems, it is quickly apparent that language
plays a decisive role in their behavior. Vygotskij
claims that the child does not operate in a visual
field but in a semantic field. "As experiments have
shown", Vygotskij writes, "the word liberates the child
from the servile dependence Kohier observed in animals"
(1934, in: 1982a, p.265).
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Vygotskij also reproaches the Gestalt psycholo-
gists for not explaining child development. He states
that for Koffka, Gestalt structures are as character-
istic of the perception of the child as they are of
that of the adult. A fundamental gap cannot be observed
anywhere. In 1924, thus after bis cultural-historical
theory had already been developed, Vygotskij on the
other hand does see fundamental differences between the
perception of the very young child and that of the
adult. There is a transition from passive, direct
perception to active, mediated perception. The young
child, as yet unable to use signs (language), perceives
very differently than the adult, whose perception is
greatly influenced by linguistic concepts. This sarae
development from direct, passive functioning to mediat-
ed, active functioning also occurs in other psycholo-
gical processes such as memory. According to Vygotskij,
the Gestalt principle is thus "anti-historical [for] it
is as applicable to the instinct as to raatheraatical
thought. We must seek that which raises the development
of the child above the Gestalt principle" (Vygotskij,
1934, in: 1982a, p 282).
Finally, Vygotskij rejects a too broad usage of
the notion "Gestalt". This notion had demonstrated its
value in the psychology of perception, but should not
come to be looked upon as a kind of metaphysical cate-
gory in reality. Vygotskij: "Finally, having become a
world view, Gestalt psychology discovered the Gestalt
in physics and chemistry, in physiology and biology,
and the Gestalt, withered down to a logical formula,
proved to be the foundation of the world; when hè
created the world, God spoke, let there be Gestalt - an
everywhere, there was Gestalt" (Vygotskij, 1927, in
1982a, p.307-308).
Despite these critical uotes, Vygotskij had a
great appreciation of this school. Another indication
of this is the association hè developed with Koffka,
who, for example, participated in the research project
in Uzbekistan (see below). Scheerer (1980) has shown
that there was a lively exchange of data between such
Gestalt psychologists as Koffka and Lewin, and Vygots-
kij and Lurija. Only towards the end of the 30's, when
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the cultural-historical theory begaa to assume coacrete
fooo, did Vygotskij and his associates succeed in
escaping the appeal of Gestalt psychology.
Other Influences
In order to complete our picture of Vygotskij's
relationship to the psychology of his time, we shall
briefly discuss a number of other psychological schools,
after which attention will be paid to a number of
influences not strictly of a psychological nature.
What has been said about Vygotskij's attitude
towards Gestalt psychology applies in fact to bis
attitude towards the psychologists from the Wurzburg
school as well (Külpe, Ach, Bühler, and others). Often
using the research data of Bühler in particular, and
just as often rejecting their theoretical interpreta-
tion, Vygotskij continues to criticize them at the
methodological level. He regards Külpe's adherents as
the subjectivistic school in psychology. Kor does
Watson's behaviorism escape Vygotskij's criticism. As
we know, in about 1925, a number of psychologists in
the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to
create an "objective" psychology. ïn particular, they
were opposed to the use of introspective reporting on
internal experiences. In its place, they wished to
initiate a psychology based upon intersubjectively
testable data. In this attempt, the objectively measur-
able reflex gradually received more and more emphasis,
while such raatters as consciousness, difficult as they
are to measure, disappeared from the field. Though
Vygotskij was initially greatly influenced by the
reflexologist movement (witness, araong other things,
the notion of consciousness hè developed at that time),
hè quickly recognized its limitations. As early as
1925, hè criticizes Bechterev's reflexology and the
objective of a "psychology without consciousness". Such
a psychology has the following limitations.
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By placing consciousness beyond the realm of
psychology, important problems of huraan behavior are
lost sight of. In Bechterev's reflexology only the most
elementary reactions are investigated. The attempt to
construct a psychology without consciousness bas also
resulted in the study of only those reactions visible
to the naked eye. Psychology is then "completely power-
less and weak, even in investigating the simplest
problems of human behavior" (Vygotskij, 1925, in:
1982a, p.79). Every fundamental difference betweeu
huraan and animal behavior is erased. Human behavior is
investigated as that of a mammal, while that which is
fundamentally different, brought about by consciousness
and the psyche, is ignored. 11 is clear, Vygotskij
says, that a law of animal psychology cannot be auto-
matically extrapolated to human psychology. In exclu-
ding consciousness from psychology, the dualism and
spiritual i sot of the earlier subjective psychology
remains largely unchanged. It was subjective psycholo-
gy's objective to study the pure, abstract intellect.
In behaviorism, we encounter its counterpart; while
the former studied the psyche without behavior, the
latter studies behavior without the psyche. The dualism
of raind and body remains unaffected (Vygotskij, 1982a,
p.80-81). Finally, Vygotskij states that from a biolo-
gical point of view, those who recognize consciousness,
hut regard it as an unimportaat derivative, are expres-
sing an absurd notion. Why, then, would such a useless
pbenomenon have survived the course of evolution?
At this point, some words should be devoted to two
more diffuse influences every early twentieth century
social scientist unavoidably encountered, namely: the
collection of ideas usually described as romanticism
and the influence upon the social sciences of Darwin's
theory of evolution. As regards the theory of evolu-
tion, Darwin published in the 1860's his "The Origin of
Species", in which hè argued that there was an uninter-
rupted transition between human beings and other ani-
mals. Seen from the vantage point of the biologist,
there is no fundamental difference between animals and
human beings. Accepting the theory of evolution means,
in any case, two things. Firstly, one accepts the
notion that human beings have not always had the same
34 CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
structure and characteristics, but have become what
they are in the course of evolution. Secoadly, one
accepts the importante of comparative study of humans
and animals. With respect to the former consequente,
Vygotskij' s position is as follows: It is true that
humans have undergone a biological evolution. But that
is not what makes them genuinely human. The truly human
processes have developed in a social process. Here, hè
also qualifies the value of comparative psychology (the
second consequente). In distussing the cultural-histo-
rital theory, we will discuss this theory more extensi-
vely and the sharp criticism it has been exposed to
(recently in Bruslinsky, 1979). Suffite it to note here
that while attepting Darwin, Vygotskij (after Hegel and
Engels) still recognizes a fundamental gap between
humans and animals.
As we know, romantitism may be regarded as a
reaction to Kant's rationalism and opposed to the
spirit of the Enlightenment in general. It is charac-
terized by an appeal to human beings' non-intellectual,
emotional powers and an opposition to methanistic
explanations of reality. The trititism of natural
Sciences' tonception of tausal explanation was to have
its influence upon the humanities and the social scien-
ces. From this characterization of romanticism, it will
be clear that Vygotskij, who after all advocated the
ideal of a strictly causal analysis in the social
sciences, feit no affinity with this school. We have
brought up this subject, however, for two reasons.
Firstly because in his educational theory, Vygotskij
(linking up with Hegel) criticized the ideas of Rous-
seau, generally regarded as the precursor of romanti-
cism (Gay, 1973). Secondly because to a certain extent,
romanticism established the conditions without which a
well-founded cultural-historical theory could not have
developed. We refer here to the great interest in the
origins of language, religion and societal fonns that
developed at this time. This interest also initiated
the beginnings of the systematic study of foreign
peoples and cultures. At this point we will suffice
with mentioning that in grounding his cultural-histo-
rical theory of the higher functions, Vygotskij regu-
larly made use of data provided by cultural anthropolo-
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gy (in particular the data of Lévy-Bruhl), a science
with its origins in romanticism.
Here we end our paragraph on Vygotskij's contem-
poraries. Obviously, the above is not at all exhaustive
with respect to the many influences upon and by Vygots-
kij and his associates. For exatnple, separate para-
graphs could be written about the influence of the
philosophies of Feuerbach and Spinoza on Vygotskij's
view of the mind-body dilemma (Van der Veer, 1983a),
about Vygotskij's association with the famous film-
maker Ejsenstejn (Lurija, 1979b, p.207) etc. In these
introductory paragraphs, though, we hope to have pre-
sented the most important of these influences and to
have sketched a picture of the iutellectual setting and
the "Zeitgeist" surrounding the work of Vygotskij and
his associates. We have consciously excluded a discus-
sion of the dialectical tradition in philosophy. Be-
cause it was of such great importance to Vygotskij's
ideas and those of Soviet psychology in general, it
merits a separate paragraph.
THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL
In all likelihood, Vygotskij familiarized hiraself
with the ideas of Hegel primarily through the works of
Marx, Engels and Lenin. We know that these three inter-
preted Hegei's work in their own materialistic way
(Kolakowski, 1981; Krancberg, 1981). In this paragraph,
therefore, we do not pretend to present the only cor-
rect interpretation of Hegei's philosophy. We shall
only deiaonstrate how Vygotskij utilized dialectical
philosophy (see also Markova, 1982).
For a proper understanding of Vygotskij and Soviet
psychology in general, Hegei's notion concerning scien-
tific knowledge is of great importance. Hegel raakes a
distinction between appearance (Erscheinung) or sem-
blance (Schein) and essence (Wesen). With this hè means
that in knowing reality, we first encounter the imme-
diately manifest, the appearance, and only by further
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analysis can we penetrate the essence of phenomena. It
is our task not to dweil on appearances, but to exposé
the essence. This distinction is related to the histo-
rical approach Hegel advocated. He pointed out that the
reality we live in is the product of a lengthy histori-
cal developmental process. During this lengthy process,
humans have as it were moulded reality to their own
ends. To Hegel, reality is a created reality. It is not
iraposed by the laws of nature, but produced by humans
themselves in a concrete historica l process. Hegel
therefore concludes that reality can be altered. In
Hegei's analysis, what at first seemed to be inevitably
dictated by the laws of nature now appears to have been
made by human beings in history. It is the task of
science to exposé the dominion of the so-called "laws
of nature" as semblance and reveal their essence (as
historically determined). Whatever one thinks of the
idea of the distinction between appearance and essence,
it is a fact that it has played au important role in
the dialectical tradition of Soviet psychology (as we
know Marx adopted this distinction). And it is in this
distinction that the Berlin School of Critical Psycho-
logy (see chapter II) found one of its points of de-
parture.
Another important theme for Soviet psychology in
Hegei's doctrine is his notion concerning the relation
between the general (the theory) and the particular
(the empirical, the individual) in knowiag reality. In
this connection, hè is in opposition to the inductive
theory of knowledge of the empiricists and materialists.
According to Hegel every induction contains a theoreti-
cal-deductive moment (compare also E. Cassirer, 1923,
p.237 ff). Unlike in the work of Locke, humans are not
a tabula. rasa, but start with theoretical preaises: the
general (the theory) always precedes the particular.
This criticism of Hegei's especially influenced Vygots-
kij in his work with respect to concept formation.
Recently, the Soviet educationalist V.V. Davydov has
once again attempted to fonnulate an air-tight theory
of concept formation, largely using Hegel as an orien-
tation point (Davydov, 1972).
T
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If we are to see Vygotskij's cultural-historical
theory in its proper context, we must certainly devote
attention to Hegei's anthropology as well. In Hegei's
view of humanity, labor plays a central role. With the
aid of tfais concept, hè attempted to break down the
time-honored division hetween subject aad object. In
the rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz and Wolf, the
eraphasis was placed upon the subject. It was in the
subject, in consciousness, that pure knowledge origin-
ated. In empirieism, it is the object that is central;
the subject is a tabula rasa or nothing more than a
collection of experiences generated by objects. But
according to Hegel, both schools remain trapped in a
subject-object dualism. For Hegel, the subject and the
object cannot be separated: without the subject, no
object and without the object, no subject. He now
presents another category which hè believes better
suited in understanding human beings, the category of
"Tatigkeit" (activity). In Tatigkeit, in labor, subject
and object are involved with one another. If human
beings are to be understood, their daily activity must
be the point of departure. Accordicg to Hegel, it is in
their labor tbat human beings know and change their
world. flere, too, is to be found the human's fundaanen-
tal distinction from and superiority to the anima l.
Unlike animals, human beings are capable of altering
reality according to a certain plan. Here we remember
the famous quotation of Marx: "The spider carries out
operations remeniscent of a weaver and the boxes which
bees build in the sky could disgrace the work of many
architects. But even the worst architect differs from
the most able bee from the very outset in that before
hè builds a box out of boards hè has already construct-
ed it in his head." (Vygotskij, 1978).
Unlike the animal, says Hegel, human beings stand
above reality, which they can alter according to cer-
tain objectives. The world is not a manifest nature, it
is man-made. According to Hegel, human beings are not
doomed, then, to submit passively to existing social
conditions. They can liberate, emancipate themselves
through labor. Labor, defined as changing reality
according to a specific plan, is for human beings a
means of liberating themselves. Hegel calls this the
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externalization of the intellect (the plan). We must
remember here that Hegei's system does not concern the
activity of the individual hut that of the world spirit,
with the individual as its tooi.
In addition to the externalization in the course
of history, the individual also experiences an interna-
lization. In their development (ontogenesis), indivi-
duals absorb the culture created in history by humanity
(phylogenesis) and internalize it. But individuals
themselves need not plod the laborious path of induc-
tion in order to attain the achievements of culture,
repeating phylogenesis in ontogenesis- These are trans-
mitted through language, labor, communieation etc.
Hegel sees this process as follows: In language is
stored information concerning reality. The concepts
adults use express something meaningful about the
organization of reality and these concepts are passed
on to children through rearing and educatian. In doing
so, the adult passes a part of huraanity's cultural
heritage on to the child. It would be nonsensical to
have the child discover everything all over again on
its own (and civilization would be impossible). The
same holds true for tools. The structure and form of
the tooi or instrument reveal something about the
knowledge the tool-maker has about the material to be
processed or to be regarded by the tooi. Knowledge
concerning production has been precipitated in the
tooi. According to Hegel, it is in the process of
acquiring language, in coomunication, in labor and in
the use of tools ("means" in Hegei's terminology) that
human beings acquire the cultural inheritance of their
ancestors.
Finally, a few remarks on Hegei's ideas concerning
education and rearing. To Hegel, education and rearing
are the means by which a child is liberated from the
state of its first nature. In this state, the child
follows its natural urges and impulses. This situation
is ondesirable. Through education, the child must be
brought to its second nature. Then it can function as
an independent human being. But this transition is not
made spontaneously through maturation. It requires good
rearing and good education. It is in particular this
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rejecticm of the idea that a child develops purely
tbrough maturation (sensu Rousseau), and the eraphasis
upon the important role of education and rearing that
Vygotskij was later to absorb into his ideas concerning
developing education and the proximal zone of develop-
ment. We see, then, that Vygotskij adopted many of
Hegei's ideas, making fruitful use of Hegei's philoso-
phy in his epistemology, his anthropology and in his
ideas on rearing and education.
CRISIS IN PSYCHOLOGY
We have just seen what a raotley mixture of psycho-
logical schools existed in Vygotskij's day. But accor-
ding to Vygotskij this is not the whole story. In turn,
all these schools can be categorized into two main
groups, with their own philosophy of science and their
own methodology. On the one hand, there is the objec-
tive, natural science psychology and on the other the
descriptive or phenomenological psychology. According
to Vygotskij, ohjective psychology advocates a natural
scientific philosophy of science. Psychological proces-
ses should be analyzed in terms of cause and effect
relationships. Lower psychological functions lend
themselves best to such a causal analysis, for example
elementary reflexes and conditioned reactions a la
Pavlov. Humans and animals have these lower psychologi-
cal functions in coramon. More complicated are the
higher psychological functions. Some advocates of
objective psychology claim that these higher functions
do lend themselves to causal analysis because all
complex behavior can easily be reduced to a combination
of siraple reactions. They are then advocates of a kind
of reductionism propagated by Watson in early behavio-
rism (compare Giorgi, 1976). Other advocates of objec-
tive psychology claim that higher psychological func-
tions do not lend themselves to causal analysis in the
above sense and therefore elude scientific analysis.
For that reason, objective psychology has primarily
concerned itself with studyiag lower psychological
functions.
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On the other hand, descriptive psychology was
strongly critical of this state of affairs. Because of
its reductionistic ideal of knowledge, objective psy-
chology lost sight of the unique character of hlgher
psychological functions. With higher psychological
functions, they meant such matters as verbal memory,
volition, voluntary attention, etc. (see below). These
are characteristic of human beings. According to Vy-
gotskij, it was acknowledged within descriptive psycho-
logy that a causal analysis of psychological processes
should take the fonn of a reduction to simpler proces-
ses. Objective and descriptive psychology then agree as
regards the analysis of psychological processes. The
descriptive psychologists claim that this form of a
reductionist analysis (which they, along with the
objective school, see as the only possible one) does
not do justice to the higher psychological functions.
To understand the higher functions, they propose empha-
thetic understanding. In this way, it becomes impos-
sible to gain an objective understanding of these
functions, according to Vygotskij unjustly so. We have
seen, then, that a sort of division of labor took
place: the objective natural scientific oriented psy-
chology studies primarily the lower psychological
functions and descriptive psychology concerns itself
with higher processes. At the same time, both schools
agree with respect to the essence of causal aaalysis,
i.e. the reduction of complex processes to simple ones.
How, then, does this agreement come about? According to
Vygotskij, and to someone as Rubinstejn as well, this
occurs because both schools go back to Descartes (Ru-
binstejn, 1977, p.26).
In essence, both schools reraain trapped in a
Cartesian aind-body dualisia. To Descartes1 mind, there
is a contrast between incorporeal, non-spatial thought
(the res co§ritans) and the independently existing world
of spatiality; the corporeal (the res extensa). The
body belongs to the corporeal and is subject to the
laws of mechanics. The mind, however, is only accessi-
ble through inward comtemplation and eludes a nechanis-
tic analysis. According to Vygotskij and Rubinstejn, in
Descartes' doctrine are to be found the origins of the
later division of labor in psychology: on the one hand,
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the noind, only to be observed through introspection, on
the other the body, to be interpreted through mecha-
nics. Vygotskij believes that the distinction betweea
lower aad higher functioas is of essential importance
to psychology (in this sense agreeing with descriptive
psychology), hut believes that the highet functions can
be analyzed within the context of an objective methodo-
logy. To bis mind, the lower fuactions are of a biolo-
gical or "natural" origin aad the higher functions of a
social origin. But that does not mean that the latter
therefore elude causal analysis. In his cultural-histo-
rical theory of the higher functions, Vygotskij ex-
plains how the higher psychological functions can be
analyzed (see the next paragraph, which is based on Van
der Veer and Van Uzendoorn, 1984).
THE CULTURAL-HISTORICA1 THEORY OF
HIGHER PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS
Phylogenesis: Labor
We have already seen that Vygotskij rejects the
approach of reflexologists and behaviorists because
they wish to reduce psychology to the study of "only
the most elementary connections between a living being
and the world" (Vygotskij, 1979b, p.5). He agrees with
so-called descriptive psychology's criticism that in
the behavioristic approach, the higher functions cha-
racteristic of human beings are neglected. On the other
hand, hè rejects descriptive psychology because it
abandons the possibility of causal analysis within
psychology. According to Vygotskij, it must be possible
to practice a psychology that takes the higher psycho-
logical functions seriously and, at the same time,
wishes to explain them causally.
The distinction between lower and higher psycho-
logical processes had been made prior to Vygotskij.
Oswald KUlpe and Wilhelm Wundt, for example, had alrea-
dy written about this distinction. Wundt distinguished
the psychological and the historical methods of re-
search. The latter hè reserved for research into the
T
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higher psychological processes, which to him were those
processes for which parallel physical processes had not
yet been discovered. These were learning, thought,
raemory, volition, etc. The psychology concerned with
studying these processed Wundt called "Völkerpsycholo-
gie". To him, it was impossible to study these proces-
ses experimentally. They would be studied indirectly,
for example by describing the historical development of
language, with the morals, habits, and religieus of
priraitive people to be found in it.
Vygotskij's approach is quite different. In the
first place, hè believed that the higher psychological
processes could be studied experimentally. In the
second place, hè developed a quite original view on the
distinction between lower and higher psychological
processes, consistent with Marxist classics. In order
to understand how huraans' higher psychological proces-
ses developed, we must consider their phylogenesis.
Hegel, Marx and Engels had commented upon it on several
occasions. Having integrated these comments, Vygotskij
developed the following view on hurnan development: At
first, the species developed according to the laws of
biological evolution as formulated by Charles Darwin in
ais "The Origin of Species". All of human's elementary
psychological processes, such as non-verbal thinking,
and eidetic memory, developed during this evolution.
They form the foundation of human behavior. But it is
not these processes that make the human being. They are
shared by humans and animals alike (Vygotskij, 1977b;
1982a; 1982b). The genuinely human processes, that is
the higher psychological processes, cannot be explained
by this biological evolution. They are cultural in
origin. At a particular point, the biological develop-
ment turned into an historical development. As did Marx
and Engels, Vygotskij sets the beginning of this de-
velopment at the time when humans began to work co-
operatively. Work involving division of labor leads to
new forms of behavior that are no longer detertoined by
direct instinctive goals. Lurija (1979a) gives the
example of planting seeds of grain. From a point of
view of immediate satisfaction of physical needs, this
is nonsense. But from the point of view of intentional,
systematic labor, it is an extremely useful activity.
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Through work, huraans control nature and create the
conditions for their own development through purpose-
fui, systematic changes. Moreover, this work is "media-
ted", as opposed to the "unmediated" activity of ani-
mals. Vygotskij draws a direct parallel between the use
of a tooi in labor and the use of a sign in thinking or
remembering. Elementary forras of behavior presuppose a
direct reaction to the task set before the organism,
which can be expressed by the simple S-R formula. Basic
to all higher psychological processes, however, is
mediation, that is the use of sorae intervening instru-
ment or tooi between stimulus and response (see also
the paragraph on research methods). For example, when
one ties a knot in a handkerchief as a reminder, one is
constructing the process of memorizing by forcing an
external object to remind one of something. In elemen-
tary forms of raemory something is remembered; in the
higher forms of memory huraans remember something by the
use of a sign (see Vygotskij, 1978; 1983). Because
huraans create their own environment, which in turn
determines their development, they are, with regard to
their historical development, their own creators. Here
we have an example of Vygotskij's, and more generally,
Soviet psychology's optimistic view of human potential.
It is within this historical development that the high-
er psychological processes, such as abstract thinking
and speech, develop.
Vygotskij saw the following indications of the
validity of hls theory of the development of higher
psychological functions- Firstly, research indicated
that the elementary reactions of primitive and civili-
zed peoples are alike (Vygotskij, 1960; Bozovic, 1977).
Secondly, higher psychological processes, thought in
particular, differ markedly between primitive and
civilized peoples. How can we explain this difference?
It cannot be said that the physiological substratum
differs, for the elementary processes are the same. Ac-
cording to Vygotskij, this means then that cultural
causes are responsible for the differences in thought.
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Phylogenesis: Speech
We have seen that, according to Vygotskij, in
phylogenesis, the change frora the anima l to the huraaa
occurred when humans began to work co-operatively and
systematically. However, a second factor which was as
rouch to determine the distinction between humans aad
animals is the developraent of speech. In the process of
division of labor, the necessity to associate with one
another, to describe certain work situations, leads to
the development of speech. According to Lurija (1979a)
we must imagine this process approximately as follows:
At first, primitive humans raade only undifferentiated
sounds closely related to gestures and practical work
situations. The meaning of the sounds was very depen-
dent on the situation. Gradually, however, a whole
system of differentiated codes developed. The develop-
ment of these codes (in Vygotskij's terminology: signs)
was of great importance to the development of human
consciousness. Indeed, at first humans were strongly
tied to practical situations and reacted to stimuli
from their iranediate surroundings. When the code - or
sign - systems developed, it was possible to think
about situations that were not directly perceptible.
The sign Ce.g. the word) refers to an occurrence or
matter that does not have to be perceptible at the
time. Humans could thus go beyond the boundaries of
sensory experience. Through this, abstract thought
became possible. One could say, without work and lan-
guage there would be no abstract thought.
If the above is true, then it follows that we must
not look for the sources of abstract thought and other
higher processes in the individual, but outside humans
themselves, namely in the cultural forms of human
historical development. Vygotskij: "There is not the
slightest bit of hope of fiuding the origins of pur-
poseful action in the height of the intellect or in the
depths of the brain. The idealistic path of the pheno-
menologists is as hopeless as the positivistic road of
the naturalists. To find the origins of purposeful
action, one must trans eend the liroitations of the
organism. The source of human consiousness and freedom
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should not be sought in the iaternal world of the
intellect, but in the social history of mankind. To
find the soul, we must abandon it."
Ontogenesis: Interna!ization
But how do the higher psychological processes
develop during child development? In child development,
"natural" and cultural developments coincide and inter-
act in complex ways. On the one hand, certain elemen-
tary, biological processes develop during ontogenesis
through maturation. On the other hand, the higher
psychological processes develop in the child through
its social interaction with adults. To Vygotskij, these
two lines of development are fundamentally different
and can actually be distinguished. It is especially in
the first three or four years of life that more or less
"natural" processes are to be found. In his study on
the development of atteution hè writes: "We call this
entire period in the development of the child the
period of natural or primitive development ... because
the development of attention in this period is a func-
tion of the general organizational developraent of the
child - above all, the structural and functional de-
velopment of the central nervous system. The develop-
ment of attention in this period is based purely on the
organic processes of growth, maturation, and develop-
ment of the neurological apparatuses and functions of
the child" (Vygotskij, 1979a).
Vygotskij's account of the development of the
higher psychological processes is as follows. The child
grows up in a society and a culture in whicti sign
system are already available. Children acquire these
sign systems through their social interaction with
adults and through education. To Vygotskij, the notion
of social interaction (obsenie) means two things. There
is immediate social interaction, which we have with
young children. This interaction manifests itself in
cuddling, touching, that is, in affective reactions.
This form of interaction changes, however to mediate(d)
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social interaction as soon as the child is able to use
signs. Although this mediate(d) social interaction
developed frora immediate social interaction, due to the
use of signs it has a character all its own. It is
within this mediate(d) social interaction that the
internalization process takes place. To illustrate this
concept, which has been described more thoroughly
elsewhere (Vygotskij, 1978; Wertsch, 1979), we will
give an example borrowed from Lurija. Imagine that we
wish to know how children learn to jurap consciously. We
cannot direct this process in little children. Now and
then the child jumps and that is all. The mother is not
yet able to elicit the behavior. But at a particular
point, the child becomes able to jump when the mother
requests it. The mother says: "jump" and the child
jmnps. The child then oiakes use of an external stimu-
lus. A bit later in its development, the child is able
to say the word "jump" itself and so to direct its own
behavior. Finally, the child only thinks of the word
and voluntary, independent behavior begins. In the
preceding (somewhat absurd) example, the following
occurred according to Vygotskij. First there was a
social, interpersonal relationship between mother and
child, in which an external stimulus (the word "jump")
induced a certain action. From this, the individual,
intrapersonal process began, in which the child, as it
were, sets itself a task with the help of a word.
Children1s talking to themselves is derived from inter-
personal talking. It can also be put in another way.
Besides its communicative function, language also has a
guiding, regulatory function. From this regulatory
function self-regulation develops, the direction of
one's own behavior (see Zivin, 1979).
With this principle of the internalization of
social actions, which was to stimulate a great amount
of research, Vygotskij joined the dialectical materia-
listic tradition in the human sciences. The concept of
internalization is, indeed, a direct assimilation of
Hegei's concept of "Verinnerlichung". Hegel also consi-
dered the development of language as a raeans by which
the child internalized the culture of its society.
Hegel also spoke of the role of signs (tools) and the
importance of social interaction in child development.
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In addition, Vygotskij believed to be linking up with
the ideas of Marx. To illustrate, hè quotes the sixth
thesis on ïeuerbach and changes i t as follows: "Alter-
iag Marx's well-known statement, we could say that
man's psychological nature is the ensemble of social
relations, which have been internalized and become
functions of the personality and forms of its struc-
ture..." (Vos, 1976). To Vygotskij, the importance of
society for the development of individual consciousness
had in this way been demons trated.
A FIRST CRITICISM
Now that we have sketched Vygotskij' s theory of
the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins of higher
psychological processes, we can discuss the distinction
hè made between lower and higher psychological proces-
ses in more detail. By higher processes, Vygotskij
understands, for instance, "logical raemory", "creative
imagination" and "verbal thinking". As examples of
lower processes hè mentions "direct perception", "in-
voluntary memory", and "pre-verbal thinking". We have
seen that the raain distinction between lower and higher
psychological processes is that the latter are rnediated
by signs and social in origin. They are the result of
social interaction between child and adult. However,
now and then, Vygotskij characterizes the lower psycho-
logical processes as "natural" and the higher psycholo-
gical processes as "cultural". In other words, hè seems
to imply that the influence of culture on the mental
development of the child is brought about only by
social interaction. Later Soviet researchers have
pointed out, however, that the child is also actively
interacting with objects and surroundings influenced by
culture (Bruslinskij, 1968, 1979; Bozovic, 1977; El'ko-
nin, 1966; Tichomirov, 1961; Zaporozec and El'konin,
1979). Through this interaction the child acquires
knowledge about its environment and this interaction
influences the development of psychological processes,
which Vygotskij considered "natural".
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Particularly important in this connection is the
research of the so-called Kharkov school of develop-
mental psychology. This school consisted of a number of
psychologists under the direction of A.N. Leont'ev, who
tried to develop the sometimes schematic ideas of Vy-
gotskij (other well-known members of the group were
Zaporozec, Gal'perin and Eincenko). The researchers of
this school emphasized the active character of the ïow-
er, unmediated psychological processes. They stressed
the concept of action (dejstvie). All psychological
processes are considered to be based on external ac-
tions (predmetnoe dejstvie). Viewed at any given time
period, the child's mental processes are the results of
the history of its interactions with the social and
non-social environment. On this basis it evolves a
large set of specific adaptations that operationalize
relations araong objects and people the child encounters
(Cole, 1979/80). According to Zaporozec, we have here a
new conceptioa of psychology: humans' psychological ac-
tivity developed on the basis of their practical acti-
vity, on the basis of the orientative and regulatory
processes connected with this activity (Zaporozec,
1966).
V.A. Asnin, for example, a raeraber of the abovemen-
tioned Kharkov school, tried to demonstrate the import-
ance of activity as follows (Asnin, 1979/80). He showed
"that a generalization occurs in the process of the
subject's concrete activity as the resul t of transfer
of a procedure acquired in performing one task to the
condition of a new and different task". Subjects were
presented with a series of problems of increasing
complexity. It was shown that by working actively
through the whole series of problems, children are able
to solve even the most difficult ones. On the other
hand, if in the initial phase of the experiment the
passive child is shown how to solve a particular pro-
blem, it can imitate this problem solving method, but
caonot generalize it to a more difficult problem. Asnin
concludes that neither instruction nor accumulated
experience alone leads to generalization; experience
must be appropriately organized for a generalization to
be formed. "For this, the subject must be active rela-
tive to the objective reality present under the parti-
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cular conditions ... By trying the problem in our
series, using similar methods to solve them and then
transferring these methods to new problems, raaking
mistakes in the process and correcting them, the sub-
jects arrived at a generalization that enabled them to
solve a problem they previously had been unable to
solve".
The main feature of this and other experiments
carried out by the Kharkov school is the insistence on
centinning interaction with the culturally determined
environment. Zincenko, another member of the Kharkov
school, demonstrated in a series of experiments that
the conception of Visual perception as a passive re-
gistration of stimuli raust also be considered obsolete.
Nowadays, Soviet psychologists consider perception to
be perceptive actinjr (perceptivnye dejstvija). The
reason for this is that a much more important role for
the effector components of perception has been de-
monstrated. As early as in the first months of life,
the activity of the child based on orientative reac-
tions is very great. As Zincenko demonstrated, the
lower processes are of an active nature and they
actually do change in ontogenesis (Zincenko and Ver-
giles, 1969; Zincenko and Ruzskaja, 1959). Children of
different age levels asked to look at a certain object,
show different patterns of eye-movements. According to
Zaporozec, these findings indicate that in ontogenesis
perceptive actions develop. These actions have a speci-
fic, unique structure as a result of the child's mas-
tering (usvoenie) society's sensory experience (Zapo-
rozec, 1966, 1969). The processes, which Vygotskij
considered "lower" or "natural" (e.g. "direct percep-
tion"), are thus not of a passive nature. Zaporozec
suggests that Vygotskij proposed his faulty conceptions
of lower psychological processes because hè himself did
not investigate them. In that way, hè had to rely on
the coramon notion of lower processes as "natural reac-
tions of the organism", which only change througb
raaturatiou.
We have thus seen how Vygotskij erroneously res-
tricted the influence of culture to social interaction,
that is the association of the child with adults. A
50 CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
second objection made by Soviet psyrhologists is that
Vygotskij restricted the influence of social interac-
tion to speech. For example, in his study on the de-
velopment of higher forras of attention in childhood hè
writes: "lts attention is, as it were, in a state of
neglect, it is not directed, it is not captivated and
regulated by the speech of adults as in the attention
of the normal child. In a word, it is not acculturated"
(Vygotskij, 1979a). The consequente of restricting the
role of social interaction to the role of speech is,
once again, that psychological processes in which no
speech factors are involved are considered "natutal" or
"biological". Recent research (Lewis and Freedle, 1973;
Bruner, 1975; Bullowa, 1979) has, however, deraonstrated
that mother-infant interactions in the pre-verbal phase
of life are of fundamental importance for the develop-
ment of verbal communication. Mother and infant appear
to communicate quite well without words and to go
through different phases of interaction. The infant is
an active participator in this interaction process
(Trevarthen, 1977; Newson, 1977; Brazelton, Koslowsky
and Main, 1974). These patterns of interaction later
become associated with words, possibly in the way
described by Bruner (1975). In a still later phase, the
words can be used as commands. There thus seem to be
several important phases of social interaction between
the child and adults, before the process starts which
Vygotskij described as internalization. By emphasizing
the role of speech, Vygotskij neglected these develop-
mental periods, considering them "passive" and "natur-
el" .
It is, therefore, understandable that several
Soviet psychologists criticize Vygotskij for having
separated too sharply the lower and higher psychologi-
cal processes. Bruslinskij, in a penetrating study
(Bruslinskij, 1967; 1968), even concluded that Vygots-
kij is guilty of constructing a dualism. Depicting the
lower processes as quite passive, biological in nature
and stressing the verbal (speech) character of the
higher psychological processes, Vygotskij, the untiring
opponent of methodological dualism, remained an ontolo-
gical dualist himself. We must realize, however, that
in a truly Vygotskijan account of child development
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sorae principal distinction between lower and higher
processes should be retained. He was, after all, trying
to develop a dialectical approach in which development
is seen as a series of qualitative transformations- In
such an approach, the higher psychological processes
are not reducible to lower ones, but have a character
of their own. With the introduction of the concept of
activity, later Soviet researchers working in the
tradition of Vygotskij's theory, have tried to overcome
this dualism and they proposed a more consistent socio-
cultural theory. It is interesting to note that, in
that way, the attention switches from speech to that
other fundamental factor in the phylogenesis of raan:
labor. As we have seen, Marxist classics consider
speech and labor the two factors that made man really
hiunan. Vygotskij emphasized the role of speech. His
followers emphasize the role of activity, which they
consider to be a form of labor. In doing so, they avoid
the idealisra for which Vygotskij was reproached in the
1930's. If culture is transraitted from parent to child
through language, without the intervention of an objec-
tive reality, the origin of the development of the
psyche is then seen as the result of the interaction of
subject and subject, rather than the result of subject
and object. This would run contrary to the anthropology
formulated by Marx and Engels (see Rahmani, 1973,
p. W).
VYGOTSKIJ OH CONSCIOUSNESS
In the twenties in the Soviet Union, it was rather
unusual to support, as did Vygotskij, a psychology in
which consciousness played a major role. Pavlov and
Bechterev rejected psychology as an independent science
and considered human behavior to be a biosocial pheno-
menon to be studied by biology and sociology (see
Bauer, 1952, p. 68 ff.). Subjective factors played no
role at all in their view of the human being. Con-
sciousness was an illusion. It is possible, these
researchers admitted, to subjectively feel spontaneity,
or freedom, but they are just appearances. Concerning
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this, Pavlov said that there is an inmediate impres-
sion, hard to surmount, of some voluntary freedora of
action, of some spontaneity. The theory of conditioned
reflexes could, however, eventually explain these
phenomena (Bauer, 1952, p.68).
So we see, consciousness as an integrating factor
in human actioas, was not very popular in the Soviet
Union at the time. To explain the integrated character
of behavior, psychologists turned to the concept of the
physiological dominant. Propagated by Uchtomsky after
Avenarius, Sherrington and Vvedensky, this concept goes
as follows. When different areas of the brain are
stimulated, all energy flows to the area that is most
stimulated. This is the dominant area. The behavior
which has its physiological substratum in the dominant
area, now dominates the entire behavior of the animal
or human being. Psychologists tried, for example, to
explain the phenomenon of attention in this way. The
problem with the notion of dooinance, however, is that
the relative strength of the stimulation is determined
post factum on the basis of the behavior which is
evoked {Bauer, 1952, p. 72). But psychologists con-
tinued to seek a notion of human beings, in which
their behavior could be considered to be completely
pre-determined. This alsp explains Freud's initial
popularity at this time (see above). In Freud's view,
"coincidental" slips of the tongue, gestures etc.
proved to be determined by subconscious processes.
Vygotskij, Leont'ev and Lurija deserve all the
more credit for having pushed to the foreground the
role of consciousness in that age of "psychology with-
out consciouscess". Speaking to the second All-union
congress of psychoneurologists in 1924, Vygotskij
stated that psychology "could study no more than the
most elementary connections between a living being and
the world" (Vygotskij, 1979b, p.l). But what view did
Vygotskij and his associates develop with respect to
consciousness? How did they believe consciousness deve-
loped? We will discuss this briefly. In his analysis of
consciousness, Vygotskij is linked to the idea William
James had in this regard. In this connection Vygotskij
cites James' essay "Does consciousness exist?" and
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praises James for bis brilliant analysis. "Completely
different paths have led (me) to the same view as that
preseated by James in his speculative analysis" (Vy-
gotskij, 1979b, p. 32). According to Vygotskij, Pavlov
had a good explanation for unconscious, autoraatic
combinations of reflexes. These include reflex arcs,
unconditioned and conditioned reflexes and reflex
chains. But, Vygotskij states, if we consider not only
this system of reflexes, but also others and the possi-
bility of shifting from one system to another, this is
also the mechanism of consciousness. "The capacity of
our body to serve as a stimulus (through its action)
for itself (for new actions) - therein lies the basis
of consciousness" (Vygotskij, 1979b, p. 19). Every
stimulus humans receive results in a reflex, which in
turn is a stimulus for a following reflex etc. To
Vygotskij, the more correctly each internal reflex, as
a stimulus, calls forth a sequence of other reflexes
from other systems, or is transferred to other systems,
the more able we are to communicate to ourselves and to
others what our experiences are, and the more con-
sciously we experience them. To Vygotskij, communica-
ting something means here transmitting a group of
reflexes to another (higher) group of reflexes. What is
not conscious is simply that (reflex) which ha s not
been transmitt»d to other (higher) systems. Vygotskij:
"There may be an infinite variety of stages of con-
sciousness, i.e. the interaction of systems partici-
pating in the mechanism of an active reflex. To be
conscious of one's own experiences means nothing less
than to possess them in object form (stimulus) for
other experiences. Consciousness is the experieucing of
experiences, just as experience is simply the expe-
rience of objects" (Vygotskij, 1979b, p. 20).
Humans gain control of their behavior by learning
certain instrumental techniques, for example aids to
raemory and using them as external stimuli in direct-
ing their own behavior. Leont'ev: "The controlling of
behavior becomes possible only by the mastering of
stimuli" (quoted by Bauer, 1952, p. 74). In this way,.
the coatrolled behavior of Vygotsfcij and his associates
develops in an unusually roundabout way. By learning to
use certain external stimuli (including the signs of
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language), humans can give their own behavlor au orga-
nized character. Lurija states that a "direct route" is
not possible. According to him the consideration of the
voluntary act as accomplished by "will power" is a
myth. Humans cannot by direct force control their
behavior any more thari "a shadow can carry stones"
(quoted by Bauer, 1962, p. 74), If it seems as if human
beings can determine their actions "directly", it is
only because through the internalization process,
certain processes can no longer be observed after a
time. The child no louger says "jump", but thinks it.
The feeling of consciousness develops because certain
reflexes (for example muscular sensations) becorae
stimuli for certain other reflexes (for example muscu-
lar movements). "Consciousness is always an echo, a
system of responses". According to Vygotskij, the
problem of self-awareness and self-observation can also
be approached through this conceptioa. Now it is clear,
Vygotskij states, why one person's experience is acces-
sible to him or her only. Only I and I alone can ob-
serve and perceive my own secundary responses, for only
for me my reflexes do act as new stimuli of the pro-
prioceptive field. With this thought in raind, Vygotskij
once again sees the value of the subjective experience
nis predecessors denegrated. He indeed advocated the
necessity of studying these inhibited reflexes. Vygots-
kij elucidates his theory of consciousness on the basis
of three areas of research: into emotions, into
cognition and into willful action. We will limit our-
selves to a discussion of the research into emotions
and will.
With respect to research into emotions, Vygotskij
agrees completely with William James' theory of emo-
tions . Vygotskij: "James took the three usual coaspo-
aents - A the cause of an emotion; B the emotion it-
self, and C its corporeal manifestation - and rear-
ranged them in the sequence A - C - B. (...) I should
only like to point out that this formulation laid bare:
(1) the reflex nature of an emotion, an emotion as a
system of reflexes A and B;
(2) the secondary, derivative nature of the conscious-
ness of an emotion when one's own response serves
as a stimulus for a new internal reaction B - C"
(Vygotskij, 1979b, p. 26).
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With respect to research iuto the will, Vygotskij
says the following. Every movement must first be per-
formed unconsciously. Kinesthesis (that is the secoad-
ary action) is then the basis for its entry into con-
sciousness. Up to now, we thought that a willful
actioa took place as follows: I thiak and then I do.
This is erroneous. First there is a primary reactioa
(doing) and oaly then is there a secondary reactioa
(coasciousaess). Consciousness has a derivative, secon-
dary nature and, genetically speaking, is determined
by the environment. Being determines Consciousness.
Looking at Vygotskij's view of Consciousness, what is
noticeable (besides the strong influence of James) is
how much his early work was still influenced by the
largely reflexological thinkiag of psychology in those
days. Later, the role of (the signs of) language would
be investigated and stressed more in his research. It
would have been very interesting if at that tirae (about
1933), Vygotskij had once agaia extensively fonnulated
his thoughts with respect to Consciousness.
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The Zone of Proximal Development
Vygotskij has propounded a number of educational
ideas in accordance with his cultural historical theory
of higher psychological functions. the first problera we
will discuss is that of the relationship between child
development and education. What is the link between
education and development? Are they independent of one
another? Can education influence the development of the
child? In his later works, particularly ia "Thought
and Language", Vygotskij attempts to answer these
questions. He begins with a critical investigation of
the then available psychological and pedagogical li-
terature. Ia chapter 6 of "Thought and Language", hè
distinguishes three notions of the relationship between
educatioa and developnent.
56 CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
He attributes the first notion to Piaget (and
Blonskij). In it, education and development are seen as
cotnpletely independent of one another. Here child
development is regarded as a process of natural matura-
tion that cannot be influenced by education. Education
can only ascertain that natural development has reached
a certain stage and then coincide with it. This raeans
that education always lags behind development. Within
this notion, it is also appropriate to have a child
take an intelligence test in order to determine the
stage of mental development it has reached, and to
match the child's education to it. According to Vygots-
kij, this idea is also to be found in Piaget's work. To
Piaget's mind, the child passes through certain neces-
sary stages, independent of whether or not it receives
education- This idea is also at the root of Piaget's
research into concept formation. In this research,
Piaget consciously limits himself to the so-called
"spontaueous" concepts. These are concepts a child
acquires spontaneously. On the other hand there are the
"non-spontaaeous" concepts, which are passed on to the
child through the educational process. To Vygotskij
this is a typical example of the neglect of the role of
social interaction and education by those guilty of
biological reductionism. In view of his link with
Hegel, Vygotskij could, never, of course, agree with
this. In chapter III we will see that Riegel criticized
Piaget in the sarae way. There we will try to defend the
Piagetian theory against this kind of criticism.
• Vygotskij attributes the second notion to James,
Thorndike and the reflexological movement. In this
notion, no distinction whatsoever is made between
education and child development. Child development is
based on learning processes of a simple associative
nature (conditioned reflexes) and education is con-
cerned with the very same processes.
The third notion is that of the Gestalt psycho-
logist Koffka. He states that child development is the
result of both natural maturation and education.
Vygotskij considers this notion to be a great impro-
vement upon the first two. His criticism, though, is
that the relationship between the factors maturation
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and education has uot been worked out sufficieatly. To
Koffka, both maturation and education influence cbild
development. These processes influence one another, but
Koffka does not indicate exactly how. Linkiug up with
these ideas of Koffka, Vygotskij now tries to develop a
theory on the relationship between education and child
development that clarifies these ideas. In this theory,
nis concepts of the zone of actual development and the
zone of proximal development play a central role. Until
then, according to Vygotskij, it was assumed that
education had to be matched to a certain initial capa-
city of the child. The question was whether a child
was mature enough for a certain level of education. Of
course this is true. In order to ascertain this,
though, it was unfortunately always the child's inde-
pendent achievement that was measured. In addition,
however, it is also possible to determine what a child
can comprehend with assistance. When the forraer proce-
dure is followed, it is the zone of actual development
that is ascertained, fonning the lower boundary of
achievement, When the latter procedure is followed, the
zone of proximal (nearest) development is determined.
This establishes a maximum level of what the child can
comprehend at that point. Education must bear both
boundaries in mind. It is the task of education not to
be satisfied with the child's actual, factual level of
development, but to work in the area between the high-
est and lowest level. In that area are to be found
those tasks the child canaot complete independently. In
this way, education actually stays one step ahead of
development, stimulates it and lifts tasks out of the
region of potential, dependent capability into the
region of actual independent capability. Education is
developing education. Basic to this idea ia that educa-
tion calls forth cognitive developments which would
not have developed independently, i.e. without this
education.
Such a view also implies a positive view of the
role of imitation in child development. "Looked at
broadly, imitation is the priociple form in which
education influences development. Teaching language,
education at school is largely based on imitation. At
school, the child is, after all, not taught what it can
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do independently, but what it is as yet unable to do
but proves to achieve in collaboration with and under
the guidauce of the teacher." (Vygotskij, 1982b, p.250).
From this viewpoint of Vygotskij, we can see once again
how important the role of social interaction and, in
particular, education is in his thinking. As does
Hegel, Vygotskij believes the child to be dependent
upon upbringing and education. The notion of child
development as following fixed, unalterable stages,
raakes a natura! law out of a natural course of events.
The f act that a child's cognitive development is in
part influenced by cultural factors is then ignored.
It is thus clear that Vygotskij's ideas concerning
the relationship between education and cognitive deve-
lopment were strongly influenced by Hegel. The emphasis
upon the role of social interaction, upon the child's
dependence on upbringing and education, and the dis-
tinction between a natural law and a natural course of
events have all been borrowed directly from Hegel (see
below).
Transfer of Scientific Concepts
We have spoken up to now of the importance of
social ioteraction and education, and the role they
play in transferring society's cultural inheritance to
the child. But we have not yet discussed how exactly
this knowledge is transferred. When Vygotskij began to
construct his cultural historical theory, hè believed
this transfer to take place with the help of signs, and
in particular with the help of words. Towards the end
of his life, hè expands on this notion and shift s the
emphasis sotnewhat. Where hè had once spoken of words as
signs, hè now begins to speak of the meaning of words.
According to Vygotskij, if a word is to play a signifi-
cant role in the process of communication, it must not
be just a sign, referring to one object, but a concept,
referring to several objects at once, Communication can
only be meaningful i f the words are not all signs
(names). It must be possible to communicate concepts.
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Imagine that I want to say to someone: "I saw a car".
That person will only understand me if a car is a
concept, that is a word referriug to a collection of
identical objects- If this were not the case, the word
"car" would be a sign or name, oaly meaning something
to me (unless the person I am speaking to just happened
to know what the sign stood for). Due to their genera-
lizing effect, the function of concepts is therefore to
make it possible to communicate without having to refer
directly to a concrete state of af f airs. In that sense
they also f ree us f rosn our senses.
According to Vygotskij, there are two kinds of
concepts, namely empirical (everyday, living or spon-
taneous) concepts and theoretical (scientific) con-
cepts. Piaget had already made a similar distinction
(see the preceding paragraph) with his spontaneous and
non-spontaneous concepts. But Vygotskij, more in line
with Hegels' thinking, places the emphasis differently.
What, then, is aa empirical concept? In order to under-
stand this, we must examine for a moment the empiricist
theory of abstraction, which in the Soviet Union was
criticized by Vygotskij and later by V.V. Davydov.
According to this theory (the idea of which can be
traced to J.S. Mill, Locke and Aristotle), the process
of concept formation can be understood as follows.
The human beiag (the child) is confronted with a
great variety of objects and is capable of distin-
guishing those characteristics which the objects have
in coranon. Objects that have certain characteristics in
common are put into specific categories. In essence,
the function of the intellect is to compare and distin-
guish a collection of objects we perceive. By comparing
birches, oaks aad pines, we automatically come upon the
abstract concept of the tree. Together, concepts form a
pyramid, with at the top the concept of species, which
at the same time is the most devoid of content. Those
who subscribe to this theory believe that in principle
it is possible to arraage objects into classes on the
basis of any characteristic. They do not believe that
it is possible to speak of certain essential character-
istics of an object. This empiricist abstractioa theory
was criticized by Davydov (1972), as by Hegel, among
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other reasoas because in it, the role o£ the senses was
overstressed. It is true, Davydov says, that coucept
formation as described above often occurs, but it is
not the only kiad, and not the most important. There
are also scientific theoretical coucepts which cannot
develop by raeans of forma] generalization. This is
because they transcend directly observable phenomena.
Hegel had already made this distiaction between etnpi-
rical concepts and theoretical concepts (Vos, 1976, p.
275). To him, the distinction between "the particular"
and "the general" played a role in this. Empirical con-
cepts arise by means of induction, that is from the
particular to the general. The subject reconstructs the
concept (the general) from the instances of it (the
particular) hè runs across.
Hegel has little regard for this type of concept
formation, for being based upon the objects' external
characteristics (Schein), it is incapable of developing
a genuine concept of their essence. Only through ab-
stract thought are we able to develop genuinely theo-
retical concepts that exposé the essence of phenomena.
An empirical concept (tree) is reconstructed from
instances we run across (oak, elm, birch, etc.). This
is not the case with a theoretical concept. In this
case we begin with conscious insight into what the
concept is and compare it with instances of it. At
school, for instance, we learn the concept mammal, and
with the help of this concept, we can then understand
many animals better. The problem we have with Hegel is
that it is difficult to understand how exactly we de-
velop these theoretical concepts. In this respect,
Davydov resorted to dialectical logic (Davydov, 1972).
Vygotskij adopts Hegei's distinction between two
types of concept fonuation or generalization. However,
by adding the idea of social interaction, Vygotskij
gives this distinction a different significance. The
child learns empirical concepts by continually inter-
acting with material, concrete things, and constructing
a concept from this interaction (little pets, with four
legs and a tail, that bark but do not raew, are bow-
wows). Childcea adopt theoretical concepts from their
parents. These concepts get "substance" through daily
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life. In short, Vygotskij's idea can be stated as
follows: In forming empirical concepts, the child
extracts a definition of the concept from a nuraber of
examples it runs across. (The word "definition" should
not be taken literally here. Not until the very last
stage of concept formation will the child be able to
put the definition of a concept into words.) With
respect to the theoretical concept, the child is given
the definition of the concept and it confirms this
definition in the examples it runs across. The child
acquires general, theoretical concepts ready made and
does not have to follow the laborious path of induc-
tion to get them. In this connection, Vygotskij regu-
larly draws a parallel to learning a foreign language.
It takes us five years or so of toiling at our native
language to learn to speak it reasonably well. Only
after that, when we go to school, do we get the first
principles of grammar. The process of learning a fo-
reign language, however, is quite different. First we
learn the granmar, through which we can get a reasona-
ble coranand of the language.
To Vygotskij, this is also the way the child acts
in its social interaction with adults. It acquires
certain concrete concepts independently, but it is
greatly dependent on interaction with adults to acquire
theoretical concepts, particularly at a young age. To
Vygotskij the relationship betweea concrete, empirical
concepts and theoretical concepts is very complex. On
the one hand, the child will have had to develop some
empirical concepts in order to successfully learn a
theoretical concept. On the other hand, the presence
of theoretical concepts influences the development of
empirical ones. Vygotskij, too, believed that reality
could be grasped better by means of theoretical con-
cepts than by means of concrete concepts. How the
presence of theoretical concepts influences the deve-
lopment of empirical concepts remains somewhat un-
clear. Vygotsfcij: "It is quite certain that conscious
insight into concepts and the arbitrariness of concepts
.... lies within the zone of proximal developraeat. In
other words, they become visible and effective in
collaboration with adult thoaght" (Vygotskij, 1982b,
p.264). Further on in "Thought and Language", Vygotskij
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states that the scientific concepts transferia the
spontaneous (empirical) concepts and elevate thera to a
higher level, thereby creating the zone of proximal
development. In this way, hè connects his notion of the
zone of proximal development with the scientific,
theoretical concept, If the child were uot to come into
contact with theoretical concepts through its inter-
action with adults, it would be doomed to remairi in the
zone of actual development. The nuraber of theoretical
concepts the young child has at its disposal would not
iacrease (Vygotskij, 1982b, p.272). However, Vygots-
kij ' s development of this idea is rather meager. Ia
addition, quite a number of objections could be raised
to the empirical research that Vygotskij describes in
supporting his ideas on the relationship between empi-
rical and theoretical concepts (see Bruslinskij, 1967).
The Disabled Child
In the preceding paragraphs, we saw the importance
Vygotskij attached to social interaction, through which
the higher psychological processes develop. All the
more serious, then, when an individual is in danger of
being cut off from this social interaction, as is the
case with children with one or another physical handi-
cap, such as blindness or deafness. "Even human percep-
tion could not have developed outside the human commu-
nity. Speech is the very basis and transmitter of such
social experience; even when thinking in solitude, the
fiction of social interaction is ever present. In other
words, without speech there is neither consciousness
nor self-consciousness" (Vygotskij, 1924 in: Vygotskij,
1983, p.78).
Because it is so difficult for the deaf child to
learn to speak, it is in particular the mental develop-
ment of the deaf child that Vygotskij believes en-
dangered. But Vygotskij certainly does not regard the
situation of the deaf, blind or retarded child as
hopeless. On the contrary, hè believes these childrea
capable of f uil social existence, but we must provide
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them with the oieans or tooi s to develop intellectually.
Those means particularly suited for achieving this
goal, such as speech and writing, have been adapted to
the average person possessing full faculty of hearing
and sight. It is now the task of psychologists to
uncover new, adapted means of enabling the disabled
child to participate in society. If they fail, the
child will remain primitive. Vygotskij raakes a compari-
son in this regard to primitive cultures, where they
lack the means or the tools, for example a written
language, which enable a civilization to flourish. In
the case of the child with a particular organic handi-
cap, these tools are simply not adapted to its problems
(Vygotskij, 1983, p.25). In both cases, then, cultural
development is limited, but Vygotskij sees ways of
stimulating that development.
Take, for example, the case of the blind child.
Vygotskij does not regard the loss of sight as fatal,
for culture is accessible through such cultural instru-
raents as speech, reading and writing. And these cul-
tural Instruments are not bound to one particular
sense. The blind child does not read with its eyes, but
with its fingers. The deaf child does not speak with
its inouth, but with its hands. In principle, Vygotskij
believes, there is no difference. The culture is just
as accessible to the disabled child, only through other
means, by using other cultural tools (Vygotskij, 1983,
p.171). Indeed, Vygotskij refuses to regard the dis-
abled child as inferior, but again and again emphasized
that it is simply different. In 1931 hè even wrote: "we
assume that even if human beings only had four senses,
it would make no essential difference in the knowledge
that they could acquire, for fundamentally, thought -
the means by which we assimilate experiential data -
would remain the same. The picture we develop of the
reality around us is not only based upon perceiving it
directly, but also upon our rationally assimilating
experience. In principle, both the blind and those
possessing sight know rauch more than they imagine; they
know much more than they can observe through the five
senses... And so for the blind child, thought is the
most important raeans of compensating for its inadequacy
in perceiving images" (Vygotskij, 1983, p.211). In this
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way, Vygotskij links his view of the disabled child to
his epistemological notion that direct perception does
not necessarily result in usable knowledge (see above).
To Vygotskij's mind then, the absence or deficien-
cy of a lower function arising in phylogenesis, such as
perception, can be corapensated by utilizing a cultural
instrument. In this regard a "disabled child" does not
differ from a "nonnal" child at all. When for example,
the natural, direct memory fails, the normal child will
also use language (classifyiug the objects to be remens-
bered Into categories) and all kinds of mnemonic sys-
tems. In doing so, the child as it were increases its
storage capacity. Vygotskij borrowed this notion that
psychological functions can be brought about in dif-
ferent ways from Binet (Vygotskij, 1931 in: Vygotskij,
1983, p-122). For each fallure of an organic functioa,
the psychologist must attempt to find a cultural in-
strument to replace it. In order to do so, a qualita-
tive diagnosis of the disabled child is required. It is
necessary to determine exactly which faculty is dis-
turbed, but also which functions have remained intact.
Again and again, Vygotskij opposed a purely quantita-
tive diagnosis, detennining only how fat a child lags
behind and what it is iricapable of doing. The psycholo-
gist needs a qualitative analysis of the child's
strengths and weaknesses. The psychological test can
perform a supportive role in this diagnosis, but no
more than that. Measurement and diagnosis are two
different things. "The tape measure sees nothing",
writes Vygotskij in 1931 "without subjective assimila-
tion, that is, without thought, without interpreta-
tion, [without] decoding the results, [without] eva-
luating the data, there is no scientific research" (in:
Vygotskij, 1983, p.299). A consequence of the quanti-
tative approach in diagnostics is that children are
characterized as "mentally retarded". But is that not
like telling the patiënt that hè is ill? Only on the
basis of a detailed, qualitative analysis is recovery
possible.
Vygotskij also makes some concrete suggestions for
improving the treatment of disabled children. Most ia-
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portant is that the child should be able to participate
in social activities and comraunicate with others.
Social isolation is the greatest danger threatening the
deaf, blind or retarded child. The psychologist must
attempt to enable the child to attain social inter-
action at all costs. According to Vygotskij, the most
serious consequences of a physical defect are the
social ones and compensatioa should be socially orien-
ted. In this connection, Vygotskij points to the dan-
gers of special schools. An attempt should be made to
integrate the special schools into society. The dis-
abled child also has a meaningful role to play in
society, hut it is then cecessary that the well-inten-
tioned, charitable care of these children should be
replaced by an active education.
But is this view not a bit too optimistic? After
all, these children do suffer from an organic defect.
Vygotskij does acknowledge that these are organic
deficiencies, which in and of themselves cannot be
remedied. But here, too, hè says that "constitution is
not a fate, but a biological play of forces which, when
its internal dynamics are known, can be influenced"
(Vygotskij, 1931, in: Vygotskij, 1983, p.294). But by
raeans of the cultural tooi, successful reorganization
of the personality is also possible. "It is therefore
understandable that the biological processes primarily
responsible for the first stage in the development of
[the] mentally retarded [child] become concealed; they
are not eliminated but neutralized (snjatymi) during
the process of development..." (Vygotskij, 1931 in:
Vygotskij, 1983, p.l18). With this explicit reference
to Hegei's dialectic, Vygotskij once again expresses
nis optimistic view of humanity. Human beings can be
"almost entirely re-educated" (1928). The higher
psychological functions are also attainable for the
blind or deaf cbild, so "nothing can limit their
possibilities". Nature is overcome by nurture. "In the
psychology of the blind, then, the line of action is
aimed at overcoming the defect through its social
compensation, through participation in the experiences
of those who cao see, through speech. The word
overcomes the blindness" (Vygotskij, 1983, p.95).
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A SECOSD CRITICISM
Ia the preceding paragraphs, we described a few
educational implications of Vygotskij's ideas. They
represent some of the most interesting aspects of his
work. The cultural-historical theory was desigaed to be
a practical theory. Vygotskij and his co-workers tried
to formulate a theory that would have practical conse-
quences for, among other things, the education of
disabled children, the developmeat of curricula in
schools and the treatment of patients suffering from
brain damage. We will now discuss some of the above-
mentioned implications.
The internalization theory proved to be one of
Vygotskij's most fruitful ideas. One need only think of
Gal'perin's school, which has produced a wealth of
importaat psychological data (see Gal'perin, 1953,
1957, 1969). The idea of internalization was, however,
not new. Both Vygotskij and others, among them Lurija
and Gal'perin, have pointed out that the internaliza-
tion concept also played a role in the ideas of Durk-
heim's French sociological school and in those of
Piaget. In "Thought and Language", Vygotskij compared
Piaget's internalization idea with that of the French
school. Vygotskij: "In its philosophical essence, it
(Piaget's idea) was related to the sociological doc-
trine of Durkheim and other sociologists, who saw space
and time and objective reality as a whole as stemming
from man's cultural life" (Vygotskij, 1982b, p.71).
Vygotskij cannot agree with this epistemological posi-
tion, as it runs counter to the tenets of dialectical
materialisia (see McLeish, 1975).
Gal'perin, who states that the notion of interna-
lization was first posited by the French school,
considers their position idealistic. To him, interna-
lization is the process by which the transition from
the non-psychological to the psychological is made
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(Gal'perin, 1980). According to Gal'perin, Piaget's
internalization is a secondary phenomenon with respect
to the logical developraent of thought. To Piaget, it
meant the development of a level of ideal, actually
logical const ructions. The question of the transition
froffl the non-psychological to the psychological is not
involved in it at all (Gal'perin, 1966, p.25). On the
other hand, Vygotskij does mention this transition. The
higher psychological functions develop first as exter-
nal actions and only then become individual psycholo-
gical processes through the internalization process. To
Gal'perin, the fundamental significance of this is that
the gap between psychological and non-psychological
functions can be bridged. He believes this idea to be
one of Vygotskij's great achievements.
Vygotskij does not always deal with the notion of
the zone of proximal development with equal consisten-
cy. In most of his work it raeans "what a child is
cognitively capable of doing with the aid of an adult".
A crucial point here is the idea that the child is
dependent upon its interaction with adults for its
cognitive development. Through this social interaction,
the zone of proximal development is created. However,
Vygotskij is not quite consistent here. In his essay
"Play and its role in the psychological development of
the child" hè states that at play the child transcends
its nonnal cognitive level of activity: "...the child
attempts as it were to vault above the level of its
custoraary behavior. We can compare the relationship
between play and development to the relationship
between education and development. Play expresses
changes in needs and changes in consciousness of a
more general nature. Play is a source of development
and creates the zone of proximal development" (Vy-
gotskij, 1966, p. 74). Here Vygotskij seems to suggest
that in play, the child creates its own future possi-
bilities and is therefore not dependent on the inter-
action with adults for them.
Actually, the concept of the zone of proximal
development itself requires a bit of clarification. It
assumes that it is possible to classify a series of
tasks according to difficulty or the difficulty of the
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mental activities (operations) involved. A child might
then, for instance, be able to complete the first 60
tasks alone (the actual zone of actual development) and
with the help of an adult the first 80 (the zone of
proximal development). The same type of example caa be
imagined for cognitive operations (mental activity).
But does this now mean that it is possible to have
achieved different zones of actual or proximal develop-
ment in different cognitive areas, such as language,
mathematics and problem solving? Can a process of
"décalage" (see chapter III) occur?
Vygotskij himself states that hè could determine
children's mental ages. This probably means that hè
gave the children tasks in different areas and then
determined the actual and proximal zones of the aggre-
gate. Two children, whose actual achievements each
correspond to a mental age of 7 can then achieve, with
the help of an adult, a result corresponding to a
mental age of 8 and 9 respectively. It would seem to
us, however, that a differentiated profile test would
provide more insight into the child's potential. From
our western "bias" it would not seem entirely impossi-
ble to construct an intelligence test in which assis-
tance has been integrated as a strictly standardized
factor. In any case, the concept of the zone of proxi-
mal development is not without difficulties. This does
not alter the fact that Vygotskij's related notion of
education as developing education has proved to be of
great value.
We will discuss Vygotskij's treatment of concept
formation quite briefly. We have already expressed a
number of points of criticism. Vygotskij does not make
clear how theoretical concepts develop and where their
superiority with respect to empirical concepts lies
(the latter is the case with other Soviet authors as
well). In addition, the way theoretical concepts in-
fluence the development of empirical concepts remains
unclarified. The empirical research of Vygotskij and
his co-workers on concept formation, which we did not
discuss above (see Vygotskij, 1977, chapter 5) is
described very unclearly and does not seem very sub-
stantial. Later authors have demonstrated that the
CULTURAL-HISTORICAI SCHOOI 69
several stages of concept fonnation Vygotskij pointed
to are related to the type of instruction (see Lomp-
scher, 1972). All in all, it can be said that Vygots-
kij 's research into concept formatiou leaves a great
deal to be desired. But it must not be forgotten that
this research was not finished at the time of Vygots-
kij's premature death.
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL SUBSTRATUM
The question as to the material basis of complex
psychological functions is a very old one. Even the
Hippocratic School of physicians knew that epilepsy and
madness were disturbances of the brain. They believed
that not only our pleasure, our joy and our laughter
but also our sorrow, pain, grief and tears arise from
the brain (Blakemore, 1977). In the middle ages, it was
believed that the spirit resided in certain cavities
called ventricles. At the beginning of the last centu-
ry, the phrenology of Gall and Spurzman was highly
regarded. Gall believed that on the basis of the shape
of the skull, it was possible to draw conclusioas about
the shape of the brain and, through it, about psycholo-
gical characteristics. A highly developed bulge in a
certain place might, for example, indicate a particular
aptitude for higher mathematica.
The more scientific study of the question of
localizations in the brain begins with the work of
Broca, Wernicke and Jackson. With their discovery of
speech centers, the first two researchers cleared the
way for a flood of research attempting to localize a
certain well-defined place in the brain for complex
psychological functions. On the other hand, the English
neurologist Jackson claimed that the representation in
the brain of psychological functions was dependent upon
their complexity. Very siraple functions, such as the
faculty of cutaneous sensation, were perhaps represent-
ed in strictly localized cortical areas. But complex
psychological functions, so Jackson believed, must be
represented at several different levels. Each function,
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tben, is represented at a low level (spinal cord,
brainstem), a middJe level (sensory or motor cortex),
and at a high level (in the frontal lobes) (Lurija,
1973, 1979b). Jackson's research resulted in a school
of neurology regarding complex functions as a result
of activity of the brain as a whole. And so, two op-
posing schools developed within neurology. On the one
hand, there were the strict localization theoretists,
who attempted to connect every mental function to a
specific cortical area. On the other hand, there were
the "holists", who regarded the brain in its entirety
as being responsible for psychological functions. From
the latter point of view, the degeneration of psycholo-
gical functions is not so much determined by the loca-
tion of certain brain damage as by the amount of brain
tissue affected. This was the situation in about 1925,
when, starting from Jackson's thesis, Vygotsky and his
associates atterapted to develop a new theory on the
cerebral representation of higher functions.
Basing himself upon research with children into
the higher psychological functions, Vygotskij claimed
that these functions formed complex functional systems
with a mediatory character. fiecause humans have a
different historical experience than animals, the
cerebral organization of their psychological functions
must also differ essentially. Attention processes, for
example, have in humans and animals a different cere-
bral organization because humans use speech in di-
recting their attention. Taerefore the cerebral organi-
zation of the human attention process will in part be
related to language or comprehension centers. Fur-
thermore, a theory of the cerebral organization of
higher functions must account for processes, such as
those involved in writing, that depend in part on
external, historically conditioned mediators (Lurija,
1979b, p.126).
Because the history of writing is but a few thou-
sand years old, while the evolution of the human brain
required millions of years, Vygotskij and his associa-
tes assume that the cerebral organization of writing
rests on a complex co-operation of several cerebral
areas. This co-operation arises in child development
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and applies in particular for the complex, language-
mediated functions. Elementary functions, such as the
registration of sensations through the retina, can
probably be localized exactly in one particular cell
group. The fact that the cerebral organization of
complex psychological functions arises during the
course of child development (ontogenesis) also means
that the cerebral orgauization of a particular function
can vary with age. In his research with children,
Vygotskij had demonstrated that complex mental pro-
cesses initially proceed with the aid of external
means. Afterwards, a child1s behavior becomes condensed
and internalized. It would seem obvious that this
varied progress of certain types of behavior should
also be reflected in cerebral organization.
On the basis of a number of clinical studies,
Vygotskij did, indeed, succeed in making this assump-
tion plausible. Among other things, Vygotskij gives the
example of a man suffering from optical agnosia (the
inability to attach meaning to sensory impressions; see
Lurija, 1973, 1979b). This man was still capable of
judging objects hè was unable to judge or name on his
own. It could then be said that the higher "centers"
remained intact (logical judgment), while the lower
"centers" (perception) were disturbed. Such a distur-
bance, however, will never be observed in children, for
if a child's cerebral representation of the lower
functions (perception) is disturbed, the higher fuac-
tions (logical judgmeut) will not develop at all. For a
child, such a situation is much more serious too, for
it cannot compensate for the lower functions by means
of the higher ones. A child would not be able to master
language. Agnosia is aot found in children. On the
basis of such considerations, Vygotskij posits the
following general law: "In the early stages of ontoge-
nesis, brain damage results in the underdevelopment of
the higher psychological functions. The same brain
damage in adults results in a disturbance of the cor-
responding lower systems, while the higher psycholo-
gical functions remain intact".
Initially, it was Lurija in particular who in this
spirit developed these, ia the final analysis, rather
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simplistic ideas concerning cerebral organizatioa. Kot
least of all, this research was made possible by the
abundance of subjects produced by the atrocities of the
Secoad World War. Basing himself, as did Vygotskij, on
clinical and neurological material, Lurija developed
the science that would later be called neuropsychology.
An excellent survey of Lurija's research can be found
in Cole (1978). The consequences of the above view on
the cerebral organization of psychological functions
are, among others, as follows:
(1) If it is detennined that the development of the
complex psychological functions (logical thought,
problem solving) proceeds differently in different
cultures, these differences can then not be re-
duced to differences in basal, physiological
processes. The lower functions are the same. The
differences develop because in ontogenesis, the
complex functions are organized differently.
Language plays an important role in this organi-
zation.
(2) Individuals with the sarae genetic material, but
with a different "historical experience" or per-
sonal history, will exhibit differently organized
complex psychological processes, but similar
achievements in the area of lower psychological
functions. In order to test these consequences,
Vygotskij, Lurija and Leont'ev devised cultural-
psychological research, which we shall describe in
the following paragraph.
CULTURAI-HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Uzbekistan
In 1931 and 1932, A.R. Lurija led two expeditions
to Uzbekistan to investigate whether the higher psycho-
logical functioas of the residents of Uzbekistan dif-
fered fundamentally from those of the inhabitants of
the Western world (Lurija, 1974; 1976a). If this proved
to be the case, and the lower functions did not differ,
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Vygotskij and bis associates would have demonstrated
that the complex psychological processes develop in
ontogenesis. Until that time, Vygotskij and his co-
workers had in part based their cultural-historical
theory on the anthropolcgical data of the French scho-
lar Lévy-Bruhl, Lévy-Bruhl was a member of the French
sociological movement near the turn of the ceatury
which emphasized the role of the collective in the
development of psychological characteristics and beha-
vior (Cole and Scribner, 1974, p.19). From this point
of view, hè attempted to analyze the cognitive func-
tioning of people in several different cultures. In
doing so, hè arrived at his well-known characterization
of the thought of "primitive" peoples as being pre-
logical (Berry and Dasen, 1973, p.11). The problem is,
however, that Lévy-Bruhl based his theory entirely on
rather dubious informatica, i.e. reports of missiona-
ir ie s, travelers and amateur anthropologists. In their
research, for example, both Herbert Spencer and Lévy-
Bruhl had used data provided by a researcher who re-
ported on an abruptly ended conversation with certain
Indians. From this hè concluded that "the mind of the
savage appears to rock to and fro out of mere weakness"
(Cole and Scribner, 1974, p.20). Lurija, too, admits
that the data then available were only of anecdotal
value (Lurija, 1979b, p.59). This is also the reason
Vygotskij, Lurija and Leont'ev wished to organize their
expedition. In order to better understand the place the
cultural-historical theory of the higher psychological
functions occupies within cultural psychology, we shall
first discuss briefly a number of tbeories regarding
the relationship between culture and cognitive develop-
nient.
Within cultural psychology, two groups of resear-
chers may be distinguished. On the one hand, there is a
group of theoretists emphasizing the differences in
cognitive functioning between different cultures. On
the other hand, there is a group emphasizing certain
universal thought processes developing identically in
all cultures. The former group of researchers, by and
large inspired by Darwin's theory of evolution, draw
the evidence for their position from several sciences.
Most controversial is their attempt to tracé differen-
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ces in cognitive functioning to genetie differences.
Associated with this group are, among others, the naraes
of Herbert Spencer, and G. Stanley Hall. Herbert Spen-
cer, for example, believed that acquired traits were
hereditary and regarded this mechanism to be an expla-
nation for the, to him, established fact that some
races occupied a higher rung on the evolutionary ladder
than others. Stanley Hall believed that the development
of the species (phylogenesis) was recapitulated in
child development (ontogenesis) and therefore that
primitive people's inferior cognitive achievements were
proof of a less advanced evolution. In this form,
arguments based on genetics have fallen into discredit,
if only on the basis of the following considerations:
(1) Today, it is no longer believed that genetically
determined differences can play a major role in
cultural differences because (a) human development
from hominide to homo sapiens took approximately 2
million years; (b) the rapid cultural advance of
homo sapiens occurred during such a short time
span (about 50,000 years; Harris, 1968} that
important genetic changes are iraprobable; (c)
radical cultural changes can occur within one
generation.
(2) It has proved difficult to define the concept of
race in terms of biological traits. This indicates
that the concept is probably more sociological
than biological ia nature.
Recently though, another group of researchers has
eiaerged, led by the American Edward O. Wilson, who
believe that genetic differences can play a role. It
must be said that Wilson is considerably more cautious
in nis position than the researchers discussed above,
at least in nis opus magnum "Sociobiology: a new syn-
thesis". Wilson states, for example, that it is part of
the conventional wisdom that virtually all cultural
variation is phenotypic rather than genetic in origin.
He also admits that human populations are not very
different from one another genetically {Wilson, 1976,
p.550). But Wilson is not prepared to accept what hè
calls "the extreme orthodox view of environmentalism",
which in fact claims that genetic variance plays no
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role in the transmission of culture. In this respect,
hè opposes the view of Dobzhanskij. Though the genes
have had to relinquish most of their sovereignty,
Wilson writes, they maintain a certain araount of influ-
ence, at least in regard to the behavioral characteris-
tics upon which differences between cultures are based.
He bases this opinion on research presumably showing
that to a relatively high degree, heredity plays a role
in such conditions as neuroticistn, dominance, depres-
sion and schizophrenia (Wilson, 1976, p.550). Wilson:
"Even a sroall portion of this variance invested in
population differences might predispose societies
toward cultural differences. At the very least, we
should try to measure this araount. It is uot valid to
point to the absence of a behavioral trait in one or a
few societies as couclusive evidence that the trait is
environrnentally induced and has no genetic disposition
in man. The very opposite could be true. In short,
there is a aeed for a discipline of anthropological
genetics" (Wilson, 1976, p.550).
Other researchers frora the group emphasizing the
differences in cognitive functioning look for a socio-
logical explanation, attempting to draw conclusions
concerning cognitive processes from an analysis of the
culture in which the individual participates. Among
this group of researchers eau be classified, among
others, Lévy-Bruhl, whose data Vygotskij repeatedly
refers to. This method has been attacked by, among
others, Boas, Kohier and Bartlett (Cole and Scribner,
1974, p.!9ff). The oost fundaraental objection raised by
these critics is aioed at the method's indirectness. Is
it possible to draw conclusions about thought processes
based on an analysis of the products of culture?
A third school attempts to reduce cultural differ-
ences in cognition to psychological causes. To this
school belong, among others, the developmental psycho-
logists Heinz Werner and Jerotne Bruner, whose thinking
exhibits a great similarity to that of the Cultural-
Historical School of Vygotskij and his associates.
According to Bruner, intelligence is largely a result
of the internalization of the tools provided by a par-
ticular culture, tools being used here in the broadest
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sense of the word, under which Bruner also classifies
symbolic systerns (Bruner, Olver and Greenfield, 1966).
Cultures differ with respect to the tools they provide
the individual with and regarding the social institu*
tions developed to transmit knowledge and skilis (Cole
and Scribner, 1974, p.24).
A majority of the researchers discussed up to this
point were inspired by the notion of evolution. A
majority of tbose to be discussed now can be classified
amcng the structuralists. In this group, there is au
inclination to regard observed cultural differences as
external phenomena. They are the expression of common
underlying cognitive structures. In anthropology, for
example, it is regularly claimed that cultural differ-
ences in cognition lie in the area of the content of
thought processes. They are differences in convictions,
notions and beliefs. On the other hand, cognitive
processes proceed the same everywhere. In every cultu-
re, attempts are made to uncover cause and effect
relationships, with thought proceding according to the
principles of abstraction and generalization. At pre-
sent, this view is typified by Claude Lévi-Strauss. To
his mind, the intellect works identically in all cul-
tures and has also not changed during the period of
homo sapiens either. Only the material that is used for
thought differs per culture (for example, the attri-
butes used in forming classes). To Lévi-Strauss, this
also meaas that there cannot possibly be different
levels of cogaitive development in different cultures.
In our discussion of Lévy-Bruhl, an objection was
already mentioned that is also applicable to Lévi-
Strauss' procedure: there is danger in basing con-
clusions regarding thought processes on an analysis of
cultural products and institutions (ways of classifi-
cation, myths, etc.).
A similar objection can also be raised with res-
pect to psycholinguistic researchers. There is certain-
ly no clear support for the hypothesis that grammatica!
rules in linguistics correspond to psychological thought
processes. This does not alter the fact that linguistic
structuralist», with its undisputed leader Hoam Chomsky,
has had a great influence on psychology. This school
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pointed, for example, to the fact that languages cannot
be classified according to their difficulty. Regardless
of the abovementioned objections to its procedure,
structural linguistics has shown that it is impossible
to deduce anythiug about levels of thought on the basis
of (supposed) differences in the levels of languages.
All languages have certain structural characteristics
in common. According to Chomsky (1968) for example, all
seutences are generaled by means of fonnational and
transformational rules. In addition to claiming that
the basic structures of all languages are identical, hè
also assumes that all children possess a certain innate
aptitude enabling them to learn a language (see Cole
and Bruner: in Berry and Dasen, 1973).
All in all, it can be said that through the in-
fluence of the structural school in linguistics, cul-
tural differences in cognitive functioning are seen
more as exterior phenomena than as differences caused
by differences in basal cognitive processes. The ques-
tion then arises as to what position the cultural-his-
torical theory of Vygotskij and his associated occupies
in this "mixed bag" of theories. Well, Vygotskij ar-
rivés at a sort of synthesis of the ideas described
above, which states that people from different cultures
have both common psychological processes and differen-
ces in cognition. The lower psychological functions are
universal, being by and large psychophysical in nature
and strongly determined by the basal processes arising
through evolution (sensations, eleraentary forms of
attention and memory). Being mediated by language,
however, the higher psychological functions differ
according to culture. This hypothesis would appear easy
to test (assuniing the distinction between higher and
lower functions is workable, see above), hut up to now,
this has never occurred systematically. To our mind,
the principal conclusion that can be drawn frora Vygots-
kij 's theory is that the origin of any differences
ascertained between cultures and peoples should not be
sought in certain stable (genetically determined)
characteristics of individuals but in their personal
histories. It is ia the contact between individuals and
the culture that their higher psychological functions
develop.
78 CRITICA! PSYCHOLOGY
It was with this idea in mind that Lurija went to
Uzbekistan in 1931 and 1932. In particular, hè very
much wished to disprove the thesis of Koffka and other
Gestalt psychologists that visual illusions occur in
every culture in the same way. Koffka himself partici-
pated in the second expedition, but left after a time
due to illness. Details on his participation and the
relationship between Koffka and Vygotskij can be found
in Mecacci (1981), Scheerer (1980a) and Koffka (1981).
Imagine Lurija's enthousiasm when it appeared that the
residents of Uzbekistan, indeed, showed hardly a tracé
of the classical illusions. Cole mentions that Lurija
immediately wired these results to Vygotskij (Cole, in:
Lurija, 1979b, p.213). At that time, agriculture in
Uzbekistan was just being collectivized, which meant
that farmers were forced to join the kolkhoz (collec-
tive farms). Lurija wisely refrains from mentioning to
what extent this was accompanied by violence. We also
do not know if Lurija whole-heartedly agreed with these
measures, simply tried to save his own skin or had a
blind spot for the ethical aspects of scientific re-
search. The fact is, however, that more than once, hè
participated in somewhat dubious research (Lurija,
1979b, p.202/3). Be that as it may, the collectivi-
zation measures resulted in a transitional situation.
On the one hand, there were the "traditional" farmers,
who could neither read nor write and never left their
native village, and on the other the "revolutionary"
farmers, who joined the kolkhoz and/or received a
number of years of schooling. Due to the considerable
obstacles their Islamic religion presented to their
participation in public life, the women formed a se-
parate group. Lurija's basic design was to form two,
three or four groups and present them with tests con-
cerning perception, classification, logical inference,
etc. From the difference in achievement between the
groups, hè then deduced how the social structure, i.e.
(non) membership in the kolkhoz or (non)attendance of
schooling, detennined the structure of the higher
psychological functions.
From a technical point of view, this is an example
of an ex-post-facto design with all its drawbacks
(Campbell and Stanley, 1966). In addition, insight into
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the study's value is harapered by Lurija's providing
very little Information on the composition of the
experimental groups. These groups differed in their
"educational level". Even assuming that Lurija would
have been capable of distinguishing two or more dis-
tinct classes of "educational level", a nuraber of
problems still arise. He tells us nothing about whether
or not the subjects were matched for sex, age, etc. We
also do not know if during the interview, the conductor
of the experiment was unaware of the "educational
level" of the subject (the double-blind procedure). As
is customary with Soviet psychological research, there
is also no statistical analysis of the results. We
shall therefore suffice with a description of a single
section of Lurija's extensive study, that concerning
the classification of objects.
The subjects were presented with 19 geometrical
figures drawn on cards. The first task was to name the
figures. In this, Lurija distinguishes abstract and
concrete Identification. He speaks of an abstract
Identification if the subject identifies the stimulus
as an example of a geometrical category (for example:
triangle, square, etc.). An Identification is concrete
if it deraonstrates that the subject regards the stimu-
lus as an object. The results are shown in Table 1.1.
TABLE 1.1
Number of concrete identifications
of geometrical figures in relation
to "educational level" (in
percentages)
Type of
subject
Number of Concrete
subjects identification
Women without any
educatiou 18
Women participants in
courses 35
Participants in kolkhoz 24
Pupils teachers polytech 12
100
85,3
59
15,2
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It can be seen here that while the concrete iden-
tification of geometrical figures still completely
dominates the answers of women with ao formal educa-
tion, this Identification has strongly declined with
the pupils of the teachers polytech (a course at se-
condary school level). This is accompanied by a com-
mensurate increase in abstract identifications. In
Table 1.2, are shown a number of examples of concrete
identifications of objects.
TABLE 1.2
Concrete descrïptions of the
objects
O
u
A
O
"raoon"
"bracelet"
"mountain"
"clock"
•
D
a
J **
"coin"
"bucket"
"mirror"
"bird-cage"
In all likelihood, the identification of objects
also influences their classification. To iuvestigate
this Lurija asked the participants to divide the fi-
gures into groups. They were free to classify the fi-
gures as they pleased. The results are shown in Table
1.3.
Lurija interprets the results of the Tables 1.1,
1.2 and 1.3 as follows: The daily activity of, in
particular, the groups of women lacking formal educa-
tion is strongly related to concretely observable
raatters. This is also reflected in the way they iden-
tify objects. Once these figures have been identified
concretely (that is, as being objects), this plays a
role in classification. It is simply absurd to place
the BIOOB, a bracelet and a coin together in one group
for in daily life, these objects have nothing to do
with one another. And so subjects either give up clas-
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TABLE 1.3
The classificatïon of geoaetrical figures
in relation to "educational level" (in
percentages)
Type of
subject
Wonen without
any education
Women partici-
Participants
in (colkhoz
Pupils teachers
polytech
Nunber of
subjects
18
35
24
10
Refusal to
clafsify as
object
21.8 20.4
18.3 8.4
12.8 11.6
-
Classificatican
accordieg to
individual
features
57.8
55
30.8
-
according to
geonetrical
-
18.3
44.8
100
sification altogether (they see no relation between the
objects whatsoever) or they classify them as objects
according to individual graphic features. A "roof" (A)
and a "house" (Q), for example, are thea classified
together, for in daily life they are also always asso-
ciated with one another. Only after the subjects begin
to work together with others and attend schooling do
they become capable of more abstract classification
principles. Lurija concludes this section of the study
with this remark: "We must therefore conclude that to a
significant extent, even relatively simple perceptual
processes, such as the perception of [...] simple
geometrical figures, is dependent upon the nature of
the subjects1 practical experience and their cultural
level".
We should only like to add here that demonstrating
the influence of daily experience on thought processes
is one thing, but what interests psychologists is how
and in what areas that experience exerts such influen-
ce. Is it training at (primary) school that raises the
thought processes to a forma! level? And more particu-
larly: what specifically defined operations were Lu-
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rija's uneducated subjects incapable of? True, using
such terms as "social determiaatioa" or even "the in-
fluence of the school" does point to the important as-
pect of the social influence upon the structure of cog-
nitive processes, but fails to indicate concretely how
the cognitive structures then change.
Twins
Early in the nineteen thirties, Lurija and nis
co-workers had the opportunity of collaborating with
the Medico-Genetic Institute in Moscow, where research
was done, among other things, into the early develop-
roent of mono- and dizygotic twins. Although the Lysenko
af f air had not yet broken upon the scène at this time,
this research had heavily political overtones. In the
Sovjet Union, as we know, great emphasis was placed
upon the influence of the (system of) society in mould-
ing the individual, and any opposition by obstinaat
genes was met with only the most unfavourable of com-
mentary (see, however, Eysenck, 1982). This was also
the reason that a large percentage of the research
material Lurija collected was lost, leaving us only
with a number of rather general descriptions (see
Lurija, 1935, 1936, 1963, 1971, 1979b; Vygotskij,
1983),
Lurija's approach to the nature-nurture problem
was drawn entirely from the ideas of Vygotskij. Al-
though hè and bis associates were familiar with the
research of, for example, Cyril Burt, they chose to
follow their own course. One of Lurija's objections was
that these researchers made use of the I.Q.-tests,
which to him was not a suitable means of roeasuririg the
workings of the intellect. "These test, which were
developed on a purely pragmatic basis to predict school
performance, seeraed to us then, as now, to be a hope-
lessly atheoretical and opaque means of observing the
structure of higher psychological functions" (Lurija,
1979b, p.82). Lurija and his co-workers therefore
decided to approach the matter differently. They de-
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signed a series of tests in the area of higher psycho-
logical functions with a view to investigating their
development. Ia the area of memory, for example, they
used three memory tests devised by Leont'ev. But before
describing these tests, we shall briefly discuss the
difference between higher and lower psychological
functions in the area of memory.
As did Vygotskij, Lurija believed it actually
possible to distinguish so-called "natural" lower
raemory processes from so-called "mediated" higher
memory processes. He assumed, for example, that through
a particular memory test, for example having to repeat
a series of nurabers, the "natural memory" could be
neasured with a fair degree of accuracy. From inter-
views with subjects, Lurija deduced whether or not hè
was dealing with an actual case of raemory based upon
natural processes. If the interviews indicated that
subjects had in no way structured or recoded the mate-
rial, Lurija determined that they had relied upon their
natural memory. If, however, the subject appeared to
have looked for and found certain verbal or logical
relationships in the material, the subject's test
results were presumed to be based upon culturally
mediated higher memory processes. From this point of
view, abstract stimulus material provides a more accur-
ate estimate of the "natural" memory than of the
"higher" raemory. During child development, however,
changes occur in both the natural and the culturally
mediated raemory, both of which expand. According to
Lurija, earlier research had indicated that in solving
memory problems, children of 5 to 7 years of age still
use a primarily "natural" approach, while children of
11 to 13 start with a predominantly culturally mediated
approach. Lurija therefore sees the relationship be-
tween lower psychological memory processes (being
genetically determined) and the higher ones as follows.
In young children, lower memory processes dominate
(passive impression, unmediated by speech or symbols).
As the child grows older, the higher memory processes
begin to predominate. Both processes remain, however,
distinguishably intact, the memory capacity in both
cases increasing.
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Lurija's idea was now to test the above hypothesis
by raeans of research into twins. His reasoning is that
in tests calling for the use of the primarily geneti-
cally determined "natural" memory, the test results of
monozygotic, identical twins would be approximately the
sarae, even if they were reared in different environ-
ments. But memory tests calling for the use of cul-
turally mediated processes will be dealt with almost
identically even by dizygotic, non-identical twins,
assuming of course they have been exposed to the saaie
cultural influences (see Vygotskij, 1983, p.131-132).
Table 1.4 shows the distribution of the 100 sets of
twins Lurija used in his experiment.
TABLE 1.4
Distribution of 100 sets of twins
according to type and age
type of twins
monozygotic
dizygotic
age
5 - 7
25
25
11 - 13
25
25
As we have already stated, Lurija used in his
study three memory tests designed by Leont'ev. In view
of the fact that in his analysis, Lurija only utilized
the results of two of them, we shall confine our dis-
cussion to those two tests. In the first test, af ter
having been shown 9 geometrical figures, the children
had to try to re-identify them when shown in a collec-
tion of 34 such figures. In a second test, the children
were shown 15 words accorapanied by pictures hearing no
obvious relation to them. The children were repeatedly
shown these words until they knew the entire series. If
they required support from the pictures in rememhering
the words, they had to draw a relationship between the
word and the picture itself. Lurija regarded this task
—J
^
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as a suitable means of measuring culturally mediated
memory. The child can use the pictures as a mnernonic,
and therefore cultural device, thereby increasing the
capacity of the natural memory.
After presenting the children with both these
tests, the following results were obtained (see Table
1.5).
TABLE 1.5
The relationship between age and type of memory
for identical and non-identical twins
age type of test
"natural" test "mediated" test
5 -
11 -
7
13
j)
d
18 >
14 >
D
m
5.4
5.6
D,d
4.4 >
1.2
D
m
1.9
1.5
D, = the difference in test scores between dizygotic
(non-identical) twins;
D = the difference in test scores betveen monozygotic
(identical) twins;
> = larger than {not tested statistically).
In a quantitative sense, these results bear out
Lurija's expectations. For tests in which the natural,
direct memory dominates, the results at both age leveIs
for identical twias bear much greater similarity than
those of non-identical twins (in both cases, D , > D ) .
u m
In the test drawing upon the mediated memory, the same
pattern can be seen for the young children (4.4 is
larger than 1.9), but for the older children, B, and D
are nearly identical (1.2 is approximately equal to
1.5). This is exactly what Lurija had expected, for in
this second test, genetically determined, natural
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memory processes no longer play a role: the children
use culturally mediated forms of memorization.
Lurija's assuraptions were also confinned by the
qualitative analysis. Interviews with the children
indicated that for the "natural" test, both older and
younger children metaorize in an eleraentary fashion.
Hardly any of the children used indirect or logical
processes in remembering the geometrical figures
(Lurija, 1979b, p.85). For the second test, though,
considerable differences emerged between younger and
older children. Most of the 5 to 7 year-olds memorized
the words in the second test in the same direct fashion
as they memorized the geometrical figures in the first;
they were incapable of utilizing the pictures, of
making a logical connection between them and the words.
"The children were completely unable to say anything
about the relationship between the words they had
remembered and the pictures they had seen. When we
asked the children about how they remembered the words,
they usually responded: I just remembered them. I do
not believe that their answers reflect a lack of intro-
spection. Their memory was simply not mediated by the
pictures" (Lurija, 1979b, p.85-86).
Several objections can be made with respect to
this study. Let us first try to discern from Lurija's
incomplete description what tests the children were
actually presented with. In the first test, the child-
ren were presented with 9 geometrie figures which
they then had to identify among a collection of 34
figures. This, then, was a visual recognition test. We
assume that the other 25 figures were of the same type
(triangles, squares, circles, etc.) as the first 9. But
it is unclear how similar the 34 figures were and if
the children received any information in this regard.
And yet this is of immediate importance to the memory
process. If all the figures were very similar, an
extensive internal coding process would be needed. If
there is little similarity, simply having the children
examine the figures is probably sufficient; the 9
figures in questiou would then be identified automati-
cally. It is also unknown how much time elapsed between
the presentation of the 9 figures to be remembered and
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the presentation of the entire collection. And yet
this, too, raay determine a particular memorization
strategy.
In the second test, 15 word-picture combinations
were presented. From the description, we infer that in
the first instance, the children were asked to memorize
the series of fifteen words. This, then, is a recollec-
tion test. Actually, we do not know if the words were
presented visually or auditorially. It is unclear how
the simultaneous presentation of pictures can facili-
tate the meraorization of the word-series and whether or
not the childrea knew that after the memorization
stage, they would be asked to name the words solely on
the basis of seeing the accompanying pictures. It would
appear to us that two different memorization processes
are at work here; one involving learning 15 words in a
particular order (possibly constructing a relationship
between one word and the next) and the other involving
learning 15 word-picture combinations (perhaps attempt-
ing to describe the word and the picture in one senten-
ce). In both cases, it is possible to tackle the pro-
blera with either "brutal force", i.e. simply "drumming"
the series of words or word-picture cojnbinations into
one's head, or with a more subtle method, for example
by constructing a running story on the basis of the
pictures or the words. To what extent the stimuli
allowed for this possibility is unknown.
So in both tests, it is unclear what the children
were actually assigned to do. Both allow for different
memorization strategies ("drilling" versus extensive
verbal description or structuring). Because it was less
abstract, the material from the second, mediated test
probably lends itself better to verbal recoding. But to
our raind, this does not automatically indicate a relian-
ce upon natural, genetically detennined memory process-
es in the "natural" first test. It is even questionable
whether such processes exist. From perceptual psycholo-
gy we know that learning to recognize and differentiate
between simple, abstract figures is also greatly depen-
dent upon experience. We are therefore inclined to see
the difference between the first and second memory test
not so much as one between a "natural", genetically
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determined test and a "culturally mediated" test, but
far sooner as a difference in the extent to wtiich the
raaterial allowed for verbal description and structur-
ing. Ia addition, a recollection test probably requires
a more active, structuring role from a subject than an
recognition test.
In brief, to our mind, two entirely different
tests are being compared here, but the difference has
nothing to do with the nature-culture problem. It was
naïve of Vygotskij and Lurija to believe that it was
still possible to encounter almost entirely genetically
determined processes in 5 to 7 year-olds. Here again,
the earlier criticized dichotomy between natural,
passive lower functions and cultural, higher ones takes
its toll. On top of that there are many deficiencies in
the design and description of the study. This makes it
difficult to draw any definite conclusions from it. It
would first appear necessary to replicate the study,
this time meeting the above mentioned objectives.
Perhaps such a replication would result in a confirma-
tion of Vygotskij's optimistic assertion that "the
results of experimental studies demonstrate that the
higher psychological processes can be educated more
easily, for the source of the development of their
structures is the collective education of the child"
(Vygotskij, 1931, in: Vygotskij, 1983, p.132).
VYGOTSKIJ ON RESEARCH METHODS
In one of the first paragraphs of this chapter we
mentioned some of Vygotskij's epistemological points of
view. In the preceding paragraphs, we discussed two
cultural-historical research projects. We clearly saw
how Vygotskij's theoretical approach determined the
experimental designs. We will now deal with his view on
research methods more explicitly. To Vygotskij's mind,
the cultural-historical theory of higher psychological
functions also gives rise to a new research strategy.
In the final analysis, hè remarks, research methods are
always a reflection of the way fundamental problems in
T
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psychology are viewed and resolved- But in order to see
the research strategy Vygotskij advocates in its proper
context, his view of the methods used until that time
sbould first be considered.
The Stinmlus-Response Model
According to Vygotskij, psychology up to then had
been dominated by the so-called stimulus-response
model. That is to say, the experimenter presents the
subject with a stimulus and then monitors the subject's
response to it. This applied to both the objectivistic
school in psychology, with which the names of Watson
and Bechterev are associated (and in the borderline
area between physiology and psychology, of course, the
name of Pavlov), and to the subjective psychology of
the Würzburg school and Wundt. Vygotskij believed that
although these two schools do differ in their theore-
tical interpretation of data, they both embrace the
same methodological approach. This also applies to
Wundt's psychophysics, which ultimately regarded the
essence of the psychological asethod as the systernatic
variation of stimuli that result in a change in the
processes they are associated with (Vygotskij, 1978,
p.59). Vygotskij does, by the way, believe there are
good sides to the stimulus-response model. To his mind,
it brought psychology closer to the methodology and
spirit of the natural sciences and paved the way for an
objective psychological approach (Vygotskij, 1978,
p.59). But with this approach it is only possible to
study lower psychological functions, representing the
passive aspect of human behavior. Wundt, too, had said
as much, and for that reason had excluded the higher
psychological functions from the experimental approach
(see above).
The stimulus-response model, however, does not do
justice to those active components so characteristic of
human behavior. This can be demonstrated as follows: It
had already been stated by Pavlov that both humans and
animals had one fundamental type of behavior in common,
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that of signalizat ion. In other words, both humans and
auiraals are capable of learning to make a connection
between two stimuli such that one stimulus begins to
function as a sigtial for the other. Pavlov also regard-
ed words as being such stimuli (the second signal
system). According to Vygotskij, however, huraaas pos-
sess an extra faculty separating them from every ani-
mal, that of signification. "... human behavior is dis-
tinguished by the very fact that man creates artificial
signal stimuli, among uhich is the "great signaling
capacity" of speech, and thus masters the signal acti-
vities of the cerebral heraispheres . . . the fundamental
and most general activity distinguisbing man from
anima Is, psychologically speaking, is signification,
i. e. the creation and use of signs" (Vygotskij, 1977b,
P- 62).
It is with the help of these self-created stimuli
(the signs) that humans become capable of directing
their own behavior. Most of the signs are acquired by
the human child through its contact with adults. The
child assimilates these signs through its contact with
adults, in particular the signs of language (words and
concepts). Uut humans also construct non-lingual signs.
This is illustrated by the so-called rudimentary psycho-
logical functions . These functions are remnants of the
historical development of the human species. An example
of a rudimentary function is the memory aid. Imagine,
for example, that l get instructions (stimuli) to
perform a certain act (response) later in the day. I
can now attempt to "drill" the connection between
stimulus and response (with or without intervening
links) into my head. This is what occurs with adults in
a vast majority of cases. In that case, the creation of
the artificial links between stimulus and response is
no longer visible. But I can also tie a string around
my finger. In that way, I myself create an artificial
external stimulus (a sign) with a view to influencing
my own behavior (Vygotskij, 1982a, p.lOSff). Instead
of the model S •+ E, we get the mediated model
R
X
(sign)
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Vygotskij calls memory aids rudimentary psycholo-
gical functions because hè assumes that all psychologi-
cal behavior has its origin in external social behavior
(the principle of internalization). For most functions,
this process is no longer visible. Sometimes, however,
we are fortunate enough to have artificially created
stimuli that are not yet internalized. Ia addition, it
is possible to present the subject with signs, words or
concepts and ia so doing provoke an internalization
process. This provides us with the opportunity of
observing the internalization process in vivo.
The rudimentary psychological functions therefore
demonstrate that humans do not react passively, as in
the stitnulus-response model, but create stimuli them-
selves, which in turn influence their own behavior.
Vygotskij: "Man1s active alteration of nature is the
central characteristic of human adaptation. The alter-
ation of nature by man is the foundation of all human
history. By necessity it also presupposes the active
alteration of human behavior. Influencing the natural
environment and changing it through his activity,
writes K. Marx, man simultaneously changes his own
nature" (Vygotskij, 1977b, p.62/63).
A New Approach
For Vygotskij then, the stimulus-response approach
has little to recommend for itself. In line and inter-
mingled with his cultural-historical theory, hè there-
fore attempted to find a new methodology for psycholo-
gical research. In doing so, his departure point is the
distinction Engels raakes between naturalistic and
dialectical approaches to human history. According to
Engels, the substance of the naturalistic approach to
history was the assumption that nature alone influences
human beings and that historical development is only
deterraiued by natural conditions. On the other hand,
while the dialectical approach admits of nature's in-
fluence upon human beings, it also posits that in turn,
human beings influence nature. Through these cbanges in
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nature, they create new natural conditions for their
existence. 11 is this picture that Vygotskij also
believes applicable to the situation in psychology. All
the stimulus-respouse methods share the shortcomings
Engels ascribed to the naturalist approach to history
(Vygotskij, 1978, p.61). They see the relationship
between humati behavior and nature as reactive one-vay
traffic.
Vygotskij elucidates bis research strategy, in
which hè attempts to avoid the error described above,
on the basis of three concept-pairs, namely (1) object-
process, (2) explanation-description, and (3) fossil-
genetic. Each of the concept-pairs expresses an aspect
of bis method. Regarding the first concept-pair, hè re-
marks that all the psychologists of his day regarded
the psychological functions as objects (the Gestalt
psychologist Koffka had said this as well) requiring
analysis as to their constituent components. It is, of
course, a valid approach, but it should be complemented
with the genetic approach. For every psychological
process is continually changing, and in order to ac-
quire a full understanding of a higfaer psychological
process, these changes too, must be studied (Vygotskij,
1978, p.61). This can be done by observing the process
of change, but also by eliciting this change. This is
why Vygotskij, like Werner, calls this strategy the
experiraental-genetic approach. By means of this ap-
proach, it is possible to reconstruct all the stages in
the process' development.
Vygotskij illustrates this by means of the tvo
other concept-pairs. He states that a psychological
process can be analyzed in two ways: in its present
manifestation, as it is now, i.e. pheuotypically, or
according to its development or origin, i.e. genotypi-
cally (Vygotskij adopted this distinction from the
Gestalt psychologist K. Lewin). This is for him an
important distinction, for two psychological processes
may very well be phenotypically identical, but at the
same time be genotypically (or as Vygotskij at times
expresses it, causal-dynaraically) radically different.
Vygotskij gives the example of the language of a child
of oue and a half to two years old, greatly resembling
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the language of adults. But from a genetic or genotypi-
cal point of view, the language of a two year old and
that of an adult are not related at all. On the other
hand, egocentric speech and internal speech do differ
phenotypically, while genotypically they are strongly
related. Vygotskij relates this, to him, important
distinctioo to Marx's observation that if "the source
of things were to correspond with the form of their
external manifest at ion, every science would be super-
fluous". He might. also have referred to the distinction
Erscheinung-Wesen (appearance-essence), which we poin-
ted out ia our paragraph on Hegel.
Vygotskij classifies those who suffice with an
analysis of the external manifestation of psychological
processes as the descrïptive psychologists. Those who
in addition also conduct genotypical analyses earn the
title of objective psychologist (see Vygotskij, 1978,
p.63). To Vygotskij, exclusively phenotypical aualysis
is so often inadequate because existing behavior is
often fossil behavior. With this hè means that many
psychological processes have already undergone their
development. So f ar as their development is concerned,
they have, as it were, already died and are analyzed
posthumously. This applies in particular to automa-
tisms. The special characteristics of fossil behavior
can only be understood by means of an analysis that
takes account of its developmental history. As did
Blonskij, Vygotskij posits that psychology should not
study the product of a long development, but the deve-
lopmental process: behavior can only be understood as
the history of behavior (Vygotskij, 1978, p.65).
Some Techniques
Until now, we have actually done nothing more than
to present a number of theoretical considerations
underlying Vygotskij's research strategy and arisiag
from his cultural-historical method. But Vygotskij also
used a number of devices and methods to uncover the
origins of behavior, which we shall now briefly dis-
cuss.
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In a number of problem-solving situations, Vygots-
kij firstly often introduces obstacles or difficulties
interfering with routine solution processes. For exatn-
ple, in a study on children's coramunication and the
function of egocentric speech, Vygotskij gave children
the task of working together with children that spoke
another language or were deaf (Vygotskij, 1978, p.12).
Secondly, Vygotskij often presented the children with
external aids that could be used in finding a solution
in a problem-solving situation. In this case, hè was
interested in seeing how the children used these aids
(signs) in reaching a solution and to what extent this
process was related to age. This was connected with
his view of higher psychological processes as processes
involving the use of Instruments or tools (see above).
Thirdly, Vygotskij confronted children with a task that
was actually beyond their knowledge and skills. The
intention was to discover what rudimentary capacities
and skills the child had already acquired (the zone of
proxiraal development, see above).
It can be easily seen here that what the three
techniques have in common is that they are designed to
exposé behavioral development. In addition, no attempt
is made with these techniques to limit behavior or to
observe a particular aspect of behavior through syste-
matic variation of a stimulus. On the contrary, in
Vygotskij's experiments, the child is given the room to
exhibit all kinds of behavior. It is, after all, the
way the child analyzes its behavior that interests
Vygotskij.
It is said of psychology that interesting conclu-
sions are rarely valid and valid conclusions rarely
interesting, This dilemma is also applicable to Vygots-
kij and his associates. Many of his findings are extre-
mely interesting. But are they also valid? We are not
really in a position to judge that here, siraply because
the reporting of the research is so incomplete. The
experiments are discussed by Vygotskij and his asso-
ciates only in outline fonn, without providing the raw
data and neglecting to subject them to any statistical
operations. Often, the research design is also only
described in the briefest of terras. The suspicion
w
M
CULTURAL-HISTORICAL SCHOOL 95
arises that jnany of the studies with which Vygotskij
illustrates his brilliant structures are not, in fact,
very significant at all. Cole, too, has expressed this
criticism (in: Vygotskij, 1978, p.11). In his intellec-
tual biography, in fact, Lurija also fully acknowledges
this criticism. "The individual studies that we carried
out at this time ... must be considered banal in and of
themselves. Today we would consider them nothing more
than student projects. And this is exactly what they
were." (lurija, 1979b, p.5l). It would appear that more
than being an empirical researcher, Vygotskij was in
essence a theorist who succeeded in elegantly applying
and refining the dialectic-ajaterialistic classics in
psychology (Radzichovskij, 1979, 1982; Jarosevskij and
Gurgenidze, 1977). Though hè valued the importance of
the experiment, Vygotskij himself was a system-builder,
who left the laborious work of systematic experimenta-
tion to his co-workers Lurija, Leont'ev and others. In
this regard, it is interesting to compare Vygotskij
with his contemporary Piaget. Piaget, too, was by and
large a theorist whose experiments were more an illu-
stration of an all-embracing theory than a test of its
validity, It is perhaps possible to tracé this simila-
rity between these great researchers to their familia-
rity with the ideas of Freud. It is, after all, known
that Piaget borrowed his clinical method from psycho-
analysis and in any case, we know that throughout his
entire life, Lurija regarded the clinical session as a
valuable research technique. If Vygotskij was also
influenced by Freud in this regard, it becomes clearer
why his research is actually more diagnostic than
experimental (see also chapter II and III for recent
developments regarding the role of the experiment in
psychological research).
Finally, as did Cole, we mention a mimber of con-
sequences of a more general nature that Vygotskij's
research approach has for contemporary psychology
(Cole, in: Vygotskij, 1978, p. H), Firstly, in scien-
tific research, both qaalitative and quantitative data
should be of iraportance. Secondly, we can conclude from
his work that to Vygotskij, pure laboratory research
does not occupy a prominent place in research practice
as a whole. It is just as good, i f not better, to
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conduct experiments or observations at school or in
play si.tuati.ons. Thirdly, with Vygotskij, the strict
boundaries between the different sciences concerned
with humans and their culture become blurred. If we are
to build the foundations of a cultural-historical
theory, we will have to make use of data from develop-
raental psychology, pedagogy and neurology, from socio-
logy and anthropology.
COHCLÜSIONS
In the preceding paragraphs, we have discussed
some of the most important ideas of Vygotskij and his
co-workers. Much, however has had to be left undiscus-
sed. Even now, after 50 years, we are still impressed
by the abundance of ideas Vygotskij formulated in less
than a decade. Lurija has even written that by the end
of the twenties, the course of his own further career
was already established: hè would devote his remaining
years to developing Vygotskij's ideas (Lurija, 1979b,
p.56). It is therefore difficult to pass a final judge-
ment on the Cultural-Historical School.
Vygotskij, Lurija and Leont'ev began their recon-
struction of psychology with no small pretentions.
Broadly, their research was as follows. Firstly, they
wished to tracé the development of the higher psycholo-
gical functions from the natural, biological functions.
This was the developmental branch of their research.
Secondly, the three researchers and their associates
wished to study disturbances of the higher psychologi-
cal functions resulting from brain damage. This was the
pathological branch of their research (see the para-
graph on the physiological substratum).
Their developmental research comprised three
themes, each touching upon a different aspect of the
biological-cultural relationship in human cognitive
development. The first theme was to investigate the
determinants of the structure that higher psychological
functions assume in child development through the
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culture in which the iadividual grows up. To this end,
a sort of cultural-anthropological study was conducted
(see the paragraph on Uzbekistan). The second research
therae included the loagitudinal study of identical
(raoaozygote) and non-identical (dizygote) twins. A
comparison of mono- and dizygote twins offered the
opportunity of unraveling the influence of nature and
culture. The research approach used, however, differed
from the approach customary in the West (see the para-
graph ou twins). The third research therae concerned a
comparative study of the intellectual development of
aormal and several types of "disabled" children (see
the paragraph on the disabled child).
The combination of the developmental and patholo-
gical branches should then elucidate the relationship
betweeu the biological and cultural aspects of the
development of the higher psychological functions. But
this research plan was only concerned with human onto-
genesis. In addition, Vygotskij and his colleagues
claimed to have provided an air-tight theory of human
phylogenesis. Of course, the history of human develop-
ment does not lend itself to stringent experiraental
testing. The data in this area are, indeed, of a rather
speculative nature, and in Vygotskij's day this was
even more the case. Some researchers, for exaraple,
regard tool-naking and hunting as the start of an
accelerated evolution resulting in the homo sapiens.
Tool-making requires a more complex neurological orga-
nization and toois increase the chance of survival. But
for the time being, there is painfully little evidence
to support such speculations (see Leakey, 1981; Klix,
1980). In addition, the category labor as used in the
dialectical tradition is not easy to operationalize. In
any case, Vygotskij does not regard the use of tools as
labor. Indeed, Kohier had already demonstrated that
chimpanzees can also make and use tools. But Marx and
Engels had written that labor played a decisive role in
human development. In the preface to one of Kohier's
books translated into Russian, Vygotskij attempts to
resolve this s eenling contradiction (Vygotskij, 1930,
iu: Vygotskij, 1982a, pp.210-220). Though hè acknow-
ledges that there is a gradual transition between the
use of tools by animals and that by humans, hè still
98 CRITICA! PSYCHOLOGY
sees a qualitative difference. According to Vygotskij,
tools played EO role whatsoever in the chirapanzee's
struggle for existence or adaptation to the environ-
ment. It can therefore not be said that the use of
tools was characteristic of the ape. But as Marx and
Engels had already argued, this was the case for huraan
beings.
There is also great uncertainty concerning the
time at which speech developed. Wilson, for example,
wonders if speech originated more than two million
years ago with the Australopitheeus-anthropoids or much
more recently with the homo sapiens (approximately
100.000 years ago). On the basis of the shape of the
palate, for example, researchers investigating this
problem attempt to determine whether or not a particu-
lar type of human was capable of speech. Not much is
clear in this area, although some researchers are
inclined to place the origin of speech very late in the
stage of homo sapiens (Wilson, 1976, p.559; teakey,
1981). All in all, it is not really possible to esti-
mate the value of the theses postulated by the anthro-
pology of the Cultural-Historical School. But the
fragmentary archeological data we do have do not appear
to run contrary to this historical materialistic theory
of the role of the labor and speech in the history of
human development (see Klix, 1980).
In the preceding paragraphs, we have more than
once criticized the view of Vygotskij and his asso-
ciates on the development of the higher psychological
functions. We shall therefore not repeat that criticism
here. It is clear that many of their notions require
clarification. Thorough research will have to demon-
strate, for example, whether the views of the Cultural-
Historical School can play a fruitful role in the
nature-nurture debate. Many of the cultural-historical
ideas, however, have already demonstrated their fruit-
fulness. We need ment ion only the internalization
theory, developed in a particular direction especially
by Gal'perin, and the ideas concerning the representa-
tion of the higher psychological functions in the
brain, further developed by Lurija. In addition, the
Cultural-Historical School also played an important
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role in the resistance to an S-R approach to human
behavior. Finally, Vygotskij and his co-workers de-
fended the combination of quantitative and qualitative
methods of research.
If we compare the material of the preceding para-
graphs with the earlier fonoulated research plan, we
can do little bat note that this plan has yet to be
fuifi l led. lts design was too ambitious. Rut as a
research program, it is still very capable of gene-
rating much fruitful study. Only through such study
will we know if the cultural-historical theory can
stand the wear and tear of time. "We know very well
that in taking the first step, we cannot avoid making
many, and perhaps serious mistakes. But the whole point
is that the first step should be taken in the rigbt
direction. The rest will take care of itself. What is
invalid will be eliminated. What is missing will be
supplied" (Vygotskij, 1983, p.342).
INTERMEZZO
Ia the second part of this book, we sball be dis-
cussing Holzkamp's Berlin School and Riegel's Dialec-
tical Psychology. Their origins, like those of the
Cultural-Historical School, are to be fouad in the
Soviet Union of the nineteen-twenties. The Berlin
School bases its work on that of Leont'ev, Vygotskij's
associate frora the very beginning, while Dialectical
Psychology drew its inspiration in particular from the
work of Vygotskij's contemporary, Rubinstejn. Vygots-
kij, Leont'ev and Rubinstejn all tried to develop a
dialectical psychology, based upon the work of Hegel,
Marx, Engels and Lenin. It is therefore not surprising
that there are so many parallels in the research and
theoretical approach of the three abovementioned
schools.
The parallels between the Cultural-Historical
School and the Berlin School are particularly clear.
The latter is, in f act, a further development of the
fortner; uot surprising in view of the f act that, as we
mentioned earlier, the Berlin School makes ample use of
Leont'ev1s work. In its initial Etages in particular,
Leont'ev1s work was entirely dominated by Vygotskij's
cultural-historical theory. His first experimental
research, into mediated meraory, was in fact a direct
demonstration of Vygotskij' s ideas on the role of the
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sign in psychological development. But even later, hè
continued to be greatly influenced by Vygotskij. In
discussing the six most important features of Leon-
t'ev's theory of activity, Wertsch (1981b) provides an
illustration of this influence; no less than four of
them prove to be adapted directly from Vygotskij's
work. This also applies to the functional-historical
method the Berlin School adapted from Leont'ev. This
method is a particularization of the developmental or
genetic explanation. To Vygotskij's mind as well,
genetic analysis can be as concerned with phylogenetic
and historical data as it is with ontogenetic data (see
Wertsch, 1981b, p.27). The anthropological model used
widely within the Berlin School is also strongly rela-
ted to Vygotskij's viewpoint. Characteristic in both
schools is that the biological aspect of any psycholo-
gical process is assigned a minor, prefatory role,
gradually overshadowed by cultural aspects.
From about 1940, Leont'ev begins to detach himself
somewhat from his mentor, emphasizing in particular the
concept of activity. According to Leont'ev, psycholo-
gical processes represent a particular form of activity
and are derived from people's involvement with external
objects (see Rahmani, 1973, p.47). He criticized Vy-
gotskij 's eraphasis on the role of social interaction
with adults in a child's psychological development.
These developments within the Cultural-Historical
School have already been described in the first part of
this book. In his criticism of Vygotskij, Leont'ev was
in all likelihood influenced by Rubinstejn (see Wertsch,
1981b, p.13). In fact, both Leont'ev and Rubinstejn
were seeking a better connection with Engels' "Dialec-
tics of Nature", which appeared in translation in 1925.
According to Engels, the oppositioa between nature and
spirit is not that of two different substances in a
particular genetic relationship. Consciousness is not a
thing in itself, but an attribute of material objects
organized in a certain way, or a process which takes
place within thera (see Kolakowski, 1981, p.379).
This monistic view, too, is clearly to be found in
Leont'ev and Rubinstejn, and it is also this view that
Riegel finds so appealing in Rubinstejn's work. He
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states that Rubinstejn's synthesis tries to overcome
the mind-body dualism wbich bas reraained unbridgeable
in Western thought and has led to the development of
several different 'psychologies'. According to Riegel,
the mental introspectionists such as Wundt, Titchener
and the psychologists at Würzburg focused exclusively
upon consciousness. Their opponents, the behaviorists,
focused upon the overt stimulation and overt reactions
of the organism (Riegel, 1979, p.29-30).
Rubinstejn emphasizes the unity of consciousness
and behavior. As did Leont'ev, hè puts forward a third
category from which to observe psychological develop-
ment: buman activity. Rubinstejn's conception of huraan
activity is that of a dialectic of subject and object.
In this conception, hè tended to emphasize the role of
independent exploration and interaction with the objec-
tive world as the source of our reflection on it (see
Wertsch, 1981b, p.13). As does Wertsch, we believe that
the principle difference betweeu Vygotskij and Rubin-
stejn is the importante the former ascribes to speech
and language. It was this eraphasis upon speech and
language that inclined Vygotskij to regard child de-
velopment as a result, in particular, of child-adult or
subject-subject interaction.
Another central idea in the work of Vygotskij,
Leont'ev and Rubinstejn is that all development is a
dialectical process. In Riegel's words: "Development
does not merely consist in the continuous accumulation
of information and goods but progresses in dialectical
leaps. Modifications are brought about by structural
changes created by the organism. But as these struc-
tures change, the functions change. The invention of
some tools and linguistic forms changes the expression
and significance of men's work and communication"
(Riegel, 1979, p.30). These words of Riegel's were
occasioned by Rubinstejn's work, but of course, dia-
lectics are also ever-present within the Cultural-His-
torical School. Vygotskij, for example, wrote in regard
to child development that it proceeds "dialectically
and through conflicts". Elsewhere, hè speaks of "the
drama of child development" (Vygotskij, 1983, p.161,
272). His work is filled with such statements, which
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are obviously incompatible with a conception of deve-
lopment as continuous accumulation.
But that is not all. The entire theory of lower
and highet psychological processes is a further deve-
lopment of Vygotskij's view of child development. By
utilizing cultural tools, huraans are capable of trans-
fonning their biological development into a cultural
development. As Riegel wrote: "At the beginning, the
development of an organism is mainly detennined by
biological evolution. With the historical growth of
psychic activities, however, development becomes co-
detennined by cultural-sociological evolution" (Riegel,
1978, p.12). Riegel's suggestion that the invention of
certain tools and linguistic forms changes the expres-
sion and significance of human labor and conununication
is also developed by Vygotskij. Actually, the tenor of
Vygotskij's work is rauch more radical. Through the use
of tools and signs (linguistic forms), the course of
all human development is altered. And in fact, Riegel
(1979) is giving a fair description of Vygotskij's
cultural historical theory when hè says that a bas ie
assumption of Dialectica! Psychology is that people
create language but, at the same time, are created by
it.
That Rubinstejn hardly knew of Vygotskij's work is
unfortunate, for we believe it would have appealed to
him greatly. Riegel, too, might have been assisted in
making his ideas more concrete by a familiarity with
Vygotskij's psychological work. More than Rubinstejn,
it was Vygotskij's strength that hè succeeded in apply-
ing dialectical materialist» to concrete psychological
research. This is in part the reason why we agree with
Wertsch (1981b, p.14) that Vygotskij's work was of more
significance to psychology than that of Rubinstejn. But
it is not our point here to pass final judgement on the
significance to psychology of the work of Rubinstejn,
Vygotskij or Leont'ev. It is more important to realize
that these figures grappled with the same problems and,
by and large, came up with the same Solutions. And it
is this fact that explains the great affinity between
the Cultural-Historical School, the Berlin School and
Dialectical Psychology.
PART II: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Chapter II:
The Berlin School Of Critical Psychology
IXTRODUCTION
Some Biographical Notes
According to Holzkamp's autobiographical notes
(Holzkamp, 1972, p. 207 ff), his first confrontation
with a critical approach to traditional psychology
consisted of his dispute with a student - Irmgard
Staeuble - about her master's thesis. This was in 1964.
This thesis was concerned witb a problem in the area of
research into prejudices and was written from the
viewpoint of the critical theory of the Frankfurt
School. It was the representatives of this school
- Adorno and Habemas - who had begun to challenge the
representatives of the traditional "positivistic"
approach, namely Popper and Albert (see Adorno et al.,
1978). These discussions about the foundations of
traditional scientific research, primarily restricted
to sociology, were to go down in history as the "posi-
tivism conflict". Two important themes in this debate
are the problem of research into the interrelation
between individual phenomena and the problem of values
in scientific research. With respect to the first
theme, there was the question of the possibility and
J
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necessity of the "pretence of totality", a notion held
particularly in (neo-)marxist circles. Does scientific
study consist of a series of detailed studies from
which insight into historical aad social interrelations
emerges, as it were, by coincidence? Or should one's
attention in each detailed study remain focused upon
the historical aad social context in which the detail
being examined is situated, ensuring the development of
a meaningful over-all view? The debate on values con-
cerned the question of the role of science in deternin-
ing the goals for which scientific knowledge should be
employed. In positivistic ranks, the position of value-
free science was defended, in particular with referen-
ces to the "naturalistic fallacy" (Hume). Science is
only capable of saying something meaningful about what
is; what should be, however, could never be logically
deduced trom purely factual premises. Science should
refrain from statements about the desirability of
particular norms, values aad goals. Alternatively, the
critical camp pointed to the inevitability of support-
ing or opposing certain goals for which knowledge is
employed. And because of this inevitability, it seemed
preferrable that science should responsibly, that is
rationally, consider these goals, rather than cling to
a semblance of neutrality.
Staeuble confronted her advisor with the necessity
of conducting this discussion araong psychologists as
well. From his positivistic poiat of view, Holzkamp had
initially made a good number of critical notes with
respect to the master's thesis mentioned above. But in
the course of the discussion, hè was more and more
inclined to take the view that psychology should not be
allowed to escape the criticism of the Fraukfurt School.
It did, indeed, appear that psychological research
restricted itself to tiny details of behavior which
were observed under very artificial experimental con-
ditions. To the extent that it was verified according
to the then current methodological criteria, psycholo-
gical knowledge was fragmented knowledge. The all-em-
bracing theories of such classical psychologists as
Freud had fallen from grace long before, at least from
the point of view of the dominating "positivistic"
thinkers. The clinical "holism" had in general made way
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for a scientifically oriented analytical approach.
Alternatively, the question rose, particularly ia
post-war Germany, to what extent psychology had sur-
rendered itself, by virtue of its demands of a value-
free science, to the values and nonns of dominant
groups in society? In Germany, recent history had
clearly demonstrated that a system of values can become
totally perverted when science, as in the "positivis-
tic" conception, functions uncritically. The idea of
value-free science was therefore difficult to defend.
Critical students in particular raised the question
whether psychology should not protect itself from such
catastrophic instances of 'value-breakdown'. Should it
not take the initiative and determine in a more ra-
tional way which values and norms should guide scien-
tific research and the application of scientific know-
ledge? (Note: in this and the following paragraphs we
used material from Van Uzendoorn and Van der Veer,
1983.)
The Development of the Berlin School
At the time Holzkamp was confronted with this sort
of questions, hè could not have conceived that 15 years
later, people would speak of Critical Psychology as an
influential "school" with a clearly recognizable iden-
tity (note: where the C and P of Critical Psychology
are capitalized this refers to the Berlin School). The
first international congress, held in Marburg in 1977,
drew more than 3000 participants, from both within
Germany and abroad. A clearer illustration of the
resonance of a raovement with a relatively short history
is hardly imaginable. This school, which Holzkamp
preferred not to regard as a separate psychological
school but as a necessary addition to traditional
psychology, was to move away from its original source
of inspiration - the critical theory of the Frankfurt
School - and return in particular to the more orthodox
Cultural-Historical School of Vygotskij, Lurija,
Leont'ev and others (see Part I).
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From the very beginning, Critical Psychology was a
phenomenon to be found only in Berlin. Though raany
people outside Eerlin and even outside the German
Federal Republic were responsive to the results of this
school (especially in Denmark and the Netherlands), the
developers of Ctitical Psychological theory have nearly
all worked at the Psychological Institute of the Free
University in Berlin (Holzkamp, 1978). Some critics
even defend the proposition that the Berlin School has
becorae a kind of family enterprise and night better be
called the "Holzkamp School" (Geuter, 1977; Huber,
1977). The personality cult such a name implies, and
which is unmistakably present in the work of Holzkamp's
students, does not appear to be entirely unfounded. One
could, in fact, defend the proposition that without the
personality of Holzkamp, (historical materialistic)
criticism of psychology might have developed hut not a
Berlin School of Critical Psychology. Holzkamp was
indeed the very person to develop detailed, and for
raany people convincing, immanent criticism of aspects
of then current psychology, through nis intensive
practical experience with traditional psychological
research and through his original identification with a
variant within the "positivistic" approach, construc-
tivism (Holzkamp, 1968).
He wrote this criticism in 5 articles, published
in the period 1968-1970, and published again in the
collection "Kritische Psychologie" (Critical Psycholo-
gy) , in which they were provided with an introduction.
This collection was rightly subtitled "Vorbereitende
Arbeiten" (Preliminary Work), for it only resulted in
an attempt, discussed briefly and with little founda-
tion, at an alternative approach to psychological
questions (see Brandt, 1979). Emphasis was still laid
entirely upon reconstruction and criticism of tradi-
tional scientific research. For example, hè criticized
the lack of social relevance in most psychological
research results and exposed the "organismic" view of
the human being behind current experimental practices
(see the following sections). In addition, hè further
developed his constructivistic variant of a positivis-
tic methodology, following here Dingler's example, in
order to flnd the necessary areas for immanent criti-
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cisra. Finally, in a self-critica!, nearly autobio-
graphical final paragraph, hè somewhat abruptly embra-
ces the historical materialistic theory, which as a
sort of deus ex machina would defiuitively correct all
the shortcomings of traditional psychology. For ex-
ample, the solutions to the problems of relevance and
values would be implied in the results of research of
good quality: in other words, the scientific nature of
research itself would guarantee a high level of social
and ethical relevance, independent of the subjective
choices of the individual researcher or of the specific
area of research.
Alternative research strategies were, however,
hardly developed. Later, Holzkamp and his associates
would try to realize these programmatic wishes and
expectations. At the start of the seventies, Holzkamp
had a unique opportunity to create the conditions, also
in the areas of organization and personnel, under which
Critical Psychology could be developed into a school
with its own research program. After hè had made the
necessary theoretical preparations for such a develop-
nient, a schism, partially brought about by studeuts,
developed at the institute at which hè was a professor
(see Buss, 1979a, p.89ff for a theoretical interpreta-
tion of the influence of students on the development of
a new paradigm). The departure of a number of more
"conservative" assistants and professors led to a
situation in which Holzkamp, as the only remaining
professor, together with the remaining assistants and
predominantly "critical" students, had to fill 12
vacancies for research assistants, 5 vacancies for
assistant professors and 4 vacancies for professors
(Holzkamp, 1972, p. 269; cf. Mattes, 1979). In fact, au
Institute for "Critical Psychology" had developed with
more than 500 students and more than 70 staff meoibers
having to make a completely new start in the areas of
teaching, research and administration. In this situa-
tion, both the work and personality of Holzkamp were a
welcome orientation point and formed the binding ele-
ment in the years that followed.
Now that we have given a broad outline of the
origin and development of the Berlin School of Critical
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Psychology, we would like to devote particular atten-
tion in the following paragraphs to the epistemological
and methodological aspects of this school. Due to its
often devastating criticism of current psychological
research, this school bas taken on the responsibility
of proving that an alternative "critical methodology"
is indeed possible. We will devote some attention to
this critical methodology. This does not mean, of
course, that we can ignore the critical reraarks Criti-
cal Psychology had made concerning the various methods
of psychological research. It will be clear that des-
pite all the work done in the seventies, the "critical
methodology" Holzkamp resolutely introduced, still
primarily consists of criticism of traditional methodo-
logy. In fact, one cannot yet speak of a flourishing
"critical" research practice. The structure of this
chapter is determined by Holzkamp's view of the general
structure of the critical psychological research pro-
cess (see Table II. 1).
TABLE II.l
General Structure of the Critical
Psychological Research Process
functional-historical
method
empirical
test
natural-historical
analysis
social-historical
analysis
individual-historical
analysis
experiment
action
research
other methods
(diaries,
interviews)
L functional-historical interpretation-
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The so-called "functional-historical method"
provides adequate concepts and insight into the funda-
mental structure of the research subject. Based on -
but not logically deduced from - results of functional-
historical analysis, hypotheses are formulated which
are tested through empirical research ("aktual-empiri-
sche Forschung")• At this stage, several different re-
search techniques are acceptable as long as they are
suited to the research object (the so-called "object-
adequacy")- Following an introduction to the functio-
nal-historical method, we «ill devote particular atten-
tion to the experiment and the methodology of action
research. In recent years, both have played a central
role in methodological thinking within the Berlin
School of Critical Psychology. Finally, both statistics
and formal logies are also enjoying renewed interest.
In the last paragraph of this chapter we shall attempt
to discover to what extent the Berlin School has indeed
succeeded in "developing alternative concepts in the
central range of methodology" (Leiser, 1978a, p.X).
Important contributions of Critical Psychology in the
areas of perceptual (Holzkamp, 1973), motivational
(Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1975, 1976) and cognitive theory
(Seidel, 1976) will only be dealt with in passing, if
at all. We feel, however, that we should restrict
ourselves; an exhaustive evaluation of these contri-
butions would require a more specialized knowledge of
these areas. In addition, in this introduction to the
critical schools within psychology, we should like to
focus particular attention on their general methodolo-
gical background. It may be added that after the com-
pletion of the werk for this book, Klaus Holzkamp
published a new, extensive work (1983). By and large,
this book is based upon Berlin work already published,
but hè attempts to raise the material to a higher, i.e.
oore differentiated and iutegrated conceptual level. We
were not able to incorporate this magnum opus in its
entirety. But as we will attempt to show at a number of
points, the analyses that follow do not appear to be
essentially effected by this publication.
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THE FlfflCTIONAL-HISTORICAL METHOD
The Context of Discovery
In Popper1s critical-rationalism, a sharp distinc-
tion is made between the context of discovery of new
concepts, a new theory or a new hypothesis and the
context of justification of propositions. In the first
context, intuition and creativity may be used freely in
fonnulating bold speculations which later are subjected
to strict tests through the falsification principle.
Where a scientist gets his ideas and theories from is
no concern of a methodology aimed at falsifying propo-
sitions. To Popper, heuristics, e.g. finding hypotheses
for research, is an area that should be studied by
psychologists instead of methodologists, The only
decisive test for the truth of a proposition is to
deduce an observable prediction and confront it with
such observations. If the predicted situation does not
occur, we speak of definite falsification (refutation)
of the proposition. The origin of the proposition is of
no consequence at all, as this implies an inductive
process that can never be strictly logically described.
Indeed, Popper did not develop a "logic of scientific
discovery", as was the English title of his most impor-
tant book, but a "logic of scientific falsification".
To Popper, there is no logic involved in the discovery
process (Van der Veer, Miedema and Van IJzendoorn,
1983).
When Holzkamp views the current state of psycholo-
gy, hè concludes that this behavioral science must have
followed Popper's recipe oost literally. In no other
discipline do so raany unco-ordinated, bold conjectures
appear to have been made in creating hypotheses and ad
hoc theories than in psychology! And these in f act,
brought forth a hodge-podge of facts with which fun-
damental theoretical developments did aot keep apace.
Instead of the integration of available factual mate-
rial into one general theoretical perspective from
which hypotheses could systematically be deduced, a
jungle of occasional theories and hypotheses developed.
In practice, Popper's dictum that the weeds of incor-
rect propositions would be uprooted by falsifications
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proved to have fatal consequences. The unbridled fanta-
sy and creativity of many a psychological researcher
led all too often to tinkering at details which were
neither theoretically nor socially relevant. It is
Holzkamp's firra conviction that the context of discove-
ry should not be lef t to its own devices; on the con-
trary, it should be an integral part of research prac-
tice. The question is how.
It is, of course, true that within the "positivis-
tic" tradition, atterapts have been made to develop a
logic concerning the context of discovery. It might
even be said that recently, there has been a revival of
interest in the context of discovery. Wartovsky (1980),
for example, cal Is it a "scandal" that the contemporary
philosophy of science has hardly investigated the
problems of the context of discovery and calls upon
researchers to intensify studies in this area. More and
more, the classical distinction between the contexts of
discovery and justification is criticized and amended.
Laudan (1980), for example, complains about all the
"nonsense" that in the course of time has been pro-
claimed abotit it. He wishes to see a stage of "pursuit"
inserted between the discovery and justification of
theories (Laudan, 1977) in which there is a prelimiuary
process of weighing a theory on solid, although not
strictly logical grounds. As we know, Feyerabend does
not believe in context distinctions at all. He believes
the procedures followed in "discovering" a theory to be
at least as important for scientific development as the
idealized justification methodology (Feyerabend, 1975).
In this way, Popper's view of the distinction of the
two contexts and his assertion that the context of
discovery is simply food for psychologists, sociolo-
gists etc., was eroded from several angles. In the
following paragraph, we wish to briefly discass a
number of attempts within the "positivistic" ranks to
provide the context of discovery with a rational basis.
Against this background, the contours of Holzkamp's
functional-historical method begin to emerge. Unlike
modern "positivistic" heuristics, we shall show that
Holzkamp's method does, indeed, provide guidelines for
the initial stage of the discovery process, the col-
lection of relevant data.
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Recent Developments in Heuristics
Two representatives of an important school within
the group of advocates of intensive study of scientific
discovery are Nickles and Laudan, who believe that, in
principle, this process is indistinguishable from other
processes of problem solving. Just as tbere are, in
general, good problem solvers and powerful heuristics,
so this must be the case for scientific thought as
well. This implies that a normative evaluation of the
research process can also include a discovery stage. Ia
principle, this also means that the philosopher (metho-
dologist) may give advices; in other words, the dis-
covery process can, to a certaia extent, be learned.
More or less in accordance witb recent developasents in
the philosophy of science, such a position has been
strongly advocated for years by the Nobel prize winner
Herb.ert Simon and others of his persuasion (among
others Curd, Schaffner, Tweney, Doherty and Mynatt). An
important difference, however, between Simon and these
philosophers is that hè has the pretention to claim
success in the theoretical discussion on the discovery
process on the basis of empirical findings (computer
simulations). More than anyone else, Simon has contri-
buted to the decreased popularity of the mystical
notion of creativity in general, and of the fonnulation
of hypotheses in particular. He is thoroughly convinced
that there is no need for a special theory to explain
the mechanisms of scientific discovery. To him, they
are simply a special case of more general problem-
solving (Simon, Langley and Bradshaw, 1981, p.l). Of
course, Simon, too, acknowledges that there are diffe-
rences between the problem solving processes found in a
psychological laboratory and those found in other
scientific pursuit. However, someone will then have to
demonstrate that these differences are of essential
iaiportance, Simon himself mentions two important dif-
ferences. Firstly, hè points out that scientific re-
search is a social process, sometimes demanding the
participatioa of several researchers for a long period
of time. Secondly, hè postulates that scientific re-
search differs from many other types of problem solving
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in that the goal is not clearly defined (Simon, Langley
and Bradshaw, 1981, p.l). To his mind, however, neither
difference affects his position. The latter remark has
to do with the distinction between "well-structured"
aad "ill-structured" problems, a distinction hè has
qualified in several publications (among ethers Simon,
1977, p.304 ff). The fonner remark does not alter the
fact that the same basic processes (may) lie at the
foundation of both problem solving processes in a
broader sense and scientific problem solving. If one
agrees with Simon that scientific problem solving does
not differ principally from problem solving in general,
a normative evaluation of the discovery process is near
at hand. After all, for a great number of problems, the
most efficiënt method of solving them is already known.
On the basis of these methods, a researcher's activi-
ties could be evaluated. There are then two possibili-
ties.
Firstly, an at tempt can be made to make a taxonomy
of the problems and for each type to establish an
optimal problem solving strategy, Among others, Tweney,
Doherty and Hynatt (1981) prefer this possibility. With
the computer, these researchers simulate "scientific"
problems and present them to lay people and experienced
researchers. Such research shows, for example, that
different types of problems require their own method of
solution. This applies not only to the generation and
preliminary evaluation of hypotheses. In the justifica-
tion context, too, there is no simple Popperian falsi-
fication recipe. Research into certain artificial
problem situations shows that falsification is not
always the most efficiënt goal. They therefore call for
a taxonomy of problems with for each of them their own
heuristic and testing method, that is, for several
"logies of discovery" and "logies of justification".
The second possibility for studying the context of
discovery implies looking for problem solving methods
so general that they are applicable to every kind of
problem. In this case, it is not a taxonomy of problems
(e.g. hypotheses with accompanying solution strategies)
that is sought, on the contrary: it is strategies with
as broad a scope as is possible. This is Simon's ap-
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proach. It does mean a choice for rather "weak methods",
in other words very general, heuristic principles,
unrelated to any specific type of probletn. Simon po int s
out that when entering an unknown area, problem solvers
will of necessity use such weak methods, which do not
call for specific knowledge. In areas that are familiar,
however, they will use "strong" (algorithmic) methods
that are specifically suited to the problem in question.
Put in Kuhnian terms, this means that in the period of
normal science, strong methods are probably used, while
iti the revolutionary phase, very general heuristic
principles are "fallen back" upon (Kuhn, 1970).
Certainly in his earlier publications, Simon re-
garded a parsimonious description of a collection of
data as one of the most important goals. It is the
researcher's responsibility to uncover a pattern or a
rule which forras the base of that collection. It is to
Simon's credit that hè demonstrated that a computer
program can efficiently solve a series of problems with
a number of heuristic principles, such as "means-end
analysis" (a comparison of an existing state with the
desired state and the selection of an operation that
can reduce this difference), "factorizing" (dividing a
problem into parts) etc. In his provocative "Does
scientific discovery have a logic?" (Simon, 1979,
p.326ff), for example, hè showed that in combination
with the primitive notions of "same" and "next", these
principles could uncover the pattern in the following
series of letters: ABMCDHEFMGHMIJMKLMMNM..
Some Criticism of Simon's Heuristics
If, however, parsimoniously describing collections
of data is regarded as one of the most important goals,
does that not necessarily result in an iuductivistic
notion of science? In not taking the step towards
generalizing his findings to new collections of data,
Simon believes hè avoids this hazard. Such a step is
not taken until the testing stage (Simon, 1977, p.331).
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Elsewhere, hè makes this same distinction between
describing a collection of data (law-discovery) and
pos i t ing that this description applies to every col-
lection of data. The latter would be a case of primi-
tive Baconian induction, the fonner not (Simon, 1977,
p.41). This distinction enables him to work on a nor-
mative evaluation of discovery processes without con-
tinually getting entangled in the induction problem.
For a mimber of decades now, Herbert Simon and his
associates have been occupied with constructing compu-
ter programs that can solve problems of varying com-
plexity (see in particular Newell and Simon, 1972).
These programs are always constructed to work according
to heuristic principles, not only because this provides
a better simulation of human thinking, but also because
in theory or in practice, many problems cannot be
solved by "brute force". As we have seen, heuristic
principles have the extra advantage of being relatively
neutral as regards content and are therefore generally
applicable. The achievements of programs constructed in
this fashion appear impressive. In a recent article,
for example, Simon describes the program BACON (Simon,
Langley and Bradshaw, 1981), which among other things
proved capable of uncovering Ohm's law, Archimedes'
principle and several laws of chemistry. He also men-
tions the program AH, which proved capable of redis-
covering many raatters in the area of number theory. It
would be inappropriate here to extensively describe and
analyse this and other programs. We would, however,
like to point out some objections that can be raised in
the case of a computer program performing a task see-
mingly requiring some intelligence. In those cases in
which Simon dealt with such objections, we shall also
present the arguments hè uses in doing so.
This criticism is as follows. The programs written
by Simon and other researchers in the area of artifi-
cial intelligence do not really simulate the process of
scientific discovery because: (a) they presuppose a
clearly defined collection of data; (b) they introducé
the collection of possible solutions in advance; (c)
they are only capable of uncovering descriptive gene-
ralizations; (d) they are only applicable to "well-
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structured" problems; (e) they utilize primitive no-
tions that in themselves require an explanation. This
short list provides some of the most important criti-
cisras. There are more, as for example the reply that
creativity caa never be bound to rules (read: heuristic
priaciples), but we shall not deal with such objections
here.
ad (a) This is a classical objection often raised
in connection with the induction problem. Arnong others,
Hempel, Nagel and Popper have argued eloquently that
data are always collected with a particular view or
hypothesis in mind. Perhaps a disticction could be made
here between being sluiply confronted with certain data,
and regarding (a partial collection of these) data as
relevant. There can be no doubt that within the context
of the current Information "explosion", running across
data in a particular area of knowledge is in part
dependent upon chance factors. Data concerning a parti-
cular problem are perhaps regarded as relevant when
differences and similarities between several collec-
tions of data are ascertained, and on the basis of rea-
soning with analogies and model s. As do Popper's hypo-
theses, Simon's data seera to appear out of the blue.
ad (b) This objection is mentioned by, atnong
others, Maull (1980), and Simon himself (1977). In a
reaction to an article by Schaffner (1980) on a program
for medical diagnoses, Maull provides the following
arguments. She points out that if all known syndromes
are introduced into the program, then making a diagno-
sis is ultimately nothing more than a process of classi-
fication. This has very little to do with a creative
scientific process. Ho uew illness is uncovered and as
such, the process of acquiring knowledge would appear
to be reduced to a kind of Platonic anamnesis. Other
programs, however, such as AM, do not appear suscep-
tible to such criticism. Simon (1977, p.334) believes
that this objection is based upon the distinction
between "well-structured" probleras, which can be ana-
lyzed, and "ill-structured" problems, which are pre-
sumed to be the exclusive domain of creativity. Simon
regards this as a distinction of degree (see further
under (d)).
1
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ad (c) Programs are only capable of uncovering
descriptive generalizations. Simon does not acknowledge
this objection because hè regards the distinction
between describing and explaining as one of degree
(Simon, Langley and Bradsbaw, 1981, p.S). Apart front
the fact that Simon regards this distinction to be of
only relative value, hè also claims that programs are
not limited to uncovering descriptive generalizations.
The program BACON regularly introduces theoretical
terms and repeatedly posits "intrinsic properties"
(o.c., p.20).
ad (d) A "well-structured" problem, bas only one
correct solution; it is the researcher's task to find
it. An example of this is uncovering the series of
moves leading to mate in a chess problem. For an "ill-
structured" problem, there is no oue correct solution.
In principle, a whole collection of solutions may be
correct. An example of this is a task such as: "Thiuk
of ten ways to use a match box". This second type of
problem is considered characteristic of creativity and
the objection is that programs cannot solve this kind
of problem. Simon does not acknowledge this objection
either. To his mind, this, too, is only a question of
difference in degree (Simon, 1977). He illustrates this
with the example of an architect designing a house. At
first sight, it would appear that there are limitless
possibilities here and that the architect is subject to
few restrictions. However, it soon appears that such a
problem becomes "well-structured", in particular due to
the nature of the building matecials and due to the
fact that it concerns a serial process. Once a parti-
cular type of foundation has been chosen, the architect
will most certainly have to bear its quality in mind
when designing the rest of the construction. On the
basis of knowledge and certain consecutive choices, an
"ill-structured" problem in this way becomes a "well-
structured" problem. To Simon, there is no fundamental
distinction here. Apart from that, it is quite fashion-
able nowadays to regard the scientific discovery pro-
cess as a problem-solving process in which the solution
must meet several restrictions (see among others
Nickles, 1981).
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ad (e) In many of the programs written by Simon
and his associates, the primitive notions "sarae" and
"next" are utilized. The problem is, however, that
these seemingly simple notions prove to be extraordina-
rily complex. Much research, for example, has been done
into discerning differences and similarities between
stimuli without the result being unequivocal (see for
example Millspaugh, 1978; Sickerson, 1972; Rosch and
Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch and Lloyd,
1978; Silverman and Goldberg, 1975; De Swart, 1981).
Tweney, Doherty and Mynatt (1981, p.282) also point out
the paramount importance of these basic operations.
Even "same" and "next" observations are theory-laden
and not as primitive as Simon would have us believe. In
the concept formation literature, which concerns itself
with these problems, one once again runs head on into
the induction problem (see Van der Veer, 1983e). On the
one hand, there is a group of researchers who believe
that people develop a notion of something by comparing
perceptual characteristics of objects. On the ether
hand, there are psychologists and philosophers that
point out that stimuli can only be compared from a
particular point of view. It would be inappropriate
here to discuss this literature. We should only like to
point out that if we continue to regard a notion such
as "same" as primitive, we are still far removed frora a
real explanation of the process of scientific disco-
very.
Limitations of Traditional Heuristics
As we have seen, the most important drawback in
Simon's procedure is that no rules for collecting data
can be derived from it. The question of what kind of
empirical material is of interest in a particular stage
of the development of a discipline remains unanswered.
The choice of variables to be measured is presupposed
(i.e. cannot be justified theoretically), so that it is
simply a question of looking for a model that in all
probability most adequately reflects the relatiouships
between those variables (in this case the data collec-
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ted). In developing a model, questions as these all
play a role: is the problem best represented by a
linear snodel, or should one allow for curvilinearity
and interactions? And what weight should be assigned to
the elements in the function? However, the poiut of
departure is a data matrix already presupposing the
selection of a number of variables from among a col-
lection of possibly relevant variables. It is this
selection in particular with which the Berlin School of
Critical Psychology has concerned itself most intensi-
vely, and for which the functional-historical method
was developed. The notions lying at the root of this
can best be illustrated with an example.
Imagine that research is conducted into the moti-
vation of children to learn certain material. The
research subject - motivation - would seem at first
glance to be determined by a whole series of variables
as sex, age, socio-economic background, self-image, the
nature and structure of the material, the type of
teacher, the system of rewards and punishment, the
sociometrie structure of the class, etc. Indeed, an
enormously complex reality. Traditional researchers
will try to reduce this coraplexity by limiting their
experiment, for example, to two variables, in order to
keep the problem methodologically and technically
manageable. Their "positivistic" methodology does not
limit them in their choice of these ("independent")
variables. Strictly speaking, they need only make a
bold conjecture, and subject it to rigorous testing.
The researcher takes as it were a slice of a complex
reality and examines it, without having to worry about
its context. A second researcher having a go at this
problem has the same fundamental freedom in choosing a
limited nuraber of variables to investigate. In turn,
she or hè will personally fish out two (most likely)
other very promising independent variables and tho-
roughly investigate their correlation with motivation
by means of a carefully arranged and laborious test
procedure. It would come as no surprise at all if both
researchers found support for their hypotheses concer-
ning the detenninants of the research subject. Two ad
hoc theories of motivation, T! and T2, would be formu-
lated, both of which would be equally "true" according
124 CRITICA! PSYCHOLOGY
to "positivistic" criteria, at least they could not be
falsified. Tj would be based on the independent varia-
bles (in this case determinauts) Vt and V2, Tg on V3
and V4. The expectation is then that reality could be
reconstructed, as it were, as a mosaic, simply by
integrating TI and Tj.
But wil l combining two partial theories guarantee
the creation of a theory that describes and explains
the essence of the subject? Holzkamp does not think so.
He argues that by means of theoretical research, a
distinction between essential and uon-essential deter-
minants should be made in advance. For imagine that Vj
and V3 are non-essential variables, influencing the
research subject only in particular situations and at
particular times. First of all it is unlikely that the
results of the partial investigations having led to the
theories can be attained again under somewhat different
historical and geographical circumstances. Secondly,
the integrated final result will be subject to the same
limitations. lu this case as well, the ideal of univer-
sally applicable laws seeras to be unattainable, and
what appeared genera l turns out to be hut one of many
fragmented bits of theory.
The question is, of course, why the natura l scien-
ces run up against this kind of fragmentation so much
less frequently, despite the fact that a "positivistic"
approach is used there as well. Holzkamp believes that
in physics and chemistry in particular, the research
subject itself assumed more and more an integrative
function (that is, influenced the pattern of theory
development). This is because its basic dimensions,
together fonning an integrated system of fundamental
properties (such as mass, force and acceleration in
classical dynamics) became increasingly apparent. These
basic dinensions then lead to a conceptual framework
which helped to determine the interpretation of re-
search into particular aspects of a problem. In the
social sciences, however, there is no consensus on the
basic structure of reality, partially because there is
no method at our disposal to analyse existing material
as to its basic dimensions. Because of this, the "anar-
chistic" cancer of social scientific theories and
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hypotheses continues to spread. "Positivistic" metho-
dology does in fact contain forma l criteria for validi-
ty. Though it is true that despite the falsification
principle and the verisioilitude thesis, the ideal of
truth remains unattainable, we can nonetheless get
closer and closer to it. But "positivistic" methodology
does not have any criteria for relevance. Such criteria
would enable us to distinguish. between essential aud
uon-essential dimensions of a research subject. Empiri-
cal testing is only a necessary, but certainly not a
sufficient condition for determining the scientific
value of a proposition about the relationship betweeu
variables. Testing according to relevancy criteria,
i.e. answering the question whether a proposition
relates to the basic dimensions of the research sub-
ject, is just as necessary. We would then be able to
avoid attributing the sarae importance to every succes-
fully tested proposition. If we are not in a position
to do so, choosing a theory would become a question of
taste and fashion.
It would seem that an obvious solution to the
problem of relevancy lies within the research subject
itself. As we have seen, Holzkamp believed that in the
natural sciences the research subject itself establish-
ed the basic categories for research hypotheses. In the
case of the self-reflecting subject of the social
sciences, "the human being", it would seem obvious that
the often implicit theories and systems of concepts
with which participants in experiraents describe and
interpret their world should be made the basis for
pre-structuring the research subject into essential and
non-essential dimensions. Use of such strategies has,
in fact, been supported by Winch (1970). He stated that
the social sciences were not completely free in choos-
ing a system of concepts by which human behavior can be
described. Indeed, how behavior in a social context is
interpreted by the "actor" and bis public greatly
depends upon the system of rules adhered to in that
context. The interpretation of certain behavior, or
better still, a certain activity as, say, sport or suï-
cide, can differ according to the cultural context and
"language comnunity". Often, a sharp distinction be-
tween suïcide and a very dangerous sport cannot simply
126 CRITICA1 PSYCHOLOGY
be drawn from ethology: describing as objectively as
possible the externally perceptible elements of a
system of behavior resulting in a voluntary death one
inflicts upon oneself. The social sciences must there-
fore derive the structure of the research subject from
the framework of interpretations of the "participant".
There is, however, a fundamental problem with tbis
and similar approaches (e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
This is the phenomenon of rationalization and of un-
conscious or subconscious motives, which can play au
important role in the self-interpretation of a parti-
cipant in an experiment. The approach assumes, in fact,
an idealistic notion of people, in which emancipated
human beings are the complete masters of themselves and
the world. In reality, however, common sense interpre-
tations free of ideological distortions are nearly
unimaginable (Holzkamp, 1978). From the point of view
of the world of the participant, reality and appearance
flow into one another, and science cannot blindly rely
upon the perceptual ability of the individual.
Heuristics and Anthropology
of the Berlin School
Holzkamp believes ' that the solution to this
undoubtedly extreaiely fundamental problem of developing
an adequate conceptual framework, can be found in the
Cultural-Historical School (see Chapter 1). Leont'ev
(1967) in particular, demonstrated that a subject's
essential traits and structures can only be discerned
by an analysis of its historical, social and phylogene-
tic (i.e. concerning biological origins) background.
The behavior of participants within the framework of
contemporary psychological research is not only the
result of their individual development. It is also a
result of the developraent of the (biological) species
and of the social structures in which the species seeks
assurances for its survival and reproduction. The basic
dimensions of the research subject ernerge when the
questioc arises what the function of particular beha-
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vior is for the material process of production and the
reproduction of life of the individual and the species.
At the same time, the question at which level of social
development this process occurs must also be investi-
gated (Jager, 1977). Leont'ev distinguishes three
methodological steps in the functional-historical
method, all of which have been adopted by the Berlin
School:
(1) Analysis of the natural historical (phylogenetic)
development seen as the (re)production of human
beings as biological organisms.
(2) Analysis of the social historical development seen
as the (re)production of society, that is, the
life of the individual within the group.
(3) Analysis of the individual (ontogenetical) deve-
lopment in a particular social context and class,
seen as the (re)production of the individual.
Three presuppositions lie at the root of the
functional-historical method. First, that the histori-
cal development of a phenomenon has left a mark on its
fundamental structure. Secondly, that the necessity of
(re)production of the individual and the species deter-
mines the basic dimensions of a phenomenon. And third-
ly, that this (re)production is maximalized in a social
context, that is in the group. In short, human behavior
is characterized by its historical, material and social
nature. The assumption here is, of course, that while
the question of the function of behavior will be answer-
ed differently at each stage of development, each stage
leaves its mark on the next stage. The three fundamen-
tal stages of development: (1) the stage of biological
phylogenesis; (2) the stage of the origin and develop-
ment of life in society; (3) the stage of life in a
specific (capitalistic) type of society,
do not replace each other entirely, but are bound up in
each other. In this view, the actions and thought of a
contemporary iudividual are aot only determined by the
uecessity to reproduce him- or herself and contribute
to the reproduction of the species in a specifically
capitalistic society. They are also determined by
residues of the two preceding stages, that is the stage
of (re)production of the biological organism and the
stage of maximalizing this (re)production in the
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context of the group. The raotivation to learn a parti-
cular araount of material is therefore not only deter-
mined by variables arising in the actual situation
(structure of the material, kind of teacher, relation-
ships in the class, etc.)- 11 is also d e term i ried by
"residues" - paradoxically eaough of essential impor-
tance - of times past; in particular from the time that
the biological organisra had to display a certain amount
of exploratory behavior in order to adjust as well as
possible to an ever-changing environment. Holzkamp-
Osterkamp (1975; 1976) in particular has dealt exten-
sively with this biological aspect and in doing so
probably broken down the "progressive" taboo on study-
ing behavioral genetics.
The importance of the residues of natural histo-
rical phylogenesis, stored in the "biological inheri-
tance", should not, however, be overestimated. Critical
Psychology attributes the "leap" from phylogenesis to
social development to the uniquely human capacity of
conscious construction and use of tools. This led to
the development of a sort of social memory - the "cul-
tural inheritance" in which solutions to problems which
confronted preceding generations are stored (see chap-
ter I). This "cultural inheritance" covers as it were
the "biological inheritance" without neutralizing com-
pletely the influence of the latter. The plough, for
example, is then the objectification of one of the
solutions man has discovered in the course of evolution
for the problem of increasing yield in agriculture. By
"Aneignung", that is actively acquiring its "cultural
inheritance", every generation is enabled to climb on
the shoulders of the preceding generations and, in
doing so, achieve a higher level of adjustment to the
environment, of production and reproduction of collec-
tive and individual life (see also Sève, 1975, p.50).
At this level of social development, the "social speci-
ficity level", the individual is dependent on the group
for maximum adjustment to the environment, and his
contribution to collective production and reproduction
is simultaneously a contribution to his own (re)produc-
tion as an individual. In this view, the age of saying:
homo homini lupus est, the bitter struggle for (indivi-
dual) existence is replaced by an aïmost idyllic commu-
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nal life of which each member is an indispensible part.
This is all the more surprising, for we are not con-
cerned here with a traditional "adjustment ideology" of
the individual but with an "anthropology" based on
historical materialistic principles.
But this notion is concerned with the general
"social specificity level" and not with specifying it
in the form of an "antagonistic class society". This
view therefore has a "contrafactual" character, that
is, it is possible but not always - and in the case of
capitalism hardly ever - a reality. Furthennore, this
idea is concerned with the average individual and not
with the unique individual. Holzkamp described this
average individual as follows, based upon the results
of functional-historical analysis: Of all living things,
only human beings have the species-specific biological
capability of changing nature through cultural activi-
ties. They are capable of participating individually in
the determination of the conditions of human life by
actively acquiring objective, historically accumulated
experience. At the same time, they participate in
creating and improving the conditions of their personal
life (Holzkamp, 1978, p. 155). The essential character-
istics of this critical "anthropology" of the average
individual are therefore: (a) a series of unspecified
biological capabilities {"biological inheritance") for
co-operatively changing nature with a view to pre-
serving and enriching the conditions of life of the
species, (b) whereby individuals actively acquire
culturally collected experiences ("cultural inheri-
tance"), stored in products of mannal and cognitive
work, enabling them to attain that level of develop-
ment, (c) that in maximalizing the collective condition
of life, the individual conditions are ipaximalized as
well.
What is essential from a functional-historical
point of view, then, is "functional" knowledge and
ability, those attitudes and needs of individuals that,
firstly, enable thens to stay alive and develop, and
thereby contribute to the (re)production process socie-
ty demands. Secondly, such knowledge and ability must
also enable them to gain control of their own life
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conditions by participating in society's control of
reality. Thirdly, they must also enable them, by acti-
vely acquiring society's "cultural inheritance", to
approach a developmental level which the developmeats
in society as a whole, make possible.
Of course, the central question arising from this
functional-historical deduction of a theoretic "model"
of the human being as subject of psychological research
is: to what extent have the presuppositions of the
method determined its results? We have seen that the
historical materialistic roots of the method consisted
of principles of the historical, material and social
nature of human behavior. These principles determined
the questions concerning the function of behavior. The
principle of the historical nature of behavior makes it
worthwhile to dig deep into the history and phylogene-
sis of human beings when confronted with the question
of the structure of the present day subject, It is
therefore no surprise that in critical "anthropology",
the biological determination of human behavior is
mentioned (without further delineating what the exact
nature of this determination is). This applies to the
principles of the material and social nature of beha-
vior as well. These principles seem to be found in
"anthropology", only in another form.
And yet, when functional-historical analyses have
been worked out concretely, they result in drastic
changes in existing conceptual fraraeworks. With the aid
of functional-historical analysis, Holzkamp-Osterkamp
(1975; 1976), for example, develops a totally different
motivational needs structure than, for example, Maslow
or Freud. On the basis of ethological and biological
material in particular, Holzkamp-Osterkamp attempts to
show that two kinds of fundamental needs exist. The
first are the so-called "productive" needs, that is
needs directed towards mastering the environment, in
this case the relevant, collective and individual
conditions of life. The second are the so-called
"sensual-vital" needs, directed towards immediate
satisfaction of individual needs, for example, nourish-
aent, sexuality, etc. The desire of human beings to
master their environment is expressed in the "produc-
1
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tive" need, among other things by anticipating possible
future nceds. For this, a collective effort is most
suitable. For iastance, protection against natural
catastrophies such as floods is achieved most efficient-
ly by collective efforts in connection with building
dykes. On the other hand, "sensual-vital" needs are
directed towards the present, towards the consumption
of social products, in part for the reproduction of the
individual (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1976, p. 23 ff.). While
Maslow places the "productive" need to explore the
environment relatively low in his hierarchy, just above
the satisfaction of physical needs, and Freud "sensual-
vital" needs, such as sexual needs, at the top, Holz-
kamp-Osterkamp stresses the "productive" needs (see
Elbers, 1984). We will not expand on the background of
and differences between the psychological theories men-
tioned above. But it is clear that a functioual-histo-
rical analysis may have a great effect on psychological
research on motivation.
Functional-Historical Method and Biopsychology
The functional-historical method once again draws
attention to the biological contribution (not determi-
nation) to human behavior, and in doing so, introduces
a "biopsychological" perspective into psychology. Of
course, this perspective must be placed in a specific
context. Functional-historical analysis makes clear
that there are limits to human action, arising from an
organism's phylogenetic adaptation to the environment
and directed to increasing the chance of survival
("functional reflection"). Another well-known theory
allowing for phylogenetic detenninants of present be-
havior is the attachment theory of John Bowlby (1971).
Bowlby frequently uses ethological material to uncover
species-specific determinants in the attachment beha-
vior of young children. He omits, however, the stage of
aualysis of general social development, while on the
other hand devoting a great deal of attention to the
last stage in the three-step approach ("Dreischritt").
As does Bowlby, Holzkamp also assumes that only in the
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light of "biological inheritance", which evolution has
given each member of the species throughout the ages,
can we understand the individual's present behavior.
The same applies to the stage of the species' more
active and collective adaptation to ever changing
environmental conditions. In this stage, in which
actively acquiring ("Aneignung") one's "cultural in-
heritance" becoraes more important than acquiring one's
"biological inheritance", humans acquired specific
adaptation strategies also influeatial in present
situations. According to functional-historical analy-
sis, the concrete individual forming the subject of
psychological research is built around a phylogene-
tically determined core or basic structure, around
which traits and characteristics develop as a result of
the socialization and collectivization of life. Final-
ly, a second layer of characteristics developed that
enables (re)production of the species and the indivi-
dual in a specific capitalistic society. These final
characteristics are not universal in nature hut limited
to a specific historical social context. The basic
structure and general social characteristics, however,
are universal and therefore essential to a Critical
Psychology maintaining the (nomothetic) ideal of disco-
vering universal laws. In Table II.2, the layered
structure of the individual is shown schematically.
TABLE II.2
A Functional-Historical Model of the Human Being
Specific social characteristics
Gen;ral social characteristics
Biological substratum
„
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The objective of functional-historical analysis is
to analyze and structure the apparently inextricable
mixture of "biological and cultural inheritance" and
characteristics bound to a specific kind of society by
means of the "Dreischritt". The goal is to detennine
which dimeasions of behavior are essential and which
are less or not essential. The natural step of histori-
cal analysis provides the characteristics of the re-
search subject that can be looked upon as essential
general biological traits of the huraan organistn. At
this stage, a distiaction must be made between these
general biological characteristics and those that are
an expression of the socialization of the average
individual, and therefore universal in nature. After
the most general and essential biological and social
traits have been distinguished in this way, a residue
remains of what is specific to life in capitalist so-
ciety. In the light of this kind of advance structuring
of the research subject, systematic hypotheses can be
developed and tested in empirical research (see the
following sections). Unlike Simon's heuristics, the
choice of relevant variables is aot presupposed, hut
can be deduced f r om the functional- historical method.
At the same time, research results can be adequately
interpreted in the light of a conceptual fraraework
derived in this manner. In other words, an interpre-
tation preserving the distinction between essential and
non-essential dimensions of human functioning.
THE PROBLEMS OF "CONTAMIHATION",
"ISTERSUBJECTIVITY" AND "FUNCTION"
The material the functional-historical method is
concerned with is the "Gesamtwissenschaft" (Jager,
1977, p. 125), that is, the information regarding the
research subject to be found in all relevant disci-
plines, such as biology, ethology, econosny and socio-
logy. Holzkamp-Osterkamp's functional historical analy-
sis of the motivation concept is based largely on
ethological and biological material (see also Schurig,
1976). Past results of scientific research should fora
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the basis of such analysis so that pioneer research
becomes possible.
A problem remains, though, that Critical Psycho-
logy does not have criteria at its disposal to test
the validity of the material functional-historical
analyses are concerned with. The validity of the re-
sults of the analyses themselves are then thrown into
doubt. As we have stated, and will explain in more
detail below, the Berlin School criticized traditional
research rather vehemently. Because of the structure of
the research situation, among other things, traditional
research could not provide valid, reliable, objective
and relevant results. This was the opinion that Holz-
karap in particular so articulately defended in his
volume of 1972. But these same research results, though
partially from different but still "positivistic"
disciplines as ethology, and biology, are the basis for
functional-historical analysis in constructing a con-
ceptual framework. The question then, of course, is
whether the shortcomings of this research material
directly or indirectly influence the functional-histo-
rical results. The method itself does not have the
means of preventing this from happening. Critical as it
is of traditional scientific study, Critical Psychology
should actually presuppose the inevitability of this
kind of negative influence. Of course, available re-
search material is not accepted in functional-histori-
cal analysis at face value. Apparently though, what is
and is not accepted is a relatively subjective and
arbitrary business. For instance, it is not clear on
the basis of what criteria Holzkamp-Osterkamp evaluates
the work of the biologist-ethologist Lorenz, contested
even in traditional scientific circles. This very
Lorenz, with his wild speculations concerning the bio-
logical determination of human agression, has repeated-
ly hazarded unfounded generalizations from results of
ethological research into human behavior, an area as
yet hardly explored by ethology. Even prominent collea-
gues are vehemently opposed to such generalizations
(Hinde, 1978). And yet it is the very same Lorenz whom
Holzkamp-Osterkamp consulted extensively in construct-
ing her motivation theory. She has the pretention to
put Lorenz' theory in its proper place, but it is not
at all clear how she wishes to accomplish this.
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Aside from the problens of "coatamination" mention-
ed above, a secoud important problem with the fuuc-
tional-historical method, is that of "intersubjectivi-
ty". This problem concerns the vagueness of the method
itself, which is only outlined by a very general three-
step procedure and a few presuppositions. It would be
naïve to believe that any other well-intentioned re-
searcher could actually work with such a description.
Recently, Holzkamp (1983) somewhat refined the "Drei-
schritt" by indicating that in the phylogenetic pro-
cess, five steps of analysis must be followed to tracé
the origin of specifically human characteristics. We
shall not expand on this notion in this context. But
this refinement also makes a rather abstract irapres-
sion, and it is questionable whether it sufficiently
solves the problem of intersubjectivity. A raethod
pretending intersubjectivity will at least have to make
explicit wliat kind of filter is used in evaluating the
usefulness of results available from the "Gesamtwissen-
schaft". As things stand now, the functional-historical
method is not "learnable" and the results are neither
testable nor replicable, simply because crucial crite-
ria have not been made explicit. For the time being,
the method must therefore be considered elitist and
esoteric, useful only to a small nuraber of insiders. In
this regard, Simon's computer-directed heuristics are
more "democratie", for his programs deteraiine the
discovery procedure step by step. Of course, heuristics
in the forra of a computer program are an extreme exam-
ple of an intersubjective, replicable procedure, But
still, a Critical-Psychological procedure will also
have to contain more opportunities for intersubjectivi-
ty and replication than is now the case with the "Drei-
schritt".
A third problem encountered in connection with the
functional-historical raethod concerns the functional
view of behavior (see for example Elbers, 1984). In the
functional-historical method, raaterial from all rele-
vant sciences is examined from one point of view: to
what extent is the behavior encountered functional to
the emancipation of the human species and the indivi-
dual from unnecessary external determination. The point
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is to determine the functioa of behavior with a view to
a shift along the continuüm between self-determination
and external determination, Behavior is evaluated as to
its function in (re)producing the human species and the
individual. In doing so, emancipation from the whims of
nature and social repression are the guiding prin-
ciples. Rightly, the question has been raised whether
in this sense, the concept of function possesses suf-
ficient descriptive and explanatory value (Verbij,
1981).
The question is, in light of the belief in pro-
gress ianplicit in the concept of function, whether all
kinds of tendencies pointing in the opposite direction
are not, to a certain extent, lost sight of. And of
course, it is incontrovertible that throughout history,
the balance between external detenaination and self-
determination seems to shift first in one, then in the
other direction with seeming randomness. And this not
only applies to emancipation from social repression but
even to emancipation from nature. Nowadays, «e no
longer take it for granted to the extent Marx did that
emancipation from the whims of nature has followed a
linear progression. What at first appeared to be an
increasing domination of nature appears now, at times,
to be acconrpanied by increasing environmental pollu-
tion, depletion of natural resources, etc. Yet to our
raind, it would be incorrect to abandon the emancipatory
concept of function simply because it cannot explain
every development with equal accuracy. Indeed, it is in
the very critical-emancipatory nature of psychology to
repeatedly pose the question to what extent certain
types of behavior have contributed or can contribute to
a shift along the continuüm in the direction of self-
deteroination. A psychology lacking au ideal of pro-
gress can no longer ask itself questions, the answers
to which contribute to huraan emancipation. And in the
final analysis, that is the ultima ratio of a critical
psychology.
In sumraary, we may conclude that with the aid of
the functional-historical method, the Berlin School
attempted to help find a solution to a fundamental
problem in traditional scientific research: the swell
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of ad hoc theories and hypotheses resulling from the
methodologically sanctioned anarchy in the context of
discovery. On the basis of this contrihution, it is
understandable why Holzkamp did not wish to call bis
theory a separate school among the traditional schools
within psychology. Has Critical Psychology succeeded in
filling the undeniable gap in theory and concept de-
velopment within traditional psychology, and therehy
made the functional-historical method indispensable to
every psychological researcher? That question can only
hè answered when the problems of "contamination" and
"intersuhjectivity" have been solved.
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
The Principle of Exhaustion
The experiment - and in particular criticism of
experimental research - plays a vital role in the his-
tory of the Berlin School. In the volume "Critical Psy-
chology" (1972), research is put on a par with experi-
mental research, and in particular laboratory research.
The criticism of this research was so severe that the
question arose if the experiment could ever regain sta-
tus within the Critical Psychological methodology.
Holzkamp criticized the experiment on immanent grounds,
i.e. hè shoved that this method of testing hypotheses
is very o f ten not up to the traditional standards of
research. He pointed out, for example, that experimen-
tal research offered endless possibilities for circmn-
venting the most extreme consequence of the falsifica-
tion principle, rejecting a hypothesis on the basis of
contradïctory experimental data. More often than not,
the methods of experimental research make it possible
to explain away such a "falsifying" outcome by pointing
to the influence of until then unknown interveniag fac-
tors, errors in the experimental set-up, conditions li-
miting generalization of the original theory, etc.
Holzkamp referred to this defensiva research strategy
with the term "Exhaustion" (coined by Dingler),
and though it was in this very area that hè
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was sharply criticized by German representatives of the
"positivistic" ranks, recent developments in the histo-
ry and philosophy of science seera to prove him right.
The principle of exhaustion has to do with the re-
lationship betweea theory and fact. Soughly speaking,
the last fifty years have seen three periods in the
consideration of this relationship: verificationism,
falsificationism and paradigm theories. Ia these three
periods, fundamentally different answers were given to
the question of how to envision this confrontation
betweeu theory and facts and what role experience plays
in justifying theoretical propositions. We wish to
briefly discuss these developments in the philosophy of
science, not only because they place Holzkamp's prin-
ciple of exhaustion in proper perspective, but also
because they demonstrate the validity of, in particu-
lar, critical psychology's emphasis upoti theory de-
velopment. Not only the Cultural-Historical School, but
also the Berlin School and the American Dialectical
Psychology are characterized by their criticism of the
atheoretical empiricism of traditional psychology. They
are also characterized by their goal of developing
well-grounded theories which to their mind should be a
prerequisite, and not a consequence, of meaningful
empirical research (see chapters I and III). This "re-
versal" of the theory-fact relationship in favor of the
theory «ill surprise many traditional psychologists.
Yet here, critical psychology is simply drawing logical
conclusions from modern philosophy of science, in which
empirical research occupies no more than a modest
position.
Verificationism and Falsificationism
Seen broadly, verificationism as advocated by the
Wiener Kreis assumes that theoretical propositions may
be founded upon inductive reasoning. Let us take for
example the proposition, based upon Bowlby's (1971)
attachment theory, that at a young age, children's
separation experiences may result in an anxious attach-
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ment relationship between parent and child, This pro-
pos ition might also have been formulated as follows:
all young children who have experienced separation are
anxiously attached to their parents. At first sight, it
would seem relatively easy to verify this proposition.
A researcher siraply seeks out. as many children as pos-
sible with separation experiences (due, for example, to
a stay in the hospital) and then investigates whether
or not these children have an anxious attachment rela-
tionship with their parents. If this is the case, the
general proposition would seem to be confirmed. Of
course, the observations upon which the general propo-
sition is based must meet a number of requirements. For
example, the researcher must have observed a large
number of children in a wide variety of circumstances.
These observations must also be a direct reflection of
sensory experiences. Ideally, an observation should
never be filtered through possible subjective inter-
pretations but should be an almost photographic repro-
duction of what has been observed. In the same circum-
stances, any arbitrary, normal observer, should be able
to make the same observations.
Observations in and of themselves, however, are
non-conveyable impressions. Kot until they are convey-
able, that is transforraed into speech, can they play a
role in the scientific process, Within logical empiri-
cism, a great deal of thought has been devoted to the
form in which observations should be communicated. The
problem is how to make use of language while avoiding
interpretations that transcend that which is observed.
The so-called "sense-data"-stateoients are presumed to
be a direct representation of observations which can be
repeated by anyone, are immediately comprehensible and
unquestionable. Neurath (1979) has taken up a somewhat
more sceptical position regarding the evident truth of
"sense-data"-statements and introduced the term "pro-
tocol sentence", which describes observations of which
the veracity should be determined in relation to all
the available relevant protocol sentences. An example:
"At time t and place p, researcher X saw a child k that
had been in the hospital for some time and did not seek
the proximity of its parents when a stranger entered."
Based upon a large number of such "elementary" obser-
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vations, it should ultinsately be possible to confirm
Bowlby's general proposition, or at least to achieve a
high degree of probability.
It is to Popper's credit that hè has layed his
fingers on the weak spots of this verificationistic
program. His most important criticism was of a logica!
nature: it is impossible to arrive at a confirmat ion of
a geaeral proposition, which itself implies an infinite
number of cases, on the basis of a f in i te number of
observations. Induction would then lose its logical-
aaalytical character, as its conclusion contains more
informatica than is contained ia its premises. One can
only extrapolate from a limited number of observatioas
in the past and present to an unlimited number in the
future based upon a (metaphysical) belief in the funda-
mental imrautability of the world. And such a belief can
only be based upon induction, that is upon the repeated-
ly - but finite number of times - confirmed expectation
that no great rifts exist between the past, the present
and the future. Popper's falsificationism (see also
above) is based upon the logical asymmetry between
observations and general propositions: observations (or
put more accurately, statements about observations) can
never confirm general propositions but can refute or
falsify them. From a strictly logical point of view,
one single observation of a child with separation
experiences and at the same time a warm, secure attach-
ment relationship with its parent is sufficient to
refute the general proposition concerning the relation-
ship between separation experiences and aaxious attach-
ment. Seen logically, this is a case of the so-called
modus tollens:
t - P
~t P,
in which t is a theory from which a prediction p con-
cerning a state in reality can be deduced. Upon further
investigation, this prediction does not prove correct,
in which case the theory from which the prediction had
been logically deduced must be regarded as falsified
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(Popper, 1980, p.7). Paradoxically enough, though,
according to the falstficationist Popper, the truly
strong theories are characterized by bold deductious
which could not hè falsified, whereby In the end, a
verificationistic element is smuggled in through the
back door, If we were to keep strictly to Popper's
adage: make bold conjectures and persistently try to
refute them (Popper, 1972b), success could be pre-pro-
gramBed with the most imlikely conjecture. The point is
to make predictions concerning new "facts" or contra-
intuitive phenomena based upon a tbeory, and to see
these predictions remain uurefuted even after severe
testing. On the basis of the theory on the relationship
between separation experiences and attachment, for
example, the prediction could be made that in societies
in which children experience an extreme number of
separations, only anxious attachment relationships can
develop. If after numerous cultural anthropological
studies among alien societies in several different
parts of the world this prediction proves irrefutable,
this theu signifies a reinforcement of the theory (its
corroboration level increases). But the truth of a
theory can never be proved in this way.
Also in this notion concerning the confrontation
between theory and experience, the problem of the
status of empirical observations plays an important
role. Ideally, observations should form the irrefutably
solid basis for the (in)correctness of a prediction,
and therefore a theory. Popper himself, however has
pointed out that observations can only perform their
function in a "linguistic" form. With the use of lan-
guage to describe observations, all kinds of universal
concepts are slipped in that unavoidably confer the
status of theory upon any statement about an observa-
tion. Statements about observations have a theoretical
aura and are not at all the irrefutable verities they
are more or less still assumed to be in logical empi-
ricisra. Measuring temperature with the aid of a ther-
mometer presupposes a theory on the relationship be-
tween teraperature and the volume of mercury; observing
the planets with the aid of a telescope presupposes an
optical theory; observing the attachraent relatiooship
between mother and child presupposes a theory in which
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it is made plausible that in certain situations, some
of children's non-verbal behavior is an indication of
that relationship (Van IJzendoorn et al., 1983). Buss
(1979a, p.!3ff) shows that the notion of the theory-
laden observation was already present in Marx and his
Hegelian interpreter Lukacs. Hut according to Buss, due
to its orientation to the natural sciences, logical
empiricism remained deaf to these early critical notes
(see also chapter I).
Where theory is concerned, there is also potential
refutability. Observation theories can also never be
(inductively) confirmed or held as true. We then get
the paradoxical situation that theoretical propositions
are tested with the aid of statements about observa-
tions that are very likely inaccurate themselves. The
confrontation between "soft" theory and "hard" f a ets
appears to have changed into a confrontation between
"soft" theory and "soft" observation statements. Pop-
per 's remedy for this seemingly hopeless circle is that
statements about observations may only be based upon
extremely strong, thoroughly tested and generally
accepted theories. By means of an agreement between the
researchers in question, the doubts concerning observa-
tion statements are temporarily set aside. In other
words, statements about observations are solidified by
means of conventional agreements, the convention being
in part based upon an estiraation of the corroboration
level of the observational theory in question.
Falsification or Exhaustion
Yet this artificial, conventional solidifyiug of
observation statements is the Achilles heel of falsi-
ficationism. Conventions are a poor substitute for what
was once called hard facts. In practice, if a dearly
beloved theory is threatened by a falsification, the
temptation for researchers and theorists is very great
indeed to forget convention and to doubt the correct-
ness of the observation theory. Galileo's colleagues,
for example, doubted (according to Feyerabend justifi-
'
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ably so as well) the correctness of the optical theory
upon which the construction of the telescope is based,
resulting ia Galileo's hearing the necessary burden of
proof. Galileo's contemporaries rightly wondered why
they should doubt simple observations of the naked eye
and not the observations with such a new and untested
instrument as the telescope (see chapter I). And yet it
was this very demand that was made upon them. In the
social sciences, this dilemma repeats itself almost
daily. By pointing to the deficiency of the experimen-
tal design or method of data collection, disagreeable
research results are "reasoned away". This is the
essence of Holzkamp's principle of exhaustion. A good
example of this is Bell and Ainsworth's study (1972) on
the development of children's crying behavior in their
first year. They found that reacting sensitively to
crying resulted in its diminishing. On the basis of
behavioristic reinforcement theory, it should be pre-
dicted that in that case, crying should actually in-
crease, because sensitive reactions should function as
a reward, and therefore a reinforcement of the behavior
preceding it. And indeed, advocates of the reinforce-
raent theory have done everything to exposé the so-
called falsifying research results as an artefact, by
means of methodological criticism (Gewirtz and Boyd,
1977).
From the point of view of logic then, the problem
of the theory-laden observation does require an adjust-
meut of the previously described modus tollens. In
terms of logic, the dilemma of a choice between "soft"
theory and "soft" statements about observations can be
described as follows:
(t A q) -» p
—! P
~l (t A q)
in which q concerns the background theory frora which
observations are made. This is a (singular) interpre-
tation of the Duhem-Quine thesis, which states that a
simple hypothesis can never be detached from theory and
tested separately, but that a theory network (t A q) is
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always in question (see Braun and Radenaacher, 1978).
Such au interpretation results in a considerable weak-
ening of empirical arguments in theoretical discourse,
From a practical and logical point of view, it always
proves possible to undennine falsifications by placing
doubts upon the observation theory on which they are
based, rather than to reject the explanatory theory
itself.
Though such a manoeuvre is always possible from a
practical point of view, it is imaginatie that a norma-
tive research methodology might strictly forbid it.
This would particularly be so in the case of ad hoc
criticism of the observation theory only after it has
produced disagreeable research results, criticism that
weakens the content of the theory itself. And indeed,
Popper, for example, has hit out fiercely at these
so-called conventionalistic stratagems designed to save
theories from falsification ad hoc. And not only Popper,
but raany other scholars as well do not appreciate the
validity of the Duhera-Quine thesis, as Mitroff (1979)
empirically established. Curiously enough, however,
recent historical research into the (in raany respects
so succesful) natural sciences has shown that the
greatest successes (for example the discovery of pla-
nets or chemical elements) owe their very achievement
to the consistent application of protective strategies
against falsifications. In that case, Holzkamp's prin-
ciple of exhaustion has become a methodological neces-
sity.
Paradigm Theories
In Kuhn's paradigm theory, the methodological ne-
cessity of protection against falsification plays a
central role. If, indeed, a theory can protect its core
of general assumptions and insights from theoretical
and empirical criticism, it may look forward to a
fruitful period of "normal" science. In that case,
there is a disciplinary matrix of more or less inter-
related basic convictions of a group of researchers. An
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important component of such a matrix are the paradigms
in a narrower sense, that is Solutions to problems ia
the form of models with which a prospective researcher
is introduced to a particular area of research. These
models of solutions to problems, viz. research designs
and methods including their observation theory, func-
tion as an implicit and undiscussed framework of re-
ference in solving new problems. In this way, conduct-
ing research becomes a question of solving variations
of one and the same puzzle along well-known lines and
with well-known devices. No costly time or effort is
lost ia reflections on and criticism of fundamental
assumptions and well-established observation theories.
Concentrating all available energy into specific pro-
blems and subdivided areas result in a rapid progres-
sion. More and more puzzles of limited scope get solved
and more and more ingenious technological applications
get uncovered.
If potential falsifications are throttled in the
protective belt surrounding the hard core of basic
convictions, and only applications are at issue, the
question then arises how fundamental changes in theo-
retical orientation can occur according to Kuhn's
paradigm theory. On the basis of numerous examples from
scientific history, Kuhn describes how, in the long
run, a paradigm can dig its own grave. The thorough
detail-studies during the period of normal science
necessarily result in the discovery of "facts" that in
no way can be squeezed into the moulds of the existing
theory. In and of themselves, such recalcitrant anoma-
lies are not capable of destroying prevailing paradigms.
What is required is that firstly, even after prolonged
and intensive attempts, these facts can still not be
fitted into the paradigm. Secondly, there must be an
alternative paradigm in the make that is capable of
sufficiently explaining the anomalies. And thirdly,
this new paradigm must offer promising puzzles herald-
ing a new period of normal science. Arguments for
abandoning the old paradigm for the new one can, how-
ever, never be sufficiently rational. After all, the
new paradigm also leaves many questions unanswered and
is confronted with innumerable "falsifications". Ac-
cepting a new paradigm therefore in many ways resembles
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a religieus conversion. There is no solid external
criterion (for example "hard facts") by which to test
and compare the old and new paradigm.
Of course, rescue operations have been undertaken
to save the Standard view of science. Such a long
cherished rayth is not easily abandoned. Lakatos in
particular has proved a strong advocate of a rationali-
zation of the choice of paradigm or theory, although
hè, too, must acknowledge that it is impossible to
definitely reject theories purely on empirical grounds.
"It is not that we propose a theory and Nature raay
sbout no; rather, we propose a raaze of theories and
Nature may shout inconsistent." (Lakatos, 1980, p.45).
Lakatos refers here to the collision between an expla-
natory theory and an interpretive or observation theory
which produces the so-called facts. Collisions between
competing explanatory theories (paradigma or research
programs) as well cannot be automatically be resolved
by relying upon solid facts as tertium comparationis.
But the researcher is still compelled to choose between
the inconsistent theories. Lakatos attetnpts to rationa-
lize this selection process by distinguishing progres-
sive and degenerative research programs, differing in
their ability to uncover new facts and to develop new
applications. Unfortunately, hè is unable to indicate
definite criteria based upon which this distinction can
be made at the moment the inconsistency coraes to light.
He, too, is aware of the historical f act that af ter
decades of stagnation, seemingly degenerative research
programs can experience a revival and surpass their
seemingly progressive competitors.
One conclusion, at any rate, remains clear: theo-
ries are not verified or falsified but superseded by
competing theories that, for whatever reasons, are
capable of acquiring more authority. In the course of
methodological developments, the relationship between
theory and fact has undergone a number of accentual
shifts. While initially facts seeraed to strongly domi-
nate theoretical discourse, a radical shift in the
direction of a dominante of theory above empirical
facts has taken place. In part due to the principle of
exhaustion, facts have lost their right of veto and at
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most - filtered through theories - only appear to be
capable of pointing out inconsistencies in the theore-
tical argiiments.
Ecological Validity
Actually, Holzkamp hardly bothered with the ques-
tioa of how scientific progress would be possible if
the principle of exhaustion were to become common
practice. He only wished to show that there was a gap
between common experiaental practices and the tradi-
tional methodological prescripts contained in the
falsification principle. To him, the question of the
possibility of scientific progress is not an empirical
question, but a theoretical one. The functional-histo-
rical method described earlier guarantees that theories
are constructed that transcend "scientific inheritance"
and make pioneer research possible. Along with this
immanent criticism, Holzkamp also made a number of
critical observations with respect to the premises of
traditional research. He believed that too little
effort was made to create experimental situations
structurally resembling every-day reality. This is
comparable to Bronfenbrenner's problem of ecological
validity (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Holzkamp's impression
was that experimental research was more concerned with
having the results meet the requirements of statistical
analysis than with their meeting the requirement that
such results should have something to say about reali-
ty. All too often, the experiment constructs its own
artificial reality. Statistical analysis of results of
an experiment requires that a number of conditions,
i.e. independent variables, can be determined as
accurately as possible with respect to their effect on
the dependent variable. According to Holzkamp, this
leads to:
(1) Fragmentation ("Parzellierung") of these condi-
tions. A complex cluster of independent variables
is cut up into as many tiny pieces as possible, in
order to determine the effect of exactly that
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component which is described in the hypothesis.
Possible effects of other related componeuts are
disregarded.
(2) Reduction of the entire complex of conditions.
Possihle interfereace with the experimental set-up
must be eliminated in order to determine as accu-
rately as possible the effect of the independent
variable upon the dependent variable. If, for
example, the capacity of the memory is determined
by the speed with which a participant in an expe-
riment learns a series of words by heart, the
interference of the participant's own background
is eliminated as much as possible by using non-
sense words instead of existing words. The idea
is that participants probably associate existing
words with various experiences that can interfere
with the memory in various ways (Ebbinghaus).
(3) De-stabilization of the stimulus situation. Often
it is impossible to completely eliminate interfer-
ence from certain factors. What can then be tried
is keeping the participant as much in the dark as
possible about the essential characteristics of
the research situation and providing as little
support as possible for suppositions concerning
the objective of the experiment. When the situa-
tion is so de-stabilized that the participants
have become totally unsure of the expectations the
researcher has with respect to their behavior, the
experiment is started. Participants will then
clutch to the stimulus as their only point of
orientation, leading to unusually strong respon-
ses. Later, this results not only in the elimina-
tion of potential interference but also in a
confirmation of a hypothesis based upon completely
abnorraal responses.
In the construction of this experimental reality,
the researcher often has an at ti mes unconscious,
abstract image of the participant. This participant is
as fixated as possible upon the here and now and just
reacts to stimuli manipulated by the researcher. What
makes this participant a unique personality, her or his
social and historical nature, is placed, as it were,
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off-screen. Assuming the marginal conditions are the
same as those for fellow participants, she or hè will,
as a purely passive-reactive organisra, react the same
way as well. Putting it into terras of aaalysis of
variance, the variance within the group is minimalized
while the variance between groups is maximalized.
Actually, participants should not be in the position to
scan research stimuli for meaning through their past
experiences, for each participant's scanning could
result in different meanings and therefore different
reactions. Therefore, the participant is reduced to an
organism, which is why Holzkamp refers to a "bidden
organismic anthropology" in traditional psychology.
Fsychology has taken on the task of expanding our
knowledge of human thought, experience and activity and
yet in doing so, has paradoxically reduced the subject
to a bloodless organism. Holzkamp does, by the way,
believe that this organismic anthropology has some real
value and reflects some aspects of reality, in parti-
cular, the reality of the working classes in capita-
listic society. There is some sinilarity between a
"Taylorized" work situation and an experimental labo-
ratory situation. As we know, Taylor stands for the
introduction and perfectioning of the assembly line
system. Work is subdivided into meaningless parts which
the laborer can perform mechanically. In traditional
experimental research, only a particular manifestation
of human activity is described and accounted for, while
more essential and universal dimensions are disre-
garded.
Pre-scientific Practice
So in fact, traditional psychological research
does not meet the requirements of its own methodologi-
cal criteria of unimpeded operation of the falsifica-
tion principle. Nor does it satisfy criteria which
should be set for the "object-adequacy" of the experi-
mental situation, that is, from the point of view of a
critical functional-historical analysis of the research
subject - the historical and social human being. But is
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there still "hope" for the experiment, after Holzkamp's
categorical criticism? Recently, the Berlin School has
once again been devoting a great deal of attention to
the experiment as research method (Maschevsky, 1977a;
1979a, h). The general irapression one gets after study-
ing this material concerning the (im)possibility of the
experiment is not entirely negative. Of course, the
margiua] notes are largely critical (nomen est omen),
and in most cases sharper aad more detailed than in the
past. At the same time, however, more room is created
for advanced experimental designs within Critical
Psychology. In an adapted forra, the experiment should
certainly be able to play a role in the stage of empi-
rical testing of hypotheses deduced from functional-
historical analysis. This is because experimenting
falls in a direct line with pre-scientific practice, in
which actions are tried out systeraatically to see if
the changes they bring about are the expected and
desired ones. The experiment can definitely not be
labelled a pernicious invention of capitalism, as
experimentation, and even reflection at a methodologi-
cal level about experimentation, was taking place long
bef ore capitalism existed. Bacon's Jïovum Organum Scien-
tiarum, for example, was published in 1620. In ancient
times, the physician Galen was one of the first to
establish a series of methodological requirements for
the experiment, containing both the principles of
systematic variation and control of intervening factors
(see for example Klaus and Buhr, 1975, p.397). From a
historical materialistic analysis of science, Bayertz
(1980), for example, also remarks that the significance
of the experiment can only be estimated accurately if
regarded not as a general activity, but as a particular
case of human labor (in other words, as a particular
form of metabolism between man and nature). Also the
idea of "conditions analysis" upon which the experiment
is based is an everyday phenomenon and therefore not to
be brushed aside as reductionistic.
If, for example, a farmer is confronted with the
problem that the grass will not grow, hè too will then
conduct a so-called "conditions analysis". In other
words, hè will divide the situation into a nuraber of
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separate components such as, for instance, the dampness
of the soil, the presence of essential nutrients or
harmful iasects etc. He will then develop a hypothesis
as to the most likely causal factor within the complex
of possible couditioas. By keeping the other factors
coastant and varying the suspected causal factor
- using artificial fertilizer for example - hè will
test to see if his presumption is correct. If his test
procedure with respect to separate components does not
have the desired result, hè will then probably even
think in terras of possible interaction between, for
instance, the variable dampness and the presence of
essential nutrients. He will see if using artificial
fertilizer in combinatioa with the necessary supply of
water will result in the desired growth. It is exactly
this everyday form of conditions analysis and variation
of conditions that can be found in every experiment.
"Conditions analysis" is based on the assumption
that reality cannot be "known" by continuously scanning
its totality, its unreduced complexity of phenomena, in
the hope that an "Aha-Erlebnis" will strike the prover-
bial match in the darkness. As a model for reducing a
complex reality into a series of independent, dependent
and intervening factors, "conditions analysis" is based
on the idea that reality can only be known in stages,
and in particular by manipulating and changing its
elements. Of course, a thorough theoretical analysis of
the research subject is then needed. In f act, Holz-
kamp's criticism of reductionism was concerned with
blind, atheoretical reductionism. It makes indeed no
sense to go fishing in the sea of possible relevant
variables in the hope that some connection will become
clear post hoc (see above). "Conditions analysis" will
have to be accompanied by theory, which is based on a
functional-historical analysis. This analysis will have
to bring out the essential elements of the research
subject and make clear which of all conditions will
have a negligible, temporary or geographically limited
impact. This is a substantial difference between tradi-
tional model construction and that which is acceptable
from a Critical Psychological point of view. Traditio-
nal "conditions analysis" would implicitly start from a
model of a reality influenced by a series of variables
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that cannot be arranged hierarchically. Critical Psycho-
logy, on the other hand, believes on theoretical grounds
that reality is adequately reflected in a model in
which the influence of a limited number of essential
conditions far exceeds that of a series of non-essen-
tial conditions.
If it could be proved that the Critical-Psycholo-
gical method was correct, and if the functional-histo-
rical method was capable of separating essential condi-
tions from non-essential ones, this would indeed be a
step in the direction of more fruitful scientific
research- Indeed, the greatest problen with traditional
experimentation is how to keep possible intervening
variables under control. It is clear that any type of
control in a traditional model must be futile (assuming
the ineffectiveness of the randomization technique, s»e
below), as the number of variables that could greatly
interfere with experiments is incalculable. Because of
personal, material and statistical problems, there will
always be uncontrolable factors influencing the corre-
lation between independent and dependent variables, so
that both generalization and replication will be great-
ly limited. For example, it is very possible that the
independent variable investigated (in the example,
dampness of the soil) only correlates with the depen-
dent variable {growth rate of the grass) if a certain
amount of artificial fertilizer is present. If this
third variable is not considered, the experiment could
yield an entirely different interaction effect in
another situation in which another amount of artificial
fertilizer is held as constant intervening factor.
There seems very little possibility of replicating the
experiment with respect to increasing the level of
dampness. Imagine, though, that a functional-historical
analysis could prove that only the level of dampness
and the amount of nutrients were essential and that the
effect of the remaining intervening variables (if
any) - the presence of insects, the structure of the
soil etc., was negligible. First of all, it would be
possible to anticipate possible interaction effects by
constructing a relatively siraple model. Secondly, it
would be possible to have more faith in generalizations
of the results to other situations in which only the
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non-essential factors somewhat vary. In that case, the
age-old dilemma of increasing internal validity versus
expanding external validity would cease to exist (Camp-
bell and Stanley, 1966).
The Priority of Theory above Fact
The central point of the Berlin School is there-
fore that the present crisis in experimental psycholo-
gy, in which generalization, replicatioa and theoreti-
cal relevance of results are difficult to achieve, is
first and foremost a theoretical problem, with the un-
necessary shortcoroings of techniques in second place.
Maschewsky, for example, does not expect that refine-
rnents in techniques will bring us any closer to a
solution to the problem. He points to the progress that
has been made in this area in the last decades, for
instance the success of multivariate analysis techni-
ques and the developtnent of complicated, quasi-experi-
raental designs. But if the theory does not keep apace
with these innovations, the problems of controlling
intervening variables, and therefore of generalization
and replication, will continue to exist. The metiiod of
control of, for example, matching - loofcing for com-
parable pairs of participants for experiatents - is
insufficieat if the variables that could greatly inter-
fere are unknown. To find sufficient numbers of com-
parable participants, they can only be matched for a
smal l nuraber of variables. Without theoretical insight
into the structure of the research subject, doubt as to
the effectiveness of this control remains therefore
justified. The sarae applies to such statistical tech-
niques as covariance analysis and partialization. These
raethods can also be very effective in limiting inter-
vening factors if the variables relevant in that con-
nection are known. This assumes that a model of the
research subject exists which contains not only the
possible correlations between the independent and
dependent variables being investigated, but also the
connection between these and possible essential inter-
vening variables. The construction of such a model is a
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theoretical matter; on the basis of prior research and
insights obtained in other ways, a functional-histori-
cal "conditions analysis" of the subject should be
made. The result of this analysis should consist of an
hierarchieal arrangement of essential and non-essential
intervening variables, related to time and place.
The usual solution of the traditional methodology
is "randomization". By randoraly selecting participants
for the experimental and the control groups, all "un-
known" interfering variables will also have been
controlled. The assumption is that the negative and
positive effects of these interfering variables neutra-
lize one another, so that a priori the two groups can
be cousidered comparable. But the assumption is then
also that the interfering variables do not have a high
degree of correlation to one another and can be com-
bined in a linear additive model. Interactions and
curvilinear relations can greatly imbalance the neu-
tralization of the positive and negative effects des-
cribed above. It is then impossible to assume that two
groups are, in principle, identical (Maschewsky, 1979a,
p. 149). The assumption that through random selection,
interfering factors compensate for one another should
be made at least theoretically plausible in each indi-
vidual research project. After all, in our social
reality it seems more often rule than exception that a
series of variables effect one another and other va-
riables in more complex ways. An important thesis of
Bronfenbrenner's (1979, p.38), for example, is that in
ecological research the principle main effects are
likely to be interactions. Therefore, a theoretical
test of this assumption for an effective use of the
randomization method points once again in the direction
of the functional-historical method.
Cook and Campbell (1979), by the way, inention
still other limitations of the randomization method
which make it unemployable in certain situations, such
as the necessity of using existing groups (for example
a class or school) instead of individuals. Because of
the limited willingness to participate in experiments,
it is usually impossible to randomly divide schools or
classes into experimental and control groups. And even
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if it would be possible to arbitrarily divide a number
of schools into aa experimental and a control group,
it would still be impossible to prevent schools in the
control group (which, for example, do not get an extra
teacher or attractive new curriculum material) from
behaving differently for that very reason. They per-
ceive an undeserved inequality in treatment and will
try to make up the difference by making necessary
improvements (internal reorganization, etc.) at their
own costs. On the other hand, they may become demora-
lized and apathetic. It is clear that randomization is
not the panacee it had been held to be until recently
(Cook and Campbell, 1979, p. 55 ff) and that other
methods of control are needed. It is also clear that
the effectiveness of these methods is very dependent on
theoretical insight into the structure of the research
subject, insight that Critical Psychology believes can
only be obtained through the functional-historical
method.
Not only the problem of controlling intervening
variables threatens to discredit the results of experi-
mental research. There is also the artefact problem.
With undeniable pleasure, Critical Psychology refers to
traditional psychology's sharp self-criticism with
respect to the results, for instance, of Sosenthal's
artefact research (Rosenthal, 1976). The participant in
an experiment had usually been seen as a "black box"
that only reacts to raanipulated experimental stimuli.
But artefact research and the "social psychology of the
experiment" - the "meta-discipline" based upon it -
have made clear that it would be advisable to consider
participants as persons with their own interpretations
and experiences, who actively assimilate the stimuli,
and respond to them. More and more within traditional
psychological study, the insigbt is beginning to grow
that the experiment*s natural sciences origin will
inevitably lead us to equate the social scientific
research "participant" with the lifeless, unreflective
"subject" of the natural sciences. In that sense, there
is be a "cognitive reorientation" in psychology, in
which the question of the human's ability to attach
meanings to things plays a central role in psycholo-
gical research. Artefact research has indeed demon-
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strated that "even" ia au experimental situation, a
participaat cannot help reacting like a "human being".
It appears, for instance, that most participants have
au idea of what is desired to help science along. With
respect to experimeatal research, science still has the
aura of deal ing with genuinely important matters. On
the basis of this authority, most participants feel
obliged to coatribute to scientific progress. On the
authority of the researcher, participants are capable
of accepting the most peculiar instructions and exe-
cuting them - as far as they are concerned - as well as
possible. Even the (fictitious) murder of a stranger is
not excluded, as the tlilgram experiments have demon-
strated (Milgram, 1974) . Participants develop an idea
of what the experimenter and science expect of them.
Sometimes these expectations ("demantl characteristics")
with respect to the requirements of the experimental
situation seem to have a greater influeace on the
research results than the experimental manipulation of
the independent variable. Maschewsky, for exarnple,
described an experiment by Orne and Scheibe in which
they investigated if the usual reaction to sensory
deprivation - hallucinations, depressions, fear, etc. -
could be elicited from participants who had been de-
luded by the experimenter into believing that they
would undergo sensory deprivation. And indeed, the
(experimental) groups, convinced they were involved in
a dangerous deprivation study, appeared to react as
such, even though they were treated exactly as were the
control groups (Haschewsky, 1977a, p. 170 ff).
Of course, here, too, the fundamental paradox of
all artefact research is clear. One could, indeed
justifiably argue that the participant does not stop
being a human being in "meta-research", and that the
results of artefact research are themselves influenced
by what is investigated or by other artefacts. This is
the so-called "Münchhausen-effect" (Hoogstraten, 1979).
It is even more paradoxical when Critical Psychologists
believe they can base their criticism of the tradition-
al experiment on the results of artefact research.
Indeed, this research is not only subjected to the
artefact problera itself. It is also subject to Critical
Psychology's fundamental criticism of the experiment;
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it cannot be generalized nor replicated and lacks
relevancy because it also lacks a substantial theore-
tical foundation, developed by means of the functional-
historical method. As is the case in traditional
experimentation, meta-research is based upon bold con-
jectures, the "positivistic" surrogate for systematic
theory construction. Maschewsky nevertheless concludes
that traditional psychology has also been unable to
solve the artefact problem, despite all the methodolo-
gical and technical progress, and that this state of
affairs itself should occasion a "Critical Psychologi-
cal reorientation".
To conclude this paragraph, we will deal with the
question of the position of the experiment in the
Berlin School. Most of the Critical Psychological
statements about the experiment are concerned with its
shortcomings; inability to generalize, replicate or
make relevant experimental results. But the crux of the
experiment, i.e. conditions analysis, the reduction of
reality to a model and variation of conditions, is tied
neither to a specific ("positivistic") methodology nor
to a specific ("capitalistic") society. As opposed to
the more holistic schools in psychology (for example,
Giorgi, 1976), Critical Psychology does not distance
itself frorn analysis, reduction and model construc-
tion, which are the conditions for experimentally
testing hypotheses. Maschewsky even warns us of the
danger of the opiaions of those who only wish to be
concerned with the "totality", the connections between
individual phenomena, out of distaste for analytic
studies. These schools, also not unknown to Marxism,
must necessarily slip into speculative reflection as
"pure Hegelei". In other words, Critical Psychology
endorses the essential priaciples of the experimental
method. But it rejects the way in which these prin-
ciples are put into practice for research, particularly
based on the experience that this practice has too much
a trial and error character and too little conscious
theoretical underpinniug. From this criticism, Critical
Psychology does not, therefore, strive to abolish the
experiment as a method of gaining knowledge, but to
achieve an "Aufhebung" of it, that is to perfect it by
integrating its most advanced variants with the func-
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tional-historical method. Contrary to Maschewsky, how-
ever, Holzkamp (1983) seeras to regard the experiment to
be especially suitable for areas which, for whatever
reason (physical or societal) remain outside the sphere
of influence of its subject, i.e. outside the sphere of
the potential "self-determination". Further, this
method may only be used in research situations ia which
participants and researchers in principle have a sub-
ject-subject relation with one another. If this crite-
rion is not met, Holzkamp believes, the experimental
method is not "object-adequate", devaluating the parti-
cipant to an externally detennined organism (see below).
However that may be, we have yet to find examples
in Critical Psychological literature of a successful
integration of the experiment as an empirical method
with a functional-historical analysis. Up to now there
have been very few attempts in that direction. The more
than 4000 pages that have been published in the past 15
years within the framework of the Berlin School have by
and large been filled with theoretical criticism of
traditional psychology and with the results of func-
tional-historical research. It would, therefore, be a
bit of an exaggeration to consider, as does Maschewsky
(I977a, p.217, 225), the achievements of Critical Psy-
chology as proof of the postulate that it is possible
to achieve more valid and more reliable up-to-date em-
pirical research results through functional-historical
analysis. For the time being, the question of the
possibility and effectiveness of integrating the func-
tional-historical method and the experimental method
must therefore remain unanswered.
ACTION RESEARCH AS A CRITICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD
In the preceding paragraphs, we saw that Critical
Psychology has made a critical issue of, in particular,
the role of the participant in the traditional experi-
ment. Due to the methodological necessity of control-
ling possible intrusive factors, ardent attempts are
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made to reduce the participant to a passively reacting,
a-historical and a-social organism. Functional-histori-
cal analysis has, however, shown that as subjects of
psychological research, humans retain their essential
characteristics as historical and social beings and as
active assimilators of the stimuli presented. It has
also been suggested that such attempts at a-theoretical
reduction for the sake of control of intrusive, subjec-
tive influences are doomed to failure. Only by pairing
the experimental tnethod to functional-historical aaaly-
sis and structuring the research subject is it possible
to guarantee control of relevant, essential and inter-
vening variables while maintaining the "human", i.e.
historical and social character of the participants in
experiments (see Holzkamp, 1983). We have seen that
from the Critical Psychological point of view, the
crystallization of this "Aufhebung" of the experimental
method is still part of the future agenda of this new
school.
Features of "Traditional" Action Research
One research method that presumes to radically
break down the traditional roles of the researcher and
the participant and to guarantee the subjectivity of
all the participants in the research design is action
research ("Handluugsforschung"). This method, based on
American action research (Lewin), has the following
features:
(1) Action research regards the meaning participants
themselves attach to their reality as a fraraework
of reference for formulating and answering the
questions posed by research (Heinze et al., 1975,
p.42). The action researcher assumes that only by
prolonged participation in the reality of those
involved is it possible to bring to light the
meaning they attach to that reality. With a view
to this, the method of "participant observation"
(McCall and Simmons, 1969) has an important place
within action research.
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(2) As opposed to traditional research, in which
situational and subjective aspects of reality are
regarded as factors interfering with tracking down
the relationships between independent and depen-
dent variables, action research accentuates such
aspects. The action researcher does not deny the
existence of such relationships, of conditioned,
regularly recurring behavioral sequences, hut aims
particularly at expanding the subjective latitude
within the participant's reality.
(3) Action research is aimed at an open discussion
- also called "Diskurs" (Moser, 1975) - with
participants on the research results- Confronting
participants with the notion researchers glean of
their reality by means of participant observation
and other aethods could result in a broadening of
the subjective latitude. To the extent action
research runs up against "law-like" relationships,
this open dialogue will be a means of investiga-
ting to what extent these are "actual" nomological
propositions and to what extent these are ideolo-
gically "frozen" regularities owing their exist-
ence to the "ignorance" of those concemed. This
is based on Habermas' famous statement that a
critical consciousness of existing "law-like"
relationships cannot lead to invalidation of the
law, but can imply the suspension of its effects
(Habermas, 1970, p.154).
It is no surprise that a research method that
would appear to distinguish itself so radically from
traditional methods with respect to the relationship
between researcher and research praxis should receive
the necessary attention from the ranks of Critical
Psychology. Understandably, the question has arisen
whether action research, that in West Germany created
such a furore especially within the field of education,
is capable of bringicg us closer to a solution to the
problems associated with empirical research in Critical
Psychology. As we saw in the previous paragraph, the
discussion on the value of the experiment has yet to
result in the crystallization of workable empirical
methods, let alone in research practices drawn from
this discussion. The 1970's have seen the start of a
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number of promising action research projects in the
areas of educational science. It is therefore to be
expected that Critical Psychology would link up with
this initiative to overcome the limitations of tradi-
tional methodology.
Subjectivism and Dilettantism
Although action research was brought to the fore,
in particular by the critical student movement of the
sixties, to demonstrate that is was possible to draw
practical consequences from the Frankfurt School's
polemics against positivism, Critical Psychology has by
no tneans adopted this research metbod uncritically. On
the contrary, on a number of essential points, the
theory and practice of action research are sharply
criticized. Schneider, for example, mentions in this
regard the objective of action research to achieve,
together with the participants, a change in their
living conditions and an expansion of the individual
freedom of choice. But to her mind, a Critical-Psycho-
logical "view of huinanity" (Scbneider, 1979, p.206),
for which the tension between self-determination ("sub-
jektiver Bestimmung") and external determination ("ob-
jektiver Bestimmtheit") is characteristic, is not its
point of departure. On the one hand, individuals are
interwoven into an historical-social fabric, which
strongly detennines their behavior ("objektive Be-
stimmtheit"). On the' other hand, however, they are
capable of actively moulding their own lives and there-
by moulding social developraeuts as well ("subjektive
Bestimrnung"). In action research, individuals should
rearrange their lives, that is, utilise the possibility
of "subjektiver Bestiranung"; but by and large, the ob-
jectives and conditions for this change, which should
be based upon a (functioaal-historical) analysis of
their "objektiver Bestiramtheit", are left open. In
doing so, action research overemphasizes individual
behavioral latitude to the neglect of the external
determination of human existence. Some action research-
ers, for example, have the notion that the field should
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be entered without any "prejudices", hypotheses etc. at
all, in order to give the participants the opportunity
of exerting influence upon the formulation of and
responses to the research questions. This, however,
results in the danger of a more impersonal deseription
of reality being replaced by subjective experieace and
values colored by ideologies (compare the foregoing
paragraphs). Neglect of the "objektiver Bestimmtheit",
that is the historical-social context that puts limits
upon the individual's freedora of choice, is often
accompanied by an overestimation of that individual's
capacity for change. Action researchers working in one
school or in one clubhouse, believe that through their
research they can instigate permanent change, without
seeking contact with such social interest groups as
labor unions or political parties. Action research then
becomes a substitute for political action, the action
researcher a political dilettante.
Action research is also often not aimed at testing
theories with a scope broader than the practical theo-
ries of the participants, but solely at instigating
changes, the objective of which is neither explicit nor
well-founded. As a result, the scientific relevance and
generalization potential, in this case transferability,
of the "research" results are dubious. And according to
Schneider, the practice of action research demonstrates
the validity of this criticism: even when the action
researcher takes the trouble to write a report on the
progress and results of the project, its usefulness
under other research conditions is, to say the least,
unclear. Due to the absence of a theoretical back-
ground, we gain no insight into the essential prere-
quisites for succesfully applying the strategy follow-
ed. And because there is no clear objective, an evalu-
ation of the results is usually dispensed with. As it
did in its criticism of the experiment, here, too,
Critical Psychology makes the point that empirical re-
search can only be meaningful if it is conducted within
the context of thorough functional-historical analysis
of the research subject. Without such prior structur-
ing, the experiment is reduced to an arbitrary selec-
tion and manipulation of variables, while action re-
search only results in activism without theory or ob-
jective.
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Criteria for Critical Psychological
Action Research
Nonetheless, Schneider believes that action re-
search could occupy a meaningful position in Critical
Psychology, but then the research method must meet the
following criteria. Firstly, the research process must
be strongly goal-oriented. We have already mentioned
how negligent most action researchers are, particularly
in the area of raaking explicit the objectives of re-
search and change. This usually results in the impossi-
bility of an evaluation, in the forra of a confrontation
of goal and effect, based upon those objectives. As a
result, the theoretical and practical value of the
projects is, to say the least, dubious. With a view to
the transferability of the results, action research
should accoDimodate itself to the conventional demands
placed upon every innovation-evaluation study. In this
regard, objectives cannot be solely of a general na-
ture, such as "promoting democratie processes" and
"emancipation", but must also be cast into forms of
intermediate and preliminary goals that can be opera-
tionalized. Because action research purports to be a
unity of research and action, lucid research objectives
should also be formulated which should include at least
an analysis of the prerequisites for change, a determi-
nation of all the stages of the strategy for change,
and finally an evaluation of the effects of that stra-
tegy. Secondly, action research should raaintain the
necessary flexibility and openness with respect to the
participaots. A detailed research plan is actually
incompatible with a great degree of flexibility with
respect to the group being studied, which often only in
the course of the research project can make clear what
they expect from the research and the changes. Action
research is characterized, on the one hand, by resear-
chers participating in the processes they are studying
and on the other by participants acting as co-research-
ers in giving direction to the study. A too rigid and
extremely goal-oriented planning could endanger the
participation of this latter group in the research
process. For that reason, actïon research must shuttle
back and forth between the poles of systeraatic planning
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and flexibility. Thirdly, action research should be not
only goal-oriented but also process-oriented. Only a
detailed description of the process can lead to insight
into the dynamics of the cbaage and do justice to the
complexity of its occurrence. The transferability of
action research results to other situations is depea-
dent upon such a description of the process. Frora this,
we should be able to extract a model in which the
interactions between essential prerequisites, induced
changes and (preliminary) effects and side-effects are
symbolized. Fourthly, action research should contain a
continual interplay between "fact", theory and praxis.
All too often, action is accentuated too oae-sidedly.
An important place shall have to be reserved for theo-
ry, in the form of results of functional-historical
analysis, in both the initial phase of the study and in
the interpretation of the results {Schneider, 1980,
p.208 ff).
All the criteria action research must meet in
order to be useful within a Critical Psychological
framework appear to be aimed at increasing its scienti-
fic value. It is only possible to understand why such
obvious deoiands are made upon the transparency, goal-
orientation and theoretical foundations of action
research if seec against the background of its often
activist research practice. For sotae, action research
was nothing more than a disguise for the marketing of
changes they feit desired. It is quite easy to imagine
that a target group would be more likely to accept
strategies for change wben advocated in the guise of
scientific research than when researchers present
themselves as professional revolutionaries. We have
already seen that under the authority of "science",
"participants" are capable of the most peculiar beha-
vior {see Milgram, 1974). Critical Psychology defini-
tely does not wish to support such activist tendencies
in action research. For this school, action research
does not have a primarily instrumental function -for
example, propagating the correct class consciousness -
but a theoretical one, that is, testing theories and
models developed through functioaal-historical analy-
sis. Rightly, Critical Psychology wishes to squeeze
vaguely structured action into the tight mould of
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methodological rules, which can guarantee the theoreti-
cal and practical relevance and transferability of its
results, while simultaneously maintaining the necessary
openness and flexibility with respect to the group
being studied.
At this juncture, it is impossible to determine to
what extent such a prerequisite can be met. At odds
here is the "idealistic" nature of the criteria des-
cribed above, arising not frora a succes fui Critical
Psychological research praxis, but imposed upon action
research in a traditional, idealistic fashion. In this
respect, the procedure of Critical Psychology differs
little from critical-rationalistic methodology: certain-
ly, neither eschew formulating research rules on an
exclusively normative basis without testing them in
practice for their feasibility. The "idealistic" origin
of the criteria action research must meet are reflected
in the formalism of the model that should serve as a
guide in this respect. In this model, based upon the
work of Schauble, Fiedler and Eickels, four stages are
represented, the third of which is divided into a num-
ber of steps. In the first stage, making contact with
the field, an attempt is made to stimulate interest in
the action research project and to arrive at a very
general formulation of the research problem. In the
second stage, innovation planning, the project raust be
protected from possible outside interference. In this
stage, for example, the necessary financial and legal
guarantees for the continuation of the project must be
obtained, while contact with such kindred interest
groups as the labor unions should be sought. In addi-
tion, accurate and detailed organization and planning
provide internal guarantees for the project's success.
In the third stage, realization of innovation, an
attempt is made to create a spiral movemeut between
problem formulation, goal determination, instigation of
change, its evaluation, repeated problem formulation,
etc. The recurrent opportunities for feedback in this
process ensure a high degree of openness and flexibili-
ty with respect to the group being studied. In the last
stage, summative evaluatiou, a goal-effect analysis is
made and a detailed description of the research process
is provided. In this stage, legitimizing the project
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for the "outside world", and in particular for the pro-
viders of funds, also plays an important role.
The Problematical Relationship
with the Functional-Historical Method
Oddly eaough, this model contains no room for the
functional-historical analysis of the research subject,
once regarded as so important. The stage of making
contact with the field, for example, should be preceded
by an analysis in which the choice for the specific
area "requiring" action research is motivated. But
functional-historical analysis is pre-eminently a form
of theoretical research in which the "lay person" can
hardly be involved. As we saw above it requires consi-
derable knowledge to survey the results of the "scien-
tific inheritance" with respect to a particular area
and to analyze them by means of a vaguely structured
method. With the functional-historical method, a tra-
ditional division of roles between the active research-
er and the passive research subject would seem unavoid-
able, certainly so long as the problem of "intersubjec-
tivity" reraains unsolved. In order to be conveyable to
colleague-researchers, but also to participants wishing
to functioa as co-researchers, a research method must
have a clear, transparent structure. In other words,
the functional-historical method is a necessary ingre-
diënt for any actioa research, and simultaneously, a
"Fremdkörper" (foreign body) by definition, for it does
not conform to any of action research's basic assump-
tions. However, Critical Psychology does not make an
explicit theme of this paradox. The question of the
relationship between the results of a functional-histo-
rical analysis and the image the group being studied
has of itself and its situation is thereby avoided. So
is the question of how discrepancies between goals
logically arising from the results of such an analysis
and those regarded as most important from the point of
view of the experiential world of the group being
studied can be resolved without reverting to the tradi-
tional relationship between researcher and subjects.
l
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Recently, Ho lzkamp (1983) has devoted some attention to
this problem. Action research proves for him to be a
paradigmatic Critieal Psychological research method aud
more important than the traditional experiment. This
is, however, conditional upon the participants, as
co-researchers, being aware of the conceptual results
of the functional-historical method, capable then of
communicating at a "meta-subjective" level with the
researcher. That seems to us a great deal to ask of
both the average participant aud the intersubjectivity
of the functional-historical method. We certainly
cannot require participants to follow an intensive
course in Berlin Critieal Psychology before being
alloued to participate in action research!
Due to the absence of a separate stage for theory
construction preceding the actual action research, it
is furthermore unclear what scientific value can be
attached to the results ot the summative evaluation in
Schneider's conception. After all, the central question
here is: has the innovation strategy achieved its goal
OT are there effects that conflict with that goal?
Reference to theoretical assumptions and expectations
is aot possible, so that the results of a functional-
historical analysis are not "tested" in this area. As a
result, the place of action research in the Critieal
Psychological research process becomes questionable.
Due to the absence of a theoretical pole, the so es-
sential tension between theory, "facts" and praxis
disappears, despite Schneider's warnings about action
research's degeneration into activism.
Methods of Collecting Data
Until now, the question of how data for the ana-
lytical and evaluatory stages in the research cycle are
to be collected has been overlooked in this discussion
of action research. We have discussed the method of
participant observation, which guarantees that justice
is done to the participants experiential world. In the
literature on action research, hosts of other raethods
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are also mentioned, not precluding such traditional
approaches as the interview, the survey, projective
tests, group discussions, the diary method, etc. (Hein-
ze et al., 1975, p.140; Haag et al., 1972, p.68; Moser,
1977). In choosing these traditional methods, the
assumptie» is that they are relatively independent of
the methodological context ia which they are applied.
When interwoven into the strategy of action research,
such strongly criticized methods as the survey and the
interview are presumed to lose their negative connota-
tion. An important critical position of Berger's (1974)
with respect to the interview, for example, was that
this form of data collection reflects the traditional
relationship between overlord and subject. Interviewers
are in the position of questioner who usually knows the
"correct" answer in advance. As isolated individuals,
the ones interviewed are expected only to respond, even
though they have no insight into the background or
meaningfulness of the questions posed. The process of
the exchange of iuformation is by and large one-way
traffic. In the action research cycle, however, this
one-way traffic is of a temporary nature. The usual
process of continual exchange and feedback between
researchers and participants is as it were nsoraentariiy
suspended on behalf of a short-lived stage of syste-
matic data collection.
However, Critical Psychology is somewhat ambiva-
lent towards such methodological eclecticism, in which
it is denied that methods can be "contaminated" with
the raethodological context in which they are applied.
On the one hand, Moser, for example, is strongly criti-
cized for his call for the use of traditional methods
(Schneider, 1980, p.181). On the other hand, the use of
such methods is not discouraged so long as they meet
the following criteria:
(a) transparency, that is research goal, hypotheses
and generalizations must be conprehensible for the
participants;
(b) conraunication and co-operation, that is continual
feedback of information to the participants and a
great openness for cotnmentary and criticism, also
concerning the technical aspects of the study;
!
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(c) stimulatory function, that is that data collection
and analysis must not only be almed at the re-
searcher's obtainiag as much Information as possi-
ble, hut also at stiiaulating participants' think-
ing about their own situation;
(d) attention devoted to both subjective and objective
factors in the research situation, that is, the
collection of "subjective" data such as attitudes
and meanings against the background of objective
situatiorial data;
(e) involvement of theory, in other words, that in de-
veloping new methods, the theoretical presupposi-
tions of critical action research must be borne in
miud;
(f) conveyability, in other words, that the methods
and techniques applied must provide intersubjecti-
vely acceptable data comprehensible also to others
outside the circle of those directly involved;
(g) process-orientation, that is, that in particular,
methods should also do justice to the process
character of every strategy for change, so that
conclusions may be drawn concerning the dynamics
behind those changes (Schneider, 1980, p.213 ff;
see chapter I). Schneider does not mention any
concrete methods meeting these rather vague cri-
teria- Developing such methods is a task for the
future.
Generalization of the Results
Of course, the above criteria only apply to the
first stage of actioa research in its narrow sense.
There is a second stage attached to the first - namely
the implementation and evaluation in a broader social
context of the strategy for change that has been de-
veloped. Curiously enough, no particular demands are
made upon the research methods used in this stage
(Schneider, 1980, p.209; 212). The purpose of this
second stage is to establish the extent to which the
strategy can be generalized to other situations, that
is to what extent the effectiveness of the program can
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then be maintained. Although Schneider does not expand
upon this so important stage for the emanation of
action research results, one gets the injpression that
it concerns a poorly founded device for testing the
generalization potential of strategies that are the
result of a singular process in a specific practical
situation. In close relation to the practical situa-
tion, and after raany cycles of formulating objectives,
and inducing and evaluating changes, the strategy for
change has developed with intention of not surprising
the participants with a ready-raade package of "desired"
changes. It would seem obvious that in the course of
such open and flexible cycles, resistance to change
would be broken down, for participants then have the
feeling that they themselves are responsible for the
changes. For the very reason that so mucb time is taken
in formulating the definitive program, it could then be
assumed that the strategy for change would be effec-
tive. In other words, an important ingrediënt of any
innovation resulting frora action research is the con-
struction stage itself, duriag which resistance to
changes is gradually broken down. If the final results
are then made into a complete package to be implemented
in other situations, it should come as no surprise that
its effects will differ considerably from the results
originally obtained. It also runs counter to the prin-
ciples of Critical Psychology that in this second
stage, participants are ouce again regarded in their
traditional role of passive consumer of a package of
changes constructed elsewhere, only to serve as data
suppliers during its evaluation. For indeed, the tra-
ditional, large-scale, extensive data collection me-
thods recommended for this phase allow no room for open
coramunicat i on.
In brief, then, in view of the fact that an essen-
tial ingrediënt, namely the construction of a test for
the generalization potential of a strategy for change,
has been left out of the stages for action research, we
firstly doubt whether it can achieve the aspired goal.
Secondly, we doubt whether this second stage does, in
fact, meet the criteria Critical Psychology itself has
formulated with respect to action research, and, in
particular, with respect to the role of the partici-
T
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pants. As was the case with the discussion of the
experiment (see the foregoing paragraphs), here, too,
we discover that Critical Psychology is as sharp in its
criticism of existing methodologies aad methods as it
is vague in formulating an alternative. The problems of
a concrete methodological and technical supplementation
of the action research methodology, of the attachment
of the functional-historical method to action research
in a narrow sense and of the transferability of stra-
tegies for change, remain unsolved. As yet, no relevant
experience with critical action research has been
acquired. On the basis of this paragraph, we can there-
fore establish that while Critical Psychology has
obtained a clear identity in the area of criticism, it
still has a long way to go to construct a truly useful
alternative paradigm. It is to the credit of Critical
Psychology that in this process, it sees action re-
search as just one of its sources of inspiration. In
West-European circles of progressive social scientists,
there is too often a tendency to regard action research
as a panacea for all ills. Rightly, Critical Psychology
limits the scope of action research to questions con-
cerning the development, introduction and evaluation of
change. In view of the danger of atheoretical and
directionless activism, it can only be regarded fa-
vorably that Critical Psychology attetnpts to pin it to
a series of methodological requirements designed to
guarantee its scientific character.
THE BERIIN SCHOOI AND STATISTICS
When Marx wrote his "Kapital", only eight percent
of the population of England and Wales «ere industrial
laborers, about the same percentage «ere domestic
servants (Haug, 1978). And yet hè developed a theory in
which the industrial laborer was given an extremely
important role in changing society. This theory would
not have been confinaed by a statistical analysis of
the data from a survey of the occupational stratifi-
cation and the accompanying division of power among the
different population groups. But the industrial revolu-
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tion carried on everywhere aad the power of the working
class grew visibly. Universal sufferage was attained,
the labor movement and labor parties became a politi-
cal-economic factor of great importance aad the indus-
trial laborer became a trend-setter as regards the
improvement of working conditions, increasiag income
from labor and expanding the package of welfare servi-
ces. And although a number of important predictions did
not become reality - for example, the material "Vere-
lendung" (impoverishment) of the working class, at
least in the western world - it remains one of the
theory's remarkable achievements to have recognized at
such an early stage the importance of this statistical
"outlier".
Adorno's Numerical Mystique
On the basis of such illustrations of the seeming
superiority of theoretical above statistical argumeuta-
tion, Adorno concluded that statistics can only empha-
size the importance of the average, of the largest
commoti denominator. The seeds of new developmerits
decisive for genuine social progress are degraded to
the status of a raarginal phenoraenon. Statistics are,
according to Adorno, incapable of discerning the spe-
cial quality of quantitatively insignificant phenomena.
In a rather impressionistic article, interspersed with
emotive language, Adorno attributes the rise of sta-
tistics in the social sciences to a general tendency in
bourgeois society to attach more importance to quanti-
ty, in the form of an oh j eet's exchange value, than to
quality, in the form of an object's usefulness with
respect to satisfying needs (in Adorno et al., 1978).
The researcher attaching great value to the results of
statistical analysis is therefore the victim of a
social ideology in which the power of numbers is grea-
ter than the quality of the product or opinion.
Here, the role of statistics in the social scien-
ces is too easily equated with the role of money in
economie exchange: both form the extremely abstract
BERLIN SCHOOL 173
basis upon which incomparable entities are equated and
compared. Such eloquently worded attacks directed at
statistics have not made their use very popular in
research circles viewing themselves as progressive and
critical. Of course, the current practice of assigning
numbers to phenomena has itself also contributed to the
raaintenance of the abovementioned numerical mystique.
But all too often in the social sciences, a numerical
scale is mindlessly chosen as a model for reality, in
which figuratively speaking, apples are multiplied by
eggs. Without any theoretical argumentation, what
should be a nominal scale for equivalent entities is
elevated to an ordinal scale of hierarchically arranged
characteristics. This kind of "operationalistic" prac-
tices often results in a breach ia the relationship
between reality and numerical model resulting ia the
model itself being elevated to the status of reality
(Kreppner, 1975). For want of theory, for example, it
is necessary to declare an operationalization of intel-
ligence, the IQ-test, to be the phenomenon itself. In
that case, "Intelligence is what an IQ-test measures"
becoraes the operationalistic solution to the problem of
no longer knowing at all what is being measured (Vroon,
1982). It is such excesses of what, in principle, is a
completely logical representation of reality in model
fonn that are grist for the milis of opponents of
statistics.
Fonnal and Dialectical Logic
In addition, the statistics that built upon fonnal
logical insights and therefore endorsed the principle
of contradictioQ - something cannot be true and false
at the same time (Copi, 1978, p.306) - appeared to
collide with the dialectical logic as foundation of a
critical theory of society. The idea that every pheno-
nenon reflects fundamental social contradictions, and
is therefore in itself contradictory - is and is aot
itself - appeared incompatible to a statistical ap-
proach that could apply but one number to that phe-
nomenon and therefore appears to deny immanent contra-
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diction. In this regard as well, then, statistics is
presuraed to be incapable of getting to the core of the
matter. It seems only capable of providing materials
for a view of reality in which undialectical appearan-
ces are taken to be the dialectically structured es-
sence (see also chapter III).
In the meantime, however, it has been recognized
that this is a fallacy which for many years has been an
obstacle to seriously and critically studying an im-
portant attaimnent of scientific pursuit, namely its
arsenal of statistical methods. With the succession of
Adorno by Habermas within the Frankfurt School, for
example, the tide turned in favor of the use of sta-
tistical methods, interwoven into an ideology-critical
and self-reflective framework. In the so-called socia-
list countries, as well, there would appear to be less
and less hesitation with respect to statistics. The
indeed very simplistic frequency tabulation, which for
many years represented the only form of quantification
in the East Gerraan and Soviet Russian social sciences,
is - in theory at least - more and more being exchanged
for more advanced statistical analyses, generally
speaking borrowed directly from "bourgeois" scientific
practice. Critical Psychology, too, has finally ha-
zarded an extensive discussion on sense and nonsense in
statistics and in the meantime, the first textbook on
statistics written from a Critical-Psychological point
of view has been published (leiser, 1978a).
The road to the rehabilitation of statistics
within the critical social sciences (we say rehabili-
tation because Marx, for example, was certainly not
averse to mathematical-statistical methods and even
regretted not having had a better grasp of the material
for studying economie processes) was opeued among other
things by the criticism on Hegelian notions on the
relationship between formal and dialectical logic.
Hegel regarded formal logic as a form of metaphysical
thought (sic) and sharply chailenged its assumptions.
In its denial that something can be itself and some-
thing else at the same time, Hegel believed formal
logic also denied the principle of change and progress
in reality (compare Riegel's notiou of this, chapter
!
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III). After all, the essence of this reality was the
dialectical progress through the struggle between
contradictory tendencies found in every phenomenon,
reflecting the fundaraental historical-social dialectic.
The East German logician G. Klaus (1972) has discussed
the "illogical" nature of this reasoning extensively.
He acknowledges that contradiction is not pennitted in
formal logic; if this were the case, every assertion
would be true. In dialectical logic, on the other hand,
it is contradiction that forms the "moving principle"
of reality. Rightly, however, hè remarks that although
in Hegelian word gaines the use of the notion of contra-
diction in both contexts gives the appearance of equi-
valence, the terms have entirely different meanings.
Contradiction in formal logic concerns attributing and
not attributing one feature to a phenomenon at the sarae
time and in the same context. In dialectical logic,
contradiction refers to the fact that in the course of
time and in another context, a phenomenon "turns into
its opposite". A dialectical statement, for example,
might be as follows: the tripartition of the powers
(the trias politica) is at ouce progressive and conser-
vative. But if this statement is unravelled and sup-
plied with the necessary contextual information, it
might read: "In the 18th century, the tripartition of
power was progressive, but not in the 20th century", at
least not to Klaus' ntind (1972, p.55ff). Dialectical
contradiction lives on, the seeming formal-logical
contradiction has been eliminated. In short, dialecti-
cal contradictions can be described in formal-logical
terms, so that dialectical and formal logic, and there-
fore social science and statistics, are not at all
incompatible (see chapter III).
Statistical Model-BuiIding
Critical Psychology, by the way, does not comple-
tely share this opinion. In his analysis of the reflec-
tive nature of logic and mathematics Leiser (1978b)
believes that while it is true that formal logic cannot
be replaced by dialectical logic, it should be assimi-
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lated ("aufgehoben") into it. Contrary to forma! logic
and mathematica! models, dialectical logic is capable
of doing justice to the nature of reality as a process.
In connection with the artificially "frozen" moments
this process is made up of, forma l logic and ma thema-
tics are important analytical instrumeuts within the
dialectical description of this process. Leiser il-
lustrates this thesis with an example concerning the
traasformation of the pre-capitalistic production of
goods in a capitalistic systea of production (Leiser,
1978b, p. 160 ff). He demonstrates that it is very
possible to mathematically represent both systems of
production. But the mathematica l models do not show
that this qualitative change had far-reaching conse-
quences for the werking class. The formal, numerical
representation of the two moments disregards the trans-
formatiori process.
It is, however, questionable here whether Leiser
has correctly described and illustrated the supposed
shortcomings of logic and mathematica. In fact, an
important feature of more recent developments in sta-
tistics is that more attention is paid to adequately
describing dynamic processes in terms of models. As an
example, we mention here the roethod of the time-series
analysis (Kratochwill, 1978). Due to the fact that with
this method it is possible to make a relatively "sta-
tic-free" and very detailed representation of compli-
cated economie processes, it has made quite a furore,
in particular in the field of econometrics. We might
also mention the method of the path analysis (Blalock,
19722), first developed to describe complicated biolo-
gical processes, with which causal relationships can be
tested for their plausibility. Assuming a sufficient
number of points of measurement, both of these methods,
now also introduced into the social sciences, are
without question capable of minutely representing
dynamic processes in terms of models. What Leiser more
likely means with his "assimilation" ("Aufhebung") of
quantitative models into dialectical logic is that
every formal logical or statistical model abstracts
from features of reality; they are only formal repre-
sentatives requiring some content. Leiser states for
example that quantitative methods are "superficially"
T
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related to the actual process, for these same model s
can be applied to the growth of cells, nuclear reac-
tions, economie processes etc. But this says nothing
more, or less, than that every model should be inter-
preted at a theoretical level, so that it can be known
which reality is behind any formal description, A model
is in aad of itself nothing, in the most literal sense
of the word, however complicated its fundamental calcu-
lations are. The final word is therefore its theoreti-
cal interpretation, so that we might refer to an assi-
milation of quantitative methods in the theory. That
Leiser translates theoretical interpretation into a
dialectical explanation alters nothing in the abüve
arguraentation. By using the term dialectical logic,
Leiser takes on the burden of proof for his position
that every theoretical interpretation should have a
"dialectical" character. He is also responsible for
showing what steps must be taken in constructing dia-
lectical reasoning, that is for solving the problem of
"iatersubjectivity" in dialectical logic.
A Constructive Approach to Statistics
Despite its criticism of formal logical or mathe-
matical-statistical models, Critical Psychology assigns
an important role to formal-logical argumentations and
quantitative methods. Naïve pretentions to totality
have made way for more realistic analytical approaches:
unravelling a phenomenon into individual aspects and
determinants ("conditions analysis"), studying a pro-
cess through analysis of its parts at several different
points in time etc. Criticism of the Hegelian notions
of dialectical logic and of the Frankfurt School's
holistic pretentions to totality formed the necessary
prerequisites for the abovementioned rehabilitation of
Statistics in the critical social sciences.
Now, if on the basis of this Critical Psychologi-
cal analysis of "traditional" Statistics there were any
expectations concerning the development of an alterna-
tive conception, these will be disappointed. The most
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important difference between a Critical-Psychological
introduction to statistics (Leiser, 1978a) and the more
common introductions are the former's illustrations,
preferably demonstrating the limited educational oppor-
tunities for working-class childreu, whiie in tradi-
tional introductions random samples from populations of
either functioning or malfunctioning light-bulbs are
used for these purposes. In addition, it is continually
and rightfully emphasized that the gap between empiri-
cal material and theory can never be bridged by sta-
tistical means alone. There is always a limited number
of mode Is compatible with the "facts"; a choice between
them can only be made on the basis of theoretical
insights. But this, too, has slowly hut surely become
an obvious point of departure in "traditional" statis-
tics. Within these statistical approaches, for example,
there is the conviction that in order to avoid com-
pletely arbitrary and unreproducible results, raulti-
variate techniques such as multiple regression require
that beforehand there are theoretically specified
models of the relationship between relevant variables
(see Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973). Apart from this,
Critical Psychology has just begun with a critical
analysis of statistical methods and more publications
in this area may be expected in the future (e.g. Jager
and Leiser, 1979).
CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapter, we discussed the most
important elements of a Critical Psychological methodo-
logy. The necessary pivot of Critical Psychological
research proved to be the functional-historical method.
This method, based upon the Cultural-Historical School
(see chapter I), is a contribution to solving the
problem of heuristics; e.g. the systematic construction
of a conceptual framework for developing meanicgful
hypotheses. We ascertained that the functional-histo-
rical method must still deal with two unsolved pro-
blems, name]y the problem of contamination and the
problem of intersubjectivity. The former problem refers
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to the negative influence historical material (the
"Gesamtwissenschaft") raight have upon the "truth" of
functional-historical results. The second problem
refers to the elitist nature of the method, which would
only appear useful to a small number of "insiders".
And yet the results of the functional-historical
method are decisive for the stage of empirical testing
of critical-psychological theory with the aid of such
methods as the experiment, action research, and statis-
tical analysis. Critical Psychology makes unnuraerable
critical remarks on current experimental practices in
psychology, but nonetheless regards the most advanced
experimental designs as employable in Critical Psycho-
logical research, on condition that the necessary
preparatory work is dooe with the functional-historical
method. The same applies to the methodology of action
research, which Critical Psychology squeezed into a
tight mould of rules and stages. Action research has
degenerated into atheoretical and purposeless activism,
and must be forced to prove its scientific value. In
the meantime, Critical Psychology has also overcome its
aversion to statistics and advocates its use in the
empirical stage of research. Also in statistical analy-
sis, the functional-historical method will have to
continue to provide guidance in guaranteeing the vali-
dity of the mathematical-statistical construction of
models.
In all its criticism of traditional approaches to
research, Critical Psychology is therefore by no means
averse to the application of current methods and metho-
dologies. It is in particular critical of the gap that
has developed between advanced methods of data collec-
tion and analysis, and the archaïc way theories, con-
cepts and hypotheses are arrived at. With the help of
the functional-historical method, Critical Psychology
at tempt s to bridge this gap. At this juncture, it is
difficult to determine whether or not this attempt will
be succesful. Critical Psychology has had too little
practical research experience to provide a definitive
proof of the success of its approach. This does not
mean that the "validity" of functional-historical
analyses is determined by the results of empirical
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research. Holzkamp (1983) has made clear that these
analyses can only be tested by meaas of historical ma-
terial. This does raean, however, that the "fruitful-
ness" of the Berlin approach must as yet be demon-
strated by succesful integration of the functional-
historical and empirical levels of analysis.
Chapter III: Dialectical Psychology
INTRODUCTION
Basic Tenets
A critical-psychological school that developed in
the wake of the Cultural-Historical school, hut largely
independent of the Berlin school, is American Dialec-
tical Psychology. Dialectical Psychology has two basic
tenets. Firstly, change, and not stability, is regarded
as the most important characteristic of huraan develop-
ment. Traditional psychological schools usually postu-
late one goal for development, that of a stable person-
ality in harmony with its environment. An example of
this «e shall later discuss in more detail is the
cognitive-developmental theory of Piaget and Kohlberg.
In that theory a relatively stable equilibrium is
postulated at the level of formal-operational thought
and postconventional raoral judgement. While i t is true
that development in the quantitative sense, i.e. the
accumulation of knowledge and experience, is still
possible in adulthood, it is difficult to imagine a
further qualitative step to another structure of cog-
nitive and moral thought (see below). Dialectical
Psychology, on the other hand, assuraes that change is
an essential characteristic of every stage in human
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development and regards stability as undesirable rigi-
dity, as the artificial paralysis of a natural develop-
ment. As a result, entirely different research ques-
tions are posed: not stable equilibrium, but continual
change in behavioral patterns must be described and
clarified. And as we shall see, this also results in a
preference for less common research designs.
Dialectical Psychology's second basic tenet is
that human development can only be explained in rela-
tionship to its historical-social context. Often due to
their research designs alone, traditional schools of
psychology are compelled to study behavior independent
of its historical background and under entirely arti-
ficial circumstances. Probably without wishing to do
so, traditional psychological research creates a pic-
ture of the human as an a-historical and a-social
being. One pretends to be able to study individual
behaviour without taking interactions with fellow human
beings into consideration. During research and in test
situations, there are often no opportunities for inter-
action at all, not even with the conductor of the
experiment. Ties with the past are also severed inten-
tionally, to prevent experimental effects from being
drowned out by high levels of static and unverifiable
influences. A superb example of this is the method of
the nonsense syllable, iatroduced by Ebbinghaus. Mea-
ningless letter combinations make it impossible for
participants to rely on their own pasts in solving a
memory problem (see also chapter II).
In a broader sense, segregating the historical-so-
cial context also means denying the influence of social
forces and ideologies upon psychological theory deve-
lopment. Psychologists are often not conscious of their
own ties to society, for example, in developing a human
ideal as the finished product of development. In addi-
tion, society is rather influential in determining the
pace of development in psychology, for example, by
making more or less funds available for particular
types of research. It is known, that during the two
world wars in particular, certain branches of psycho-
logy (e.g. psychometrics) experienced an accelerated
development (Samelson, 1979). Yet such facts hardly
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penetrate the consciousness of the traditional research-
er. Dialectical Psychology wishes to attempt to take
account of the historical- social context of the beha-
vior under study, for example by emphasizing longitu-
dinal designs. In addition, dialecticians wish to de-
monstrate that seeraingly free- floating psychological
theories are bound on all sides to society and are in-
fluenced by social forces in many areas. Such attempts
are designated by Dialectical Psychology in particular
with the term "sociology of psychological knowledge"
(Buss, 1979b).
The structure of this chapter will be as follows:
we will start by clarifying the different definitions
and schools within Dialectical Psychology, introducé
Riegel as one of its main propagators and tracé some of
the more important ideas. After describing the concrete
content of Dialectical Psychology, we will go into more
aethodological and meta-theoretical problems tackled by
the dialecticians. The chapter will be concluded by
evaluating in some detail the pros and cons of Dialec-
tical Psychology.
Schools within Dialectical Psychology
American Dialectical Psychology is not one homo-
geneous school, but is itself characterized by differ-
ences of opinion concerning the significance of dialec-
tics in studying psychological phenomena. In critical
psychology, the meaning of the concept "dialectics" is
neither unequivocal nor fixed; interpreted dialecti-
cally, multiplicity is, in fact, a necessary feature of
any definition of dialectics, as Rychlak postulates
(1976). But still, a nuraber of its more important
definitions should be described in greater detail.
Buss (1979a) refers to three aspects of dialec-
tics. Firstly, dialectics can be regarded as a descrip-
tion of the processes of change in society or nature,
with special emphasis upon the driving force of contra-
dictions and conflicts. In this definition, dialectics
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are alraost an ontology, that is, a description of the
essence of reality. Secondly, dialectics at times also
imply the idea of the ccmtinual interaction between a
changing individual and a changing society, in which
the two "parties" can be both the cause and effect of
one another's changes. At times, this notion is ex-
tended and the existence of separate entities - indi-
vidual and society - is rejected by using the concept
of "transaction" iastead of "interaction". The objec-
tive here is to uncierscore the interdependence of the
individual and society (compare this with Norbert
Elias' concept of figuration, 1980; see also the Inter-
mezzo). Thirdly, the concept of dialectics occasionally
refers to a toethod of acquiring knowledge. Rychlak
(1976) described these dialectics as a "valid organon".
Dialectics then refer to a form of "logical" reasoning
in which the conflicts between opposing views aud
opinions can be resolved at a higher level of analysis.
The triad: thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is often
associated with this form of dialectical reasoning and
a higher status is assigned to it than to forma! logic.
Dialectics, then, have at least three definitions:
dialectics as ontology, i.e. a description of the es-
sential features of reality; dialectics as a metaphy-
sical postulate emphasizing change; and finally dialec-
tics as a method of acquiring knowledge. Now, it is not
always equally apparent which interpretation of the
concept "dialectics" is maintained by the different
dialectical psychologists. Roughly speaking, two
schools can be distinguished. The first school postul-
ates that all of the interpretations should be used si-
multaneously, the second that dialectics only refer to
a point of reference or postulate for viewing people
and society. The first school could be classified as
"dialectical methodology", with which the names of Rie-
gel, Lawler, Van den Daele, Buss and others can hè as-
sociated. To them, dialectics are a research method
emanating directly from the dialectical structure of
reality. A valid research method should be dialectical.
The second school could be called "dialectical heuris-
tics", with which the names of Youniss, Baltes, Corae-
lius, Meacham, Lerner and others are associated. The
dialectical heuristicians assume that dialectics pro-
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vide us with a world view from which meaningful
research questions can be deduced, which can then be
tested by means of more or less traditional research.
Dialectics as ontology result in an entirely different
view of huraan development, for example by regarding
change as a focal point and drawing attention to the
conflict between opposing tendencies as the "cause" or
motor of the dynamics of development. This results in
original research hypotheses and theories shedding
light upon aspects of reality hitherto neglected. As
such, dialectics are a rich source of new ideas con-
cerning psychological research, but are not themselves
an alternative research method within the context of
justification (see chapter II). In addition to these
two schools within dialectical psychology, another less
influential, eclectic school can be distinguished,
which regards dialectics as an important, but certainly
not the only relevant approach. One of its leading
representatives is Gergen, and we shall later devote
attention to bis idea of the "vivification" of a theory
by means of erapirical research.
11 would be go ing too f ar to see Dialectical Psy-
chology as the Klaus Riegel school, regarding the work
of other dialecticians as simply a series of footnotes
to his extensive writings. But just as was the case
with the figure of Holzkamp in the Berliu Critical
School, both Riegel's work and personality were an
enormously important crystallization point for the
development of a dialectical school in America. We
shall therefore focus this chapter on this inspiring
social scientist and, after a short sketch of his life,
discuss his ideas concerning the history of psychology
in relation to social change. This will be followed by
a discussion of his critical reasarks on the established
psychological theories, in which we shall look at his
attempts to construct an alternative dialectical para-
digm, examining more fully his methodological notions
and the consequences of his ideas on the subject-object
relationship in research. Of course, this approach of
focusing upon one person certainly does not mean that
other representatives of Dialectical Psychology will
remain in the shadow of the great inspirator. We shall
devote the necessary attention to social scientists
_
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from whom Riegel drew inspiratioa, in particular such
Soviet psychologists as Rubinstejn (see Chapter I), and
to social scientists who were stimulated by Riegel but
went their own ways, i.e., the school of dialectical
heurlstics.
KLAUS F. RIEGEL: SOME BIOGRAPHICA1 NOTES
Klaus Riegel was born in 1925 in Berlin, where hè
spent his youth. Af ter the war, hè started out working
as a maintenance mechanic, but soon began studies in
raathematics and physics. Two years later hè left for
America, acquiring his M.A. at the tlniversity of Minne-
sota (1955). After returning to Germany, hè started on
a thesis on the intellectual faculties of the elderly
(Riegel, 1957). Shortly after its corapletion, hè re-
turned to the United States to continue his research in
that area together with his wife. Among other things,
hè conducted longitudinal research into the effect of
aging on intelligence. He began to publish regularly,
primarily in gerontological journals, and now and then
on psycholinguistics. At first glance, this would
appear nothing out of the ordinary, simply the scien-
tific career of a researcher interested in his subject
and, entirely within scientific tradition, reporting
regularly on his work. However, this impression is only
partially accurate. During this time, Riegel must have
read and thought an enorraous amount about the founda-
tions of his discipline, for after 1965, an essential
change can be observed in the content of his articles.
In 1965, hè published an article on the relationship
between social status and language use and in 1966, the
first theoretical contributions to the Journal Human
Development appeared (Riegel, 1966). This is the be-
ginning of a series of theoretical articles ultimately
leading to an attempt to formulate a dialectical theory
of human development. At the sarae time, Riegel was
active in the area of methodology; hè not only wanted
to include the changing individual, but also the chang-
ing society in his designs {Riegel, Riegel and Meyer,
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1967). Other methodologists, notably Baltes and Schaie,
shared his dissatisfaction vith longitudinal and cross-
sectional designs. Riegel was also occupied with the
problem of the a-historical character of (developmental)
psychology. He himself sought a solution to the problem
of linking up with the historical sciences, which could
profit from the methods of developmental psychology and
vice versa (Riegel, 1967).
In 1970 hè joined the editorial staff of the
magazine in which hè had so often published: Human
Development (previously: Vita Humana). Riegel now had a
forum at his disposal for venting his ideas and high-
lighting the work of people thinking in similar direc-
tions. His own ideas concerning the social influence on
psychological development crystallized in part through
the ideas of Rubinstejn, made accessible to English
readers by the work of Payne (1968). In a now classic
article (1972), hè wrote on the relationships between
science (and in particular developmental psychology)
and society. At his instigation, annual conferences
were held on dialectics. A "Network for Dialectical
Psychologists" was established and a Dialectical Psy-
chology Newsletter appeared. This was the birth of the
American variant of critical psychology. Riegel col-
lected his essays in Psychology of Bistory and Develop-
ment (1976), but died a year later at the height of his
career. Two books were published posthumously: Psycho-
logy, Mon Amour: a Countertext (1978) and Foundations
of Dialectical Psychology (1979).
HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
"A spectre is haunting Western psychology; the
spectre of scientific dialectics. The scaffold of the
academie world is shaking; the time for its transforma-
tion is near" (Riegel, 1979, p.14). With these ominous
words, Riegel sounds the death-knell upon two, to him,
failing traditioas within developraental psychology, the
"capitalistic" tradition and the "mercantile" tradi-
tion. What then is the core of Riegel's objections to
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these still current tendencies in theory and research
in developmental psyehology?
For many years, Anglo-Saxon scientific study was
dominated by the "capitalistic" orientation of Hobbes,
Locke, Galton, Hall aud Gesell. This orientation crys-
tallized into a social-Darwinistic interpretation of
onto- and phylogenetic development. According to Rie-
gel, such slogans as helium omnium contra omnes, and
"struggle for life, survival of the fittest" capture
succinctly the essence of this interpretation. For
psyehology, for exaraple, this raeant that in studying
individual differences, the young white male adult,
involved in business or industry, was to be regarded as
the most succesful "survivor", to be elevated to the
criterion by which all other individuals would be
measured. If individuals or groups did not meet this
standard, they were simply classified as backward,
deviant etc. Children were thus characterized as im-
perfect adults, differing not in the qualitative but
only in the quantitative sense from the ideal adult.
Through research attempts were made to describe trends
and create standards by which individuals could be
measured. Within this conception, development is a
gradually increasing accumulation of knowledge and
skills. That this orientation was able to dominate
developmental psyehology, especially in Anglo- Saxon
countries, is in Riegel's view attributable to specific
external, i.e. economie and cultural circumstances. In
this connection Riegel raentions the wide-spread myth in
these countries of progress through unfettered competi-
tion, and the typical English predilection for hunting
and breeding, paving the way for a capitalistic perspec-
tive in developmental psyehology.
Buss (1979a, p.27ff) refines this analysis some-
what by pointing out that in particular, Galton's ideas
were stimulated by the following three social tenden-
cies: (1) British capitalism had resulted in a strong
specialization of positions in society and their accom-
pauying qualifications. This was legitimized by a
theory in which individual differences in capabilities
were traced to genetical differences. (2) Measuring,
i.e. quantifying differences in intellectual skills was
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common practice ia a capitalistic society in which
goods were not judged according to their usefulness but
according to their forma l exchange value (see chapter
II). And this applied not only to objects but to sub-
jects as well; for example, to laborers, whose efforts
were assessed aecording to their exchange value, ex-
pressed in tenns of money; (3) The combination of a
hierarchically structured class society, and respect
for individual freedom and opportunity can only be
durable if differences in status are a reflection of
innate differences in skill and developmental poten-
tial. With his genetic theory, Galton provided this
legitimacy. But this same liberal capitalism impeded
the development of aa eugenic raovement, which Galton
had hoped to initiate with his Utopia "Kantsaywhere".
The totalitarian nteasures of a Platonic state, neces-
sary to put eugenic ideas into practice, for example
prohibiting reproduction among certain groups, were
incompatible with the liberal foundations of British
society. This makes apparent that society is not only
capable of stimulating psychological theory develop-
ment, but also of setting limits on eccentric theore-
tical tendencies.
Origins of the Mercantile Tradition
As opposed to England's colonial and capitalistic
tradition, Europe's most important countries had an
especially strong mercantile tradition. There a new
middle class arose, not as privileged as the wealthy
landed aristocracy, but considerable better off than
the werking class. Riegel believed that the discrepancy
between the social interests of this middle class and
their privileges ultimately led to the French Revolu-
tion. Coopetition was pennitted especially within the
classes, but not between (the hierarchically arranged)
classes. According to Riegel, this gave rise to a
"mercantile" tradition in which differences in back-
ground could be valued. Children were no longer regard-
ed as inferior adults but appreciated for themselves
and regarded in the context of their peers. By nature,
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human beings were good; it was society that gave rise
to differences. The most important exponent of these
ideas was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Fröbel and Montessori
followed in his footsteps, introducing a more child-
oriented approach in education. Riegel believes that
Spranger, too, was influential through his plea for an
understandiag attitude towards the adolescent sub-cul-
ture. Piaget was the last link in this chain of liberal
scientific thinkers. Throughout, development is seen as
gradual, discontinuous progress through a series of
stages which cannot be compared to one another. Accord-
ing to Riegel, competition within stages is conceiva-
ble, but it is not of great importance and is rejected
as a driving force across stages (Riegel, 1972, p.134).
Riegel thus suggests a correspondence between the
sociological concept of class and the psychological
concept of stage. Just as mobility from the lower to
the upper classes was rarely possible, and the repre-
sentatives of each class were regarded entirely on an
individual basis, each stage of mental activity also
had an entirely individual character. Because of the
emphasis Piaget laid upon the young child's "egocentric
character", hè is regarded by Riegel as one of the
"mercantile" scientific thinkers. On the other hand,
Vygotskij would belong to the "socialist" scientific
thinkers because of his emphasis upon the social as-
pects of development (see chapter I).
A Dialectical Synthesis
Riegel regards the "mercantile" approach as a step
in the right direction and does, indeed, welcome the
growing interest araong American researchers for this
school. On the other hand, hè is not an advocate of a
wholesale adoption of this approach, because science
can advance only if the divergent viewpoints are inte-
grated at higher levels (o.c., p. 135). Elevating both
viewpoints to a higher level, Dialectical Psychology
can provide a solution. Development is neither an
accumulation of information by an, in essence, passive
organist», nor the spontaneous production of new ways of
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thinking. Characteristic of Riegel's synthetic concept
is the notion that the individual should be regarded as
an actively changing organism in a continually changing
world and that both the individual and the environment
should be the object of study and research. Following
upon the Marxist anthropological notion that man chang-
es the «orld through his labor and, in turn, is himself
influenced by this changing world, the dialectic be-
tween the individual and the environment should become
a major theme in the dialectical school (see chapter
I). Riegel summarizes his concept in a diagram in which
subject (individual) and object (environment) have
either an active or a passive character. In doing so,
hè arrivés at a classification into four schools, and
it should be clear from the above that hè has an affini-
ty to the active subject in an active environment.
TABLE III.l
Classification of Trends in Psychology
Individual
passive active
passive Locke/Hume Leibniz
Ebbinghaus Piaget/Chomsky
active Mannheim
Vygotskij/
Skinner
Hegel/Harx
Rubiustejn
Some Criticism
In his attempt to uncover a number of trends in
the history of psychology and to anchor them in social
developments, Riegel tries to describe this history
from an externalistic point of view rather than through
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the traditional internalistic "Ideengeschichte" (histo-
ry of ideas). He is not, however, entirely succesful.
Riegel's description is actually only in part externa-
listic, for the lines hè dravs from Darwin to Galtoa,
Stanley Hall, Terman and Gesell, and from Rousseau to
Fröbel, Montessori, Spranger and Piaget can be inter-
preted much more easily from an internalistic vantage
point, that is as the assimilation of ideas of one
scientific thinker (or group of them) by others. In
addition, Riegel's classification of the researchers
raentioned seems a bit contrived. Stanley Hall, for
example, was strongly influenced by the theory of
evolution, but hè certainly did not endorse the notion
that development is a quantitative, cumulative process.
On the contrary, hè also distinguished stages in child
development, uamely infancy, childhood and adolescence.
It would seem more instructive to view the controver-
sies Riegel sketched in the light of the law of bioge-
netics. As we know, advocates of this law believed that
in ontogenesis, children must repeat certain stages
from the history of huraanity. Firstly, this resulted in
an emphasis upou the nature of these stages themselves,
and secondly, in a passive attitude towards education
(this was exactly Stanley Hali's attitude). However,
this combination of the theory of evolution and think-
ing in terms of stages does upset Riegel's simplistic
diagram.
Striking is also that Riegel devotes no attention
at all to behaviorism, a school which at that time was
on the rise and which was based on entirely different
notions of human behavior, namely on the influence of
the environment. Riegel suggests that Darwin's ideas
were received wannly by the aristocratie upper classes
of the population, while it was the middle classes who
were attracted to the notions of Rousseau. The question
then arises why it was the Anglo-Saxon ideas that
gained solid ground in America, despite the absence of
a traditional aristocracy. It is not unlikely that the
dissemination of ideas in America was particularly the
result of increasing immigration from England, which
suggests that is was not the aristocracy (who did not,
in fact, emigrate), but others who were responsible for
this dissemination. In that sense, Riegel's analysis
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would appear to have some serious shortcomings, failing
to transcend the level of general impressions.
Perhaps Buss' interpretation (1979b) provides an
alternative explanation here. Buss states that due to
the imnigration problem, genetic ideas concern!ng such
psychological skills as intelligence were welcomed with
opea arms in the United States, despite the largely
behavioristic tradition. The doctrine of inheriteó
intelligente, and the intelligence tests associated
with it, provided legitimacy to discriminatory iaioii-
gration quotas restricting immigration froia some Euro-
pean countries early in the twentieth century. Unskill-
ed (agricultural) workers from "backward" European
regions, and certain minority groups in particular were
the victims of these quotas.
It is also curious that Riegel did not raention the
philosopher Locke in connection with the opposing views
of the Anglo-Saxon countries and the continent. And yet
it was Locke who even before Rousseau claimed that
children should be regarded as a separate category,
which was not to be judged by standards deduced from
adult behavior. Riegel's theses on the influence of
social factors on the development of psychology are
quite appealing but not very convincing.
The epistemological diagram classifying the four
tendencies in psychology also deserves critical atten-
tion. Piaget's classification in the upper right-hand
corapartment of the diagram, in which an active role is
assumed for the individual but a passive one for the
environment, is not entirely correct. In his early
work, Piaget was very much interested in social condi-
tions, apparent from his discussion of Durkheim's ideas
on the social context of moral convictions (see e.g.
Youniss, 1981; Van IJzendoorn, 1980). In his later
work, however, the image of a self-directed rnonadic
individual becomes increasingly more prevalent (see
Harten, 1977; Broughton, 1981e). Elsewhere we have also
shown that Vygotskij cannot be accused of neglecting
the active role of the individual (see chapter I). It
is clear that Riegel's epistemological diagram is a
Procrustean bed in which a number of important psycho-
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logists, from whora Riegel himself drew inspiration, are
in danger of being distorted almost beyond recognition.
The diagram does, however, contain the path hè followed
in developing Dialectical Psychology: frora a critical
reconstruction of Piaget's ideas to the fundamental
dialectical foundations Rubinstejn provided psychology
with. In the next paragraph we shall follow his path.
DIALECTICAL OPERATIONS
The relationship between Riegel and Piaget deser-
ves particular attention. Piaget's theories are an
extremely important link to Riegel in the development
of a Dialectical Psychology, illustrated by the fact
that Piaget is the author most cited in "Foundations".
In principle, Riegel was aot unreceptive to Piaget's
theory of the senso-motoric stage. In this first stage
of cognitive development, the dialectic between accom-
rnodation and assirai lation is still very clearly pre-
sent. On the one hand, the child adapts objects f rom
the outside world to fit into available schemata (assi-
milation). At one point, for example, the child clut-
ches at every object whether the object lends itself to
that purpose or not. The child quickly realizes that
some objects are either too heavy, cumbersome, awkward
or whatever. The result is au adaptation of these
schemata to experiences (accommodation). For a long
time, for example, children are convinced that the
amount of water in a tall, narrow glass is greater than
that same amount poured into a short, wide glass. They
persist in that opinion even when they see the water
being poured from one to the other. When that same
amount of water is then poured into a third glass,
similar to the first, they are suddenly convinced that
it is the same araount of water after all. The contra-
diction prevails until the concrete-operational stage,
when the child acquires a schema for the transformation
process and its reversibility. Piaget also devotes a
noticeable amount of attention to the presence of
dialectical thinking in the second, pre-operational
stage. Children do not appear to be concetned about
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contradictions in their appraisals of reality - accor-
ding to Riegel with good (creative) results. When
sbown, for example, twenty woodea beads, of which
fifteen are painted brown and five white, a child might
conclude that there are more brown beads than wooden
ones. This is because it is incapable of simultaneously
taking account of all the different diraensions by which
beads can be classified.
Piaget's error is assumed to be that hè did not
define the child's tolerance for contradictions as an
example of creative dialectical thinking. Piaget sees
it as a (fortunately) passing phase which, in the
transition to a higher stage, disappears through the
experience of conflicts between behavior and judgement
(and between schemata: "décalage")- To Riegel, this
meant that Piaget analyzed children's thinking as being
more and more alienated, non-creative and non-dialecti-
cal. In the pre-operational phase, a child still under-
stands that an object may possess a certain quality and
not possess it at the same time. It will not, for
instance, have difficulty in constructing a creative
explanatioa for the f act that some small objects float
in water while others sink to the bottom. In a later
phase, however, the child will regard this as an incon-
gruous contradiction and start to look for unimagina-
tive rationalizations. One of these might be to deter-
mine what the relatiouship is between the object's size
and weight in comparison to the same relationship
between a volume of water and its weight (the notion of
"specific gravity").
In Defence of Piaget
Riegel continually advocates the retention of
dialectical aspects of children's thinking. Unlike
Piaget, hè does not welcome this "alienation of think-
ing" towards a rigid formal-operational reasoning in
which there is uo place for contradictions. This can be
attributed to the Hegelian aotion that dialectical
logic is superior to forraal logic and as such should
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replace, or at least complement it. But while forma l
logic concerns the formal characteristics of language,
we believe dialectical logic should be seen as a work-
ing hypothesis for investigatiag developments in the
real world. According to this hypothesis, aspects of
reality follow a dialectical course from thesis via
antithesis towards synthesis. Dialectics are therefore
concerned with the world of objects, while formal logic
relates to the meta-level of propositions about reali-
ty. It is therefore erroneous of Riegel to believe that
a child is thinking dialectically wheri it remains un-
concerned about the contradictions contained, for
example, in the statement that a smal! elephant is both
large and small or that an express train travels both
quickly and slowly. Indeed, making explicit the frames
of reference implicitly contained within these state-
ments results in an absolutely logical argument. We
might then "translate" the statement concerning the
elephant as follows: in coraparison to a big elephant, a
small elephant is small, but compared to a large mouse,
on the other hand, a small elephant is big. In short,
Riegel wrongly places dialectics and formal logic on
the same plane: that of the analysis of propositions.
Dialectical logic, however, is concerned with the world
of objects and is as such unquestionably consistent
with formal logic. It is therefore no problem at all to
analyze, by means of formal logic, propositions, which
attempt to describe the dialectical course of reality
(Klaus, 1972; Tolman, 1981; see also chapter II).
That Piaget's theory is not dialectical in the
psychological sense is for that matter also contested
by a number of French researchers. Goldmann, a co-work-
er of Piaget in the late forties, has pointed to a
number of interesting parallels between Piaget's work
and the dialectical epistemology of Hegel and Marx
(Goldmann, 1959). The similarities hè points to in
particular are the genetic approach and the unity of
thought and action. As we know, Piaget was particularly
concerned with the developnsent of intelligence in
ontogenesis. This same emphasis upon behavioral deve-
lopment is to be found in the Russian dialectical
psychology of Blonskij and Vygotskij. These authors
were inspired by the ideas of Hegel, Engels and Marx
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concerning the historical origins of human behavior
(see chapter I).
According to Goldmann, Piaget's eraphasis upon the
fundamental unity of thought and action is in complete
agreement with Marx' ideas, in particular with respect
to bis cautioning against the notion that thought is
something abstract, detached from practical activity
("Tatigkeit"). Finally, Goldmann points out that ia
describing intelligence as the result of accommodation
and assimilation, Piaget is in essence presenting the
sarae portrait of human activity as did Marx. Marx,
indeed, also wrote that man changes nature (assimila-
tion) and through it, himself (accommodation). This
analysis of Piaget*s theory, recently endorsed by
Garcia (Garcia, 1980), shows that while not a Marxist,
Piaget displays some striking similarities to the
thinkers of the dialectical tradition (see Broughton,
1981e, p.406).
A Fifth Stage
And yet Riegel feit obliged to neutralize the
so-called anti-dialectical character of Piaget's theory
by adding a fifth, dialectical stage to Piaget's clas-
sical stages, suggesting that the transition through
one or more of the "traditional" stages is a condition
for reaching that stage. In other words, the highest
level of dialectical thinking can be reached both
through the senso-motoric stage and through the pre-
operational, concrete-operational or formal-operational
stages. This stage, then, is an acknowledgement of the
fact that the highest level of thought can be attained
by various, but equivalent means. Via formal opera-
tions, Riegel believes, a scientist must enter the
stage of dialectical operations in order to conduct
creative scientific work. The manual laborer raight
achieve that dialectical stage by mastering concrete
operations. The artist could learn to master the dia-
lectical skills aecessary for his or her activities
even through the pre-operational level. Fiaally, Riegel
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believed that the lover might suffice with a dialecti-
cal intelligence acquired through the senso-motoric
stage. Unfortunately, Riegel fails to make his theory
more convinciag by not conducting a further, more
concrete analysis of the qualification requirements for
the different professions aad activities. There is no
empirical basis for this theory; here, too, we see the
strongly impressionistic nature of his work.
Riegel also remarks that through his araendment of
Piaget's theory, intra-individual variations in intel-
lectual functioning are more easily explained. Indeed,
the different stages do not exclude one another; in
principle, each individual can and should be able to
function at all levels (the idea of the all-round
personality). To do household chores, a scientist needs
concrete-dialectical operations, to make love senso-mo-
toric dialectical intelligence. However, Riegel errs in
assuming that intra-individual differences cannot be
explained within the framework of Piaget's theory. In
this coanection, hè neglects to point out Piaget's
important notion of "décalage", i.e. intra-individual
differences in level of development depending upon
experience. This phenomenon of "décalage" has an im-
portant place in Piaget's theory of the dynamics of
development, his so-called equilibrium theory. It has
also acquired a key position in didactic theories based
on Piaget's theory. Riegel, however, repeatedly remarks
that it is impossible to draw didactic conclusions from
this theory. The child is either in au earlier stage,
so that due to assimilative tendencies stimulation is
ineffective, or in a later stage where stimulation is
superfluous.
In doing so, however, Riegel loses sight of the
frequent occurrence of a person's functioning at a
higher level in one area, and at a lower one in another
unfamiliar area. This "décalage" results in a state of
tension and implies therefore opportunities for deve-
lopment that didactics can take advantage of (Piaget,
1976). This also applies to inter-individual "décala-
ge". Kohlberg's didactics for moral education, for
example, could in certain respects be characterized as
an arsenal of methods for eliminating inter- and intra-
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individual horizontal "décalage" (Van IJzendoorn, 1980;
see also Vygotskij's related notion of the zone of
proximal development, chapter I). Finally, it should be
mentioned that Riegel's description of Piaget's didac-
tic paradox assumes only the presence of assimilative
tendenties while ignoring the accommodating tendencies
so essential in this respect.
In short, Riegel criticizes Piaget for his neglect
of the dialectical character of creative and mature
thought and adds that Piaget allows too little room in
his theory for parallel inter- and intra-individual
differences. With respect to the first criticism, we
have pointed to Riegel's inaccurate interpretation of
dialectical logic. Riegel's second objection is related
to his lack of knowledge of the phenomenon of "décala-
ge", an entry noticeably absent from the indexes of his
books.
Alternative Dialectical Interpretations
of Piaget
In American Dialectical Psychology, the work of
Piaget is still the subject of lively discussion, and
by far, not every dialectician endorses Riegel's inter-
pretation discussed earlier. Some take a more extreme
standpoint than Riegel's, others have a greater appre-
ciation of a number of dialectical elements in Piaget's
genetic epistemology. A representative of the fonner
school is Buck-Morss (1975), who accuses Piaget of a
socio-economic bias. Buck-Morss believes Piaget's
theory of child development to be a direct reflection
of the capitalistic society in which it originated.
Repairs sensu Riegel do not help a great deal in this
regard. Buck-Morss' most important argument is that
Piaget describes child development as the development
and perfectioniag of the ability to distinguish fora
from content. In the course of development, ever better
cognitive judgments are made ever aore frequently
purely on the basis of environmental form-features and
less and less on the basis of features relating to
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content. One of the first cognitive milestones in a
child's life, object-pennanence, is already an act of
alienation, iu that it implies a division between form
and content. Objects are no longer evaluated according
to their unique, individual utility, but according to
their external appearance. Whether it concerns an
amount of water ar the same amount of clay, only the
equivalent quantities are important, whatever is done
with the water or clay. In such an evaluation, an
object is regarded as a measurable quantity, abstractly
and independent of its origins. Buck-Morss regards this
as characteristic of a capitalist society, in which the
forraal exchange value of goods, and not their utility,
is of paramount importance (see also Adorno et al.,
1978). The coguitive ability to distinguish form from
content, and in particular to evaluate according to
forma l characteristics, is the very skill a capitalist
society demands (cf. Lawler, 1975).
The problem is now that by far, not every group in
a capitalist society learns to master this cognitive
skill perfectly. Research has shown that not everyone
is capable of formal-operational thought, and Buck-
Morss attempts to explain this with the different
positions these groups occupy withiu society. Only
those groups (classes) actively participating in and
helping to shape society learn to think completely
formally - and these are especially the higher socio-
economic groups. The lower socio-economic groups do not
have the opportunity of escaping the concrete reality
of daily life and of influencing the course society is
taking. Indeed, they have no use for formal operations.
The question is, however, how this analysis can explain
the fact that in the so-called "socialist" countries,
formal-operational thought also exists and is very
likely mastered to different degrees by different
groups. If formal-operational thought were only a
reflection of a capitalist society structure, this forra
of thought would not be present ia the so-called "so-
cialist" countries. This seems not to be the case, so
the analysis of Buck-Morss must be inadequate.
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Haberraas on Rational Communication
Another interpretation of the phenomenon of for-
mal-operatioaal thought is suggested by the Frankfurt
School. Kabennas in particular assumes that independent
of the type of society, there is a universal tendency
towatds a more and more perfect mastery of nature.
Formal operations enbody the so-called instrumental
rationality required for this task. Fonnal-operational
thought enables people in both capitalist and socialist
countries to discover the technical raeans of achieving
postulated objectives (cf. also Buss, 1979a, p.llSff).
According to Habennas, Piaget has therefore described
one of the necessary skills in modern man's intellec-
tual "arsenal". But hè adds that in connection with
mastering the environment, this skill must be comple-
mented with the ability to formulate the desired objec-
tives together with all others concerned. He calls this
skill "communicative behavior", and only where this is
mastered is there rational management of the interac-
tions of people with one another and with their natural
environment. The skill of communicative behavior incor-
porates the conditions as shown in Table III.2.
Habermas' model shows that for comnunicative
behavior, not only formal-operational thought is re-
quired, but also post-conventional moral judgment, as
described by Kohlberg (see Van IJzendoorn, 1983) and a
mature identity in the sense of G.H. Mead. Only when
these conditions are met is an optimal interaction
between people and their natural and social environ-
ments possible. Moral development creates the condi-
tions for rational, practical discourse on the objec-
tives society feels justified in aspiring to, and
cognitive development creates the conditions for the
rational search for the raeans of realizing those objec-
tives. An optimal identity development ensures that all
individuals will be capable of articulating and doing
justice to their most essential needs. This corresponds
with Meacham's idea of compromises between moral prin-
ciples and the requirements for optimal self-esteem
(1975).
10 <**»
p a>
a a
B
-• rt(9
p
& B
r>
W 0
B O
a* M
n a.
hl H-
B P
U IK
n
- rt
o
t-»
\« "T*
~J ÖT
ON 5T
- re
M
~-j cn
00-
P VO
D. -J
Ln
*— ' O.
• H-U
M
n
u
o- o
re o
s* §a S
ï i
O H-
f»
r*
H-
ft
•0
1-1
H-
H*
t—1
CO
f- , CD
CE 00o o
0) 1
a. H-
v^ O*ft
B
ft
h--ft
-^. rfa
« H- O
O O MP" P rtt- E ia1 H- o
re o
oo rt <
'""' a n
h-1 1
hO h>. O
H' O I-J
l» P B
m t» o
rt (-• i-
rt l
•-^  rt O
p->ö
o rt
n uP" i
rt
H- n
P 0
rt 1
re 'S
H h-p rt
rt rt
M-
0
P
P n
0 Oari cn
[A
*<S (u
n p
rt a
re3
w
H- !•<
U O
re Mp rt
rt
H-
rt
M O
rt o
rt <
>-< n>B
rt
H-
O
h- '
rt n
H- O
0 P
P n
sa nM re
rt
rt reP- i
o oc *o
m rep- n
rt i>
t
H- H*
P P
rt n
re o
i-i B
u -o
n H-
rt rt
!-• rt
o rt
a
H- o- n
rt rt o
u ET P
s> n
n < i
o H- re
P O rt
W h( (ï
rt10 n
c o
rs e.p
n
re
M
!-• P
o. E
re rtD p
H- (U
rt H-
H-tS
rt hl
< rt
rt i
t-1 n
o
B
<l
Oft
o
a
B- i-Io n
B 1
m o
p->0
rt m
u
rt
H-
O
P
U
1— 1
o
rt f
re rei <
a n
n H-
rt
H- O
O Hlp
cd p"
rt rtp- <p n
< h-
O O
1—4
o.
rep
rt
H*
rt
3
re o
i—1 f*
O 0-
•O M
P
rt
rt o
< 00
rt B
M H-
0 rt
•O H.
B <
p
rt
ff
cr
n
B
O
rt
1—1
0
i-h
50
i-t
H-
O
=3
n
i— •
0
0i1
n
caft
H-
0
G
DIALECTICA1 PSYCHOLOGY 203
Coutrary to Buck-Morss then, Habermas does not
regard formal operations as a demonic icvention of
capitalism, but as a necessary condition for an ever
greater mastery of nature. Unlike Riegel, Habermas does
not complement formal-operational thought with dialec-
tical operatious, though hè also believes that formal
operations are inadequate in making rational the inter-
action between people and their environment. But Haber-
mas, on the other hand, complements cognitive develop-
ment with the development of a number of other skills,
such as the ability to make post-conventional moral
judgments. In doing so, hè stays closer (for some too
close: Broughton, 1981e) to the achievements of de-
velopmental psychology than Riegel, who rather gratui-
tously adds an empirically unfounded fifth stage to
cognitive development. For this reason, we regard the
model of communicative behavior, despite its short-
comings, as a psychologically better grounded, and
theoretically more tenable alternative for Riegel's
amendment. It iutegrates instrumental and practical
rationality without making concessions with respect to
the logical and erapirical quality of the theory under-
lying it. Of course, this preference is also related to
our rejecting the notion that dialectical logic is a
higher form of formal logic. In the interpretation of
Piaget as well, dialectical heuristics lead to a dif-
ferent conclusion than dialectical methoiiology (cf.
Youniss, 1978).
THE DOUBLÉ DIALECTIC AND THE DYNAMICS
OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
The critical reconstruction of Piaget*s theory did
provide Riegel with a dialectical picture of the inter-
nal dynamics of human development, but it has not re-
sulted in explicit themes with respect to the influence
of the social context in Dialectical Psychology. But as
we saw earlier, Riegel still sought descriptions of and
explanations for the changing individual in a changing
society. He now developed nis alternative in this
direction by consulting Rubinstejn.
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The assumption of Rubinstejn's theory is that at
birth, the individual1 s development is primarily deter-
mined by bio-physical processes, but that in the course
of the chronological growth of intellectual activities,
cultural and social processes play an ever greater
directive role. Ia addition to these interact i ons
between the individual and society, there are also
interactions between biophysical and individual intel-
lectual activities. The fonner interaction system
represents the historical dialectic, the latter the
material dialectic. Riegel believed that an individu-
al 's thoughts, actions and emotions could transfora
those of others living contemporaneously or subsequent-
ly, but with respect to contemporaries, the reverse is
also possible. With the dynamic interaction of the
internal and external dialectic, humans not only trans-
form the external world in which they live; they in
turn are also transforraed by the world they have crea-
ted (see chapter I and II). A dialectical theory should
be concerned with simultaneous development along four
interwoven dimensions: the internal- biophysical, the
individual-psychological, the socio- cultural, and the
external-physical dimensions. As opposed to Rubinstejn,
Riegel believed that environmental influences should be
divided into two aspects: in addition to the socio-cul-
tural aspect, behavior could also be affected by natu-
ra! disasters, the geographical location and the clima-
te (see Table III.3).
Riegel now sees development as the co-ordination
or synchronization of any combination of two dimensions
and ultimately of the accumulation of progressions
along each dimension. However, co-ordination and syn-
chronizatiou are not always possible. When synchronisai
is absent, the result is a crisis or a conflict. But
such a conflict should not be viewed negatively. A
crisis is a constructive confrontation in which contra-
diction or lack of harmony are the source of new chang-
es, both in the individual and in society. We shall
illustrate the above by discussing a number of his
examples.
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TABLE III.3
The Doublé Dialectic
(material dialectic}
internal-biophysical
 f individual-psycho-
dimension ^^  x" logical dimension
J^S (historical J dialectic)
external-physical f^ >., socio-cultural
dimension dimension
At the internal-biophysical level, the heart and
lungs can function synchronically under normal condi-
tions, but when the person in question is fatigued,
they might conflict with one another. But because this
concerns a conflict within one dimension, there is no
question here of development. An individual may be
biologically mature enough for marriage, but because
the right partner has not yet been found, lack maturity
at the individual-psychological level. It is also
possible that the individual-psychological and biologi-
cal levels are synchronized, but that the housing
market is tight so that socio-cultural circumstances
are at odds. If a natural disaster occurs, the extern-
al-physical circumstances might spoil the plan. Riegel
claims that everything is continually changing and
rarely in perfect harmony.
From a psychological point of view, dealing con-
structively with conflicts means progress. But in
Riegel's sketchy approach, it remains obscure what hè
exactly means by "dealing constructively with con-
flicts", and what conditions must be met in order not
to experience and deal with asynchronisras in a destruc-
tive fashion. Probably in part due to Riegel's desire
not to tie himself to a (closed) vision of humans and
society, even the criteria for judging whether or not a
constructive solution for an asynchronism has been
found remain implicit. In the above example of asyn-
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chronism, for instance, i t indeed makes some difference
whether the solution is sought in the area of social
action or in the private domain. But at this point,
Riegel refrains from making any judgment. What in any
case is comraendable in Riegel's theory of doublé dia-
lectics is its implicit call upon developniental psycho-
logy to replace its one-sided emphasis upon, in parti-
cular, the interaction between internal-biophysical and
individual-psychological aspects with an interdiscip-
linary approach devoting equal attention to all four
aspects. Here we leave the subject of development from
a dialectical perspective to go on to an appraisal of
other issues, i.e. ideology-critique and methodological
questions.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWCEDGE
On the one hand, Dialectical Psychology is theore-
tical criticism of the dominant psychological theories,
on the other a constructive contribution to psychologi-
cal knowledge through empirical research. The theoreti-
cal criticism utilizes the snethod of ideology-critique,
a branch of the sociology of knowledge. An example of
this was seen in the discussion of the dialectical
criticism of Piaget's theory. The empirical research in
Dialectical Psychology utilizes, among other things,
the mixed-longitudinal design and aspires to a subject-
subject relationship between the researcher and the
"participants". These approaches will be discussed in
the paragraphs that follow. Here we shall discuss in
greater detail the problem of ideology-critique.
Ideology-Critique in Dialectal Psychology
The sociology of psychological knowledge has es-
pecially been advocated by Alan Buss (1979b), who him-
self is responsible for several examples of such re-
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search. In his view, there are two reasons for the
necessity of devoting attention to the social influen-
ces upon psychological theories. Firstly, the subjects
of these theories - humans - change under the influence
of society, and this leads to changes at the level of
theory development. The sociology of knowledge is
designed to tracé these changes and if necessary, to
identify obsolete theories as being such. Buss calls
this the individual-society dialectic. Secondly, the
sciences are also exposed to social influences during
the construction and adjustment of a theory, and it is
self-evident that to a greater or lesser extent, the
theory will reflect that society. At times, for ex-
ample, a theory may bear traces of the scientist's
special social position within capitalism. Buss calls
this the scientist-society dialectic. If psychology
really wishes to be conscious of its ties to society
and to operative values, a sociology of psychological
knowledge must be capable of describing this dialectic;
such a consciousness is a prerequisite for a truly
critical psychology.
In and of itself, this is an entirely acceptable
line of thinking, and it is no surprise that for many
years, critical psychology in all its different va-
riants has produced ideology-critique of established
psychology schools and theories. But there are a nuraber
of problems connected with Buss' notions, emerging, in
particular with the application of his ideas to con-
crete theories. The problems are related to the absence
of a clear frame of reference for criticism. With what
right does an ideology-critic place himself above the
theories hè studies, and what external "validity crite-
ria" are used in doing so? An ideology-critic is also
subject to the influences of society and cannot pretend
to be alone in knowing the path to a-historical truth.
In addition, the ideology-critique as described by Buss
contains the danger that traditional scientists will be
rather tastelessly "caught" with their supposed social
biases and ties, and rather destructively discredited,
without this producing any indication of the valuable
element s of the theory being criticized. Bucfc-Morss'
analysis discussed earlier is an example of destructive
ideology-critique. It can no loager be called dialec-
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tical in the sense of being a synthesis of valuable
eleraents at a higher level. To her mind, Piaget's
theory is not a necessary step in the direction of a
dialectical theory of hujnan development, but more an
aberration of alienated capitalism.
Another example is Furby's criticism (1979) of
Rotter's theory of the locus of control. According to
Furby, this theory contains the bias that an internal
locus of control is always more valuable than an exter-
nal one, and according to him that is no coincidence.
An internalized locus of control does, after all, serve
the interest of capitalism's ruling classes, for with
it, faults in the systera are attributed to the people
themselves rather than to the structure of capitalism.
Blaming oneself for unemployment is no real problem for
society. Only when the unemployed blame their fate on
external circumstances, evidence of an external locus
of control, does unemployment become a hotbed of social
unrest and conflicts. And because American psycholog-
ists belong to the privileged classes in their society,
they have a great deal to lose with the development of
an external locus of control. Furby's .method here is to
roake a theory suspect by pointing to the privileges of
psychologists as a group, while from a methodological
poiat of view, the maker of the theory should not be a
significant factor in its evaluation. In acldition,
there is not a tracé of a dialectical "Aufhebung" of
Rotter's theory at a higher level. The questioa then
arises whether the theory really does not contain any
valuable elements.
Some Definitions of "Ideology"
Perhaps the probleia of ideology-critique can be
soraewhat clarified by producing a number of variants of
the definitiou of the concept "ideology" as used since
Marx and Engels (cf. Klafki, 1976). Firstly, "ideology"
can be defined as a socio-economically determined,
necessarily "false" cousciousness. In this sense,
ideology performs an important function in maintaining
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unjust power relationships. Often the ideology is taken
to be true by the underprivileged classes themselves.
Ideology-critique is then the scientific description of
the circumstances under which a theory could develop
and its role ia legitimizing social abuses. Secondly,
"ideology" can also be used as a designation of the
totality of notions, ideas aad theories on social
reality, that is, the entire "Überbau" (superstructure)
of society. In a bourgeois, capitalist society, this
"Überbau" is necessarily impregnated with erroneous
ideas and justifications. In a so-called socialist
society, the official Marxist-Leninist "ideology" is
right because it is presumed to reflect a just society.
Thirdly, Mannheim's concept of ideology ties in well
with the notion of ideology in the so-called socialist
countries. It labels all products of thought ideolo-
gical, due to their relationship to society. In f act,
this concept of ideology was the foundation for the
discipline of the sociology of knowledge. To Mannheim,
the objective of ideology-critique was to distinguish
knowledge as a reflection of curreat social conditions
from knowledge as a reflection of earlier, out-of-date
conditions. Mannheim believes the latter to be invalid
knowledge. A fourth definition of "ideology" is opera-
tive in critical-rationalism, indicating quasi-theories
that are a mixture of prescriptive and descriptive
statements but still claiming a scientific status. Mar-
xism, for example, is an ideology in this sense, and
ideology-critique should be directed towards purging
its theories from normative prescriptions.
Confusions in Dialectical Ideology-Critique
American Dialectical Psychology's ideology-criti-
que appears designed for the first and third defini-
tions. On the one hand, it concerns demonstrating what
legitimizing function psychological theories perform in
capitalism. On the other hand, ideology-critique is
seen as a means of preventing psychology from lagging
behind social changes. Buck-Morss, for example, demon-
strates that Piaget's theory of formal operations
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legitimizes capitalism's fixatiou upon the formal-ab-
stract features of goods and persons, while Buss shows
that this criticism reflects an obsolete and superseded
type of society, that of industrial capitalism.
Such. problems can be avoided by developing a
theory of ideology-critique and devotiug more attention
to methodological aspects. Receatly, Broughton started
on this by fonnulating six guidelines for ideology-cri-
tique at the conclusion of his exteusive criticism of
Piaget (1981e, p.394ff). Firstly, the level of analysis
must be clear: the target of ideology-critique should
be theories and not the scientists who formulate them.
Secoudly, it must be clear what the nature and the
direction of the influences are: undoubtedly, science
is influenced by social power relationships, but it is
not completely determined by thera. On the other hand,
it may be assumed that science also influences society.
Ideology-critique is often one-sidedly and simplistic-
ally aimed at disclosing theories1 social determiuants.
Thirdly, ideology-critique should as much as possible
rest on evidence from a series of disciplines and not
operate by means of simple parallels and metaphors.
Greater accuracy is a must. Fourthly, ideology-critique
should avoid eclecticism in choosing its targets. There
are examples of ideology-critique criticizing such
entirely different theories as that of Freud and Piaget
with the same method and the same evidence. Fifthly, it
must be established unequivocally which ideology is
being attacked: Piaget cannot be criticized for his
instrumentaliscn and for his affinity to the values of
democratie liberalism, both at the same time. Sixthly,
the epistemological position of the ideology-critic
must be clear: ideology-critique has no credibility if
it does not make its own premises explicit. In this
connection, relativism should be avoided. Ideology-
critique is not effective if in attempting to remain
relativistic, it does not recognize any universal
criteria for distinguishing between truth and false-
hood. In particular, this last aspect points to an
epistemology of ideology-critique still absent in
Dialectical Psychology. Neither Riegel, Buss nor Brough-
ton have yet developed a well-grounded and non-relati-
vistic ideology theory, oriented upon an unequivocal
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concept of ideology. At present, eclectic approaches
dominate, attempting to establish the ideological face
value of a theory in a relatively unsystematic fashion.
This does not, however, alter the fact that a number of
original and fruitful analyses (see for example Buss
1979a, p.l49ff), have been conducted.
As stated, ideology-critique is part of the meta-
theoretical research of Dialectical Psychology. In
addition, Dialectical Psychology also impïies a theory
of human development, based on Piagetian and Soviet
Russian approaches, that can be tested empirically. In
this connectiou, Dialectical Psychologists have dis-
cussed the merits of the mixed-longitudinal design,
which will be dealt with in the next paragraph.
TOWARDS A DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY
Riegel's ca11 upon developmental psychology to
devote more attentiou to the doublé dialectic, finally
making it possible to actually describe the changing
individual in a changing environment, would have had
little cogency were it not for the methodological
realization of his dialectical theory. Such traditional
research designs as the longitudinal or cross-sectional
designs are inadequate. The dialectical alternative
integrating these two well-used designs at a higher
level is the so-called mixed-longitudinal design.
Riegel derived this design largely from the pioneering
work of Baltes (1968) and Schaie (1965). It dovetails
perfectly with Riegel's attempts in particular to draw
into the research design the social context in which
certain developments occur. We shall now attempt to
illustrate the advantages of the nsixed-longitudinal
design over prevalent designs.
Imagine we want to follow the development of a
certain type of behavior (for example language use).
Let us look at Table III.4. Ou this basis, several
comparisons are possible. A cross-sectional design is
characterized by a comparison of two cells in the sarae
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TABLE III.4
Different Sources of Variance in
Developmental Psychological Research
year of measurement
20 years old
1920
1970
1900
1950
Age
70 years old
year of birth
1850
1900
row. In 1920, then, you might corapare twenty year-olds
and seventy year-olds, people born in 1900 aud 1850
respectively. In 1970, you could do the same with
people born in 1950 and 1900 respectively. By keeping
the time of measurement constant (namely 1920 or 1970),
the comparison provides both age differences and gene-
ration differences (also called "cohort differences").
In other words: cross-sectional designs take both age
differences and generation differences into account.
The two cannot, however, be separated. A time-lag
design consists of a comparison, for exaraple, of the
language use of twenty year-olds in 1920 and in 1970 or
of seventy year-olds in 1920 and 1970, a comparison
then of two cells in the same column. This comparison
is contaminated by differences in time of measurement
and generation. The generation that was 20 year old in
1970 was born in 1950, while the generation of twenty
year-olds subjected to the test in 1920 was born in
1900. The same applies for the seventy year-olds. In
other words: time-lag designs furnish results in which
the variance is determined by differences in the time
of measurement and generatioa. The role that the two
types of differences play individually cannot, however,
be distinguished.
A longitudinal design boils down to a comparison
of the same group at two different points in time (in
the diagram, the participants born in 1900; they are
subjected to the test in 1920 and in 1970 at twenty and
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seventy years old respectively: the diagonal from upper
left to lower right). A longitudinal research design
thus furnishes results contaminated by both age and
time of measurement dif f ereaces. Thus none of these
approaches provides automatically an unadulterated
estimate of age, generation or time of measurement
differences. A combination of the three designs results
in three equations with three unknowns, the effects of
age, time of measurement and generation differences;
these effects can therefore be determined exactly. We
then have a so-called "mixed-longitudinal design".
Psychology can then describe individual developments,
sociology can sight the cohort differences and the
historical sciences can chart the developments in the
course of (chronological) time.
A concrete example: the feasible but fictitious
results of a cross-sectional intelligeace-study could
be represented with a curve showing a decrease in in-
telligence with the increase of age. This curve could
easily be interpreted as a continual decline of intel-
lectual functions corresponding with advancing age.
Quite apart from the relative value of IQ-tests, it
should be noted that the results could very well be an
artefact of the selected design. Such a cross-sectional
study does not, indeed, take account of generation
differences. Tuddenheim, for example, determined that
the median of test scores of recruits in the Second
World War corresponded with the 84th percentile of the
distribution of the same scores drawn from research
among recruits in the First World War. These differen-
ces can, however, be attributed to historical-social
changes, for example in education, prosperity, communi-
cation media, etc. (Riegel, 1978, p.4). In cross-sec-
tional research, however, regression resulting from
historical changes is, as it were, built into the
design. An "a-historical" and "a-social" developmental
psychology appears to be fertile soil for such effi-
ciënt designs, but from a scientific point of view,
they are hardly practicable. On the ether hand, the
mixed- longitudinal design does allow for conclusions
concerniag, for example, the influence of historical-
social and external-physical changes on individual-psy-
chological and internal-biophysical development, and in
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so doing is a good basis for the iuterdisciplinary
dialectical research Riegel was such an enthusiastic
proponent of. And indeed, this "dialectical" design has
found acceptance, both in the Unites States and in
Europe (Elder and Rockwell, 1979).
The Mixed-Longitudinal Design in Discussion
It should, however, be noted that a discussion has
recently sprung up about the statistical merits of the
mixed-longitudinal design (Adam, 1978) among the ranks
of Dialectical Psychology, and that disagreement has
also artsen concerning its validity (Buss, 1979a,
p.!27ff). Among other things, Buss wonders whether the
Schaie-Baltes model is a good operationalization of the
dialectic between individual and social development.
The data collected by raeans of the mixed- longitudinal
design are usually interpreted by means of analysis of
variance. Among other things, analysis of variance
looks at the interactive effects of a number of inde-
pendent variables on the dependent varlable, an aspect
of individual development. For example, these indepen-
dent, causal variables might be age and the time of
measurement. According to Buss, however, the inter-
action-effects uncovered in this fashion are entirely
different from what Riegel meant with the individual-
society dialectic. This dialectic assumes reciprocal
influence, simultaneous functioning as cause and ef-
fect, whereas in analysis of variance, individual
developraent can never operate as dependent and inde-
pendent, causal factor at the same time. Buss implies
that hè was able to convince Riegel of the validity of
this argument, but in this connection, can only name
"personal communicatiou" as his source.
In addition, Baltes and Cornelius (1977) have
clearly distanced themselves from Riegel in his efforts
to find an exclusive dialectical method for his Dialec-
tical Psychology. They support the view of dialectical
heuristics that the context of discovery can greatly
profit from an application of dialectical principles to
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a certain area of research but that in the context of
justification, the time-honored and dependable research
methods are suitable for testing the dialectically
generated hypotheses and theories. From the point of
view of an obsolete, logical-eiapirical concept of
theories (see chapter II), they sketch three levels of
theory development: (a) general laws and premises, (b)
specific laws, deducable frora the premises mentioned in
(a), and (c) definitions linking theoretical coucepts
to observational statements. This last level is the
domain of current empirical methodology, in principle
suitable for any filling-in of level (a). Ultimately,
theoretical deductions will have to be confronted with
experience according to the traditional methodological
rules, whether (a) is determined by a mechanistic, an
organismic or a dialectical paradigra: there is no
exclusive relationship between (a) and (c) Put more
strongly: at the concrete level of confronting theory
with experience, even methodological pluralisra is more
fruitful than fixation upon one type of method, for
example the mixed-longitudinal design.
Restrictions to a Pluralistic Methodology
Apart from an obsolete theory-concept, which it
would have been preferable to replace with a Lakatosian
notion of the construction of a research program (Laka-
tos, 1980), we doubt whether this extremely eclectic
position is tenable. Of course, any critical-psycholo-
gical school should be conscious of a number of univer-
sal criteria a method should meet in order to be called
scientific. These criteria might best be summed up with
the term "intersubjective replicability". Research
methods should lead to results via a route that in
principle can also be followed by others. It is then
possible to check whether the results obtained were not
raerely the products of the individual researcher's
imagination. But this does not alter the fact that a
metatheoretical orientation such as Dialectical Psycho-
logy can result in a certain preference for a particu-
lar type of method better suited to the research sub-
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ject. This subject is determined in part by the meta-
theoretical assumptions of the context of discovery. It
would be ridiculous to expect dialectical researchers
to rate the utility of cross- sectional survey research
as high as that of mixed-longitudinal research when
they have defined their subject as a chaaging indivi-
dual in a changing society. The meta-theoretical orien-
tation places limits upon methodological pluralism
because it detertaines in part the research subject and
because methods may be subjected to the criterion of
"object-adequacy" (see chapter II). But Baltes and
Cornelius are right in seeking the strength of Dialec-
tical Psychology in the heuristic value of dialectics.
We also saw in the previous chapter on the Berlin
School of Critical Psychology that within the context
of discovery, a new approach is most needed in com-
batting the existing paucity of ideas and in streng-
thening the position of the theory within psychology
(cf. Lerner, Skinner and Sorell, 1980).
ACTION RESEARCH AS A DIALECTICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD
The mixed-longitudinal design is intended to tracé
the influence of a changing environment upon the deve-
lopment of individuals. In and of itself, however, this
design makes no demands upon the relationship between
researchers and the participants in their experiraents.
But as does the Berlin School of Critical Psychology,
Dialectical Psychology has well-defined ideas as to how
this relationship should take shape. In many cases,
obviously, dialectical psychologists do not regard
Wundt's principles of psychological research as useful.
According to Wundt, regarded by many as the founder of
experimental psychology, a good experiment should
enable the researcher: (1) to properly determine when
the events being studies have started; (2) to follow
the process conscientiously; (3) to replicate the
experiment under similar conditions, and (4) to syste-
matically vary the conditions under which the experi-
ment occurs (see the concept of "conditions analysis",
chapter II). The behaviorist conditioning experiment is
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paradigmatic for such an approach. To increase the
replicability of the experiment, the gap between the
researcher and the participant is widened as much as
possible and participants are robbed as much as possi-
ble of their subjectivity. Earlier, we mentioned Ebbing-
haus' experiments with nonsense syllables, in which the
meariinglessness of the learning test corresponds per-
fectly with the degradation of the human subject to a
memory machine. As does Holzkamp (chapter II), Riegel
draws here a parallel to the way an industrial laborer
is treated: in a Taylorized production process, assem-
bly-line workers also perfonn meaningless sections of a
task and are also expected to act like robots and not
think for themselves (Riegel, 1978, p.36). In chapter
II, we already presented and commented upou Holzkamp's
criticism of such artificiai research conditions.
Dialectical Research as Dialogue
Riegel's criticism is in the same vein, and in
particular concerns the absence of ecological validity:
according to Riegel, participants will achieve less
when they are forced into an unnatural role than might
otherwise have been the case under more favorable
conditions (1975b). From a dialectical point of view,
however, participants must succeed in maintaining their
subjectivity. Ideally, the research situation should
consist of a dialogue between the researcher and the
participant, in which both parties make their contribu-
tion (thesis and antithesis) and develop knowledge
together (synthesis). The interrogation is a degener-
ated dialogue providing the participant with no oppor-
tunity to contribute fully to the drawing of the con-
clusion. And yet it is this very interrogation, and not
the symmetrical dialogue, that is characteristic of
traditional empirical research (Meacham, 1980). Unfor-
tunately, Meacham's call for research in the fonn of a
dialogue does not result in concrete proposals for
alternative designs. As a representative of what we
have called dialectical heuristics, hè seems satisfied
with a more important role for the participant in the
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stage of formulating hypotheses. But in the work of
Riegel, too, we find no rigorous consideration of the
methodological consequences of a subject-subject rela-
tionship between the researcher and the participant.
The examples of good research hè gives are by and large
hardly at variance with what also occurs in "tradition-
al" psychology. For example, hè described a Piagetian
conservation experiment in which conservers and non-
conservers are given the opportunity of influencing one
another. It then appears that rather often, non-conser-
vers acquire the conservation concept, while the con-
servers certainly do not lose it. Such experiments,
though, are examples of classical Piagetian research,
in which an attempt is made to investigate the effects
of an interindividual "décalage" on cognitive develop-
ment. In the Cultural-Historical tradition as well (see
chapter I), such a research design is used regularly to
investigate, under optimal learning conditions, at what
point children reach the height of their achievement-
potential.
Another of Riegel's examples is a study on mental-
ly retarded children in which the diagnosis of the
retardation in development was conducted by the child-
ren 's raothers instead of by the researchers themselves.
The researcher had chosen this design for the study in
order to increase the mothers' willingness to co-ope-
rate with therapy. The mothers would then see with
their own eyes what problems their children had rather
than having to trustingly rely upon the information of
the researcher. This is unquestionably an example of a
more symmetrical relationship between researcher and
participant, though it should be mentioned that this
did not apply for the children themselves.
The Dialectical Psychologist as Change Agent
More importantly, however, this study shows the
scientist not only in the role of diligent "fact collec-
tor" but also as an agent of change. Data are collected
on the children's development with the intention of
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applying these data in a therapy designed to compensate
as much as possible for the retardation in their de-
velopraent. This is moving in the direction of action
research, where the process of acquiring knowledge
serves the purpose of influencing praxis. It is curious
that Riegel hardly concerned himself with the question
of the application of psychological knowledge. He was,
though, extremely interested in an adequate description
and explanation of the changes in the behavior of
individuals in a changing environment. But in genera l,
intentionally influencing behavior on the basis, among
other things, of the knowledge acquired, is a thema hè
or Dialectical Psychology in general, in f act rarely
touched upoa. Yet it would only seem possible to guaran-
tee an equivalent status for participants in research
if they can learn as rauch from the researcher as the
researcher trom them. And this is often only the case
when, on the basis of knowledge and insight acquired
about participants, the researcher succeeds in provi-
ding them with raeans of optimalizing their behavior. To
our rairid, these are the radical consequences of the
dialectical requiremeut of regarding the research
process as a dialogue between subjects.
Iconic and Enactive Criteria for Truth
Now Riegel did not disregard this problem alto-
gether either. Based on Bruner (1964),
 ne introduced
into Dialectical Psychology the distinction between
iconic and enactive representations. It is presumed
that Western thought's criteria for evaluating know-
ledge are characteristically sensorial-perceptual in
nature, that is, iconic. The "truth" of a scientific
proposition is determined according to the extent to
which this proposition can be established with senso-
rial-perceptual data. Truth, then, is the agreement
between theory and observed facts. In chapter II, we
showed that such a notion has a number of logical
shortcotnings.
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An alternative is representing situations by
suitable motor schemata. For example, i t would be
difficult to give an adequate description of the floor
of our living room and yet we caa find our way more o r
less with our eyes closed. This is an example of au
enactive representation. The question in an enactive
representation is whether knowledge acquired can help
us in our interaction with the world. According to
Riegel, the error of Western thought is that it bas
neglected the practical and social aspects of its
contributions. To bis mind, changing the world shou ld
even have priority above pure description and inter-
pretation, this following Marx' fameus dictum that
philosophers have spent enough time interpreting the
world; it is now time to change it. According to Rie-
gel, social relevance as a criterion for the validity
of a scientific theory should not be overshadowed by
the requirement of methodological rigor (1978, p.189).
In stating as much, hè has, it is true, posed the
question of the practical applicability of Dialectical
Psychology at the epistemological level, but provided
no answer at all at the methodological level. And that
applies as well for those who have dealt with this
material after him. Gergen (1980), for example, empha-
sizes the necessity of a "reciprocal pursuit of know-
ledge" (p.261). From this hè draws the conclusion that
the researcher will have to act as a change agent, but
hè does not develop that role any further.
It should hè clear that it is not our intention to
call for action research as the dialectical research
raethod par excellence. In the previous chapter, we made
a large number of critical notes with respect to Criti-
cal Psychology's notion of action research. In addi-
tion, in this chapter we have hinted at our sympathy
for the school of dialectical heuristics, i,e. for the
notion that dialectics themselves only have a heuristic
function and are not a research method or an unequivo-
cal reference to a particular method. A dialectical
bias does, however, limit soraewhat the number of ne-
thods suitable for dialectical problems. Against this
background, it would seem to us of importance that Dia-
lectical Psychology should not bog down in the discus-
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sion on the advantages and disadvantages of experiraen-
tal and longitudinal research, but should also be
inspired by the Western European polemics on action
research in order to do more justice to the ideal of
enactive knowledge. In this regard, Dialectical Psycho-
logy can learn a great deal from the experience of such
Gennan action-researchers as Klafki, Moser and Schnei-
der, at tempting to avoid their errors. One of these
errors, for example, was the initial belief that action
research should be subject to less stringent methodol-
ogical criteria than "traditional" empirical research,
thereby opening the door to atheoretical activism. We
are convinced, however, that in the long run, a Dialec-
tical Psychology focusing upon the question of a chang-
ing and chaageable human being cannot escape the quest-
ion of the intentional influences upon the changes
being investigated. In view of Dialectical Psychology's
aspiring to a subject-subject relationship between
researcher and participant, it would seem logical to
expand its arsenal of methods with a form of action
research.
CONCLUSIONS
In this closing paragraph, we should like to re-
view some of the raain themes of Dialectical Psychology
and sunmarize the critical notes. We shall also point
out the merits present in the work of Riegel and other
dialectical psychologists. Despite the multiplicity of
the concept "dialectics", Dialectical Psychology may be
regarded as a school focusing on change rather than
stability and focusing attention upon the historical-
social context of psychological (theory) development.
We have distinguished two dialectical schools, "dialec-
tical heuristics" and "dialectical methodology". The
former regards dialectics as a heuristic for developing
new theories and hypotheses in the context of discove-
ry. The latter school also believes dialectics to be a
"valid organon", a means of acquiring knowledge. And
because it is more sensitive to subtle contradictions
and conflicts, this means is presumed to be superior to
methods modelled on formal-logical pattems.
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We have focused our exposition around the person
of Klaus F. Riegel, who with Rychlak has the honor of
going down in history as the founding father of Dialec-
tical Psychology in the United States. First, Riegel
concerned himself with the historical roots of his
discipline and traced the development of two corapeting
schools in psychology, the mercantile and the capita-
list traditions. He attempted to make clear that the
origins of these traditions were in part determined by
the specific social relationships present in Europe and
in the Anglo-Saxon countries in the 19th century. We
concluded, however, that Riegel's analysis was rather
sketchy and based in particular on metaphors. Never-
theless, his historical research has been a source of
inspiration for a new discipline within Dialectical
Psychology, the "sociology of psychological knowledge",
pioneered by Buss. Dialecticians like Buss (1979a) and
Danziger (1979) were able to provide a number of Rie-
gel 's analyses with a more detailed foundation. The
dialectical assumption that the historical-social con-
text influences the rise and fall of theories remained
uncontested and was provided with a more solid struc-
ture.
These historical analyses were then Riegel's guide
in constructing a dialectical developmental psychology.
Via Piaget and the Soviet psychologist Rubinstejn, a
psychology could be developed with the interaction
between an active subject and an active, ever-changing
environment as its central principle. In Piaget's
theory, great emphasis is placed upon the importance of
unbalancing factors for a proper understanding of the
dynamics of human development. Riegel goes a step
farther by almost completely denying the existence of
states of equilibrium and reducing all developments to
conflicts. We have shielded Piaget's theory from the
criticism of such dialectical psychologists as Riegel
and Buck-Morss, because in their criticism we sense the
misconception that Piaget's theory is a maturation
theory.
The idea that dialectical logic is sometiow supe-
rior to fonaal logic also seemed to play a role in the
dialectical criticism of Piaget. A developmental theory
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regarding the mastery of formal operations as a (ten-
tative) terminus of ontogenesis therefore remained
unsatisfactory. For that reason, Riegel found it ne-
cessary to add a fifth dialectical stage to the four
stages of Piaget, And for that reason, Buck-Morss re-
garded formal operations as a typical product of a
capitalist society. We have attempted to defend the
notion that dialectics most assuredly caanot hè re-
garded as a competitor of or an alternative to forma J
logic, as they are situated at different levels. In
addition, we have pointed to the interpretation of the
modern Frankfurt School with regard to Piaget1 s work.
Habermas in particular has demonstrated that formal-
operational thought, though a necessary condition for
communicative behavior, is certainly not sufficient on
its own. He complements this cognitive ability with
post-conventional moral judgment and a balanced ego-
identity, and believes that this combination of abili-
ties and characteristics can lead to an optimal inter-
action between human beings and their environment.
American Dialectical Psychology and the German Frank-
furt School agree with one another completely concern-
ing the great importance of Piaget's theory for a
critical psychology, hut differ in the way they believe
that theory should be amended. In that respect, Haber-
mas ' amendment would appear to have the advantage of a
more solid empirical foundation.
In its resistance to formal logic as a terminal
stage of human thought, dialectical psychology shows a
striking resemblance to the work of V.V. Davydov (1972;
see chapter I). In other respects as well there is a
great affinity between Dialectical Psychology and the
Soviet Cultural-Historical School of Vygotskij, and it
may be assumed that the only reason Riegel did not
refer to Vygotskij's work was that there were no trans-
lations of his methodological and epistemological work
available. Riegel - and with him Dialectical Psycholo-
gy - did derive a great deal from Rubinstejn's theory,
available through a translation by Payne (see the In-
termezzo). From this theory hè derived three fundamen-
tal aspects of developmeut, i.e. the internal biophy-
sical substratum, the individual-psychological aspect
and the socio-cultural aspect. To these three aspects
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hè himself added a fourth, the external physical as-
pect, and argued that the dynamics of human development
should, in particular, be sought ia the asynchronisras
between these different aspects. Unlike Rubinstejn, who
emphasized the material substratura of every develop-
ment, Riegel did not believe it opportune to attribute
a special role to any of the four aspects. From this,
it could be concluded that Riegel is placing Dialecti-
cal Psychology outside the dialectical-materialistic
tradition. But in view of the state of knowledge with
respect to the deterrainants of ontogenesis, the ques-
tion remains as to what extent opting for the material
substratum can be justified on other than a priori
grounds.
In addition to a view of human development con-
trasting with that of traditional theories, Dialectical
Psychology has also concerned itself with the problem
of the methodological consequences of dialectical
principles. As we saw, there are rather great internal
differences of opinion on this matter within Dialecti-
cal Psychology. For many years, dialecticians uuanira-
ously opted for a mixed-longitudinal design in their
research into the changing individual in a changing
society. In the meantime, however, there has been
criticism from several different quarters. Some believe
it absurd to seek an exclusively dialectical design
(e.g. Baltes and Cornelius), others have raised criti-
cal statistical and theoretical questions (Buss). This
discussion has yet to be concluded. More and more, the
question also arises within Dialectical Psychology
whether research results should not also be evaluated
with respect to their practical utility. Riegel called
this the enactive truth-criterion, but hè himself did
not descend froa the abstract epistemological level to
the area of concrete research methods. In their reflec-
tions on research as a dialogue, and the researcher as
ac agent of change, Meacham and Gergen got a bit clo-
ser. But a discussion on the merits of action research
as a practice-oriented research method par excellence
has yet to be initiated. As we saw in chapter II, this
discussion has developed in the Berlin School, and we
suggested that under certain conditions, the idea of
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actiën research could very likely be a good complement
to Dialectical Psychology's arsenal of research methods.
Up to now, Dialectical Psychology has not proved
really capable of converting its fundamental philoso-
phical and methodological assumptions into cogent
research practica. Riegel can boast of a long career as
an empirical researcher, hut none of his studies ap-
pears very well related to his dialectical principles.
But Dialectical Psychology has been amply succesful in
raising a number of very critical questions with res-
pect to the "fact-finding" tradition. It has also been
partly responsible for theory gaining more ground
within scientific work and for popularizing Soviet
psychology in the United States. In any case, Dialec-
tical Psychology has considerably enlivened the dis-
cussion on the context of discovery and stimulated the
development of new hypotheses and theories.
Afterword
CRITICA! PSYCHOLOGY AS TAUTOLOGY
At first glance, the term "critical psychology"
would seera to be a tautology. After all, has not scien-
ce always been "critical" in its nature, set against
dominant modes of thought based on myths and preconcep-
tions? A good exaaple of classical critical science was
the unmasking of the anthropocentric notion that the
sun revolved around the earth, presumed at the time to
be the center of the universe. With scientific raethods,
Copernicus and Galileo attempted to prove the (for that
time) heretical theory that the earth revolved around
the sun and its own axis. It has been said that Galileo
was condemned by the inquisition for his critical
scientific work because hè refused to confess that his
theory represented nothing more than an efficiënt model
for ca Iculat ing the motion of the planets. In this
case, science is critical because it unmasked a deep-
seated uiyth. A second example is Darwin's theory of
evolution. In it, hè demonstrated that the principles
of the "struggle for life" and the "survival of the
fittest", variation and selection of the most suitable
forms, were the foundation of the evolution of flora
and fauna on earth. In this theory, the hmnan being is
presumed to be the final product of a long evolutionary
process. In view of the dorainance of the biblical in-
terpretation of creation at that time, evolution was
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considered a truly critical theory. An example of
classical critical social scieace is the work of Marx.
He demoastrated that contrary to being lord and master
of their own society, people were actually dominated by
the forces of institutions, which are partly detennined
by raaterial economie conditions. Marx thereby unraasked
the myth of individual freedom and equality, one whicli
was maintained as much as possible ia the area of
politics and law, but could hardly be maintained in
economie matters. Finally, an example of classical
critical psychology is provided by Freud, who deraon-
strated that as creatures with physical and psycholo-
gical drives, people were not only not masters of their
social environment, but not of themselves either.
According to Marx, people were the willing victims of
their social conditions; according to Freud, they did
not even have control over their own psychological
nature.
Science, then, appears to have completely exploded
an age-old, mythical world view. The earth is no longer
the center of the universe, humans are not completely
different from animals; they can hardly be regarded as
masters of their social environment and certainly not
of their own nature. Regarded as such, critical science
is a tautology: in a world dominated by rayths and
prejudices, the unbiased search for truth is in and of
itself critical in its effects. The position of science
in the twentieth century, however, has changed radical-
ly. Science's self-evident function of exploding myths
has dwindled. More and more, science is becoming the
tooi of existing society and, as Habermas (1970) ar-
gued, one misused to stifle criticism of existing power
relationships. He refers to science as an ideology, an
instrument for masking social conflicts and injustices.
In particular, hè points out that science is regularly
misused to depoliticize politically explosive quest-
ions. An example of this is the discussion on nuclear
energy, which is depoliticized by asserting that be-
cause lay people do not understand the technical de-
tails, they can and should not participate in the
discussion. Ia discussing the usefulness and danger of
nuclear energy, the lay person is also put off with the
almost unverifiable promise that science will succeed
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in finding a technical solution to the problem of
nuclear wastes. A political question is defused by
transforming it into a technical sciectific problem.
Science, then, is no longer automatically critical, but
allows itself to be misused for the purpose of depoli-
ticizing public discussion. And after having laborious-
ly liberated themselves from a dependency upon myth and
tradition, people are once again in danger of becoming
dependent, but this time on science.
The Frankfurt School calls for critical reflection
on the goals and functions of research activity becom-
ing an integral part of scieatific pursuit. Science
should establish its own priorities and not play lackey
to every group that happens to occupy a dominant posi-
tiou in society. As expressed in Kant's age-old ideal
of enlightenment, science should direct itself to
emancipating people from the superfluous powerlessness
and dependence they have forced upon themselves. The
unbiased but uncritical search for truth should be
replaced by an interest in the pursuit of emancipatory
knowledge, its ceatral objective being emancipation
from the whiras of nature and excessive social and psy-
chological coercion. This ideal of emancipation cannot
be achieved by tossing "traditional" science overboard
and approaching the accumulation of knowledge from an
entirely alternative angle. On the contrary, the search
for laws of human behavior must continue unabated,
because only by knowing these laws can we liberate
ourselves from them. Habermas' dictum, which states
that while behavioral laws cannot be nullified, they
can be made inoperative, still holds. But a critical
science must supplement this kind of research with
ideology-critical research and should continually
examine behavior in its historical-social context.
TRADITIONAL AND CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The main currents of critical psychology discussed
in this book should, in fact, be seen in this light.
Critical psychology is not so much an alternative for
traditional schools as it is a call to take the study
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of the changing and changeable person in a changing
society seriously. The ma in currents of critical psy-
chology interpret themselves either as a synthesis of
competing traditional schools {the Cultural-Historical
School and Dialectical Psychology} or as a supplement
to current psychology (the Berlin School). None of
these schools have the pretention of casting the achie-
vements of curreut psychology aside and starting again
with a clean slate. None of the critical schools ques-
tion, for example, operative research methods. While
they believe that some methods and designs are better
suited to critical psychological hypotheses than others,
there is absolutely no question of radically rejecting
the traditional methodology. This would also be illogi-
cal, in view of the fact that such methods as the
experiment, the survey, systematic observation etc.,
are not the exclusive property of one psychological
paradigm. These raethods of collecting data, for ex-
ample, were not invented by "positivism" in psychology
itself. On the contrary, it is more an a posteriori
theoretical legitimization of the use of these strate-
gies in science- Ultimately, the methods themselves
were adopted from pre-scientific practice.
The critical schools do, however, radically dis-
sociate themselves from the current "fact-finding"
tradition and the cult of facts within psychology.
Blinded by the technical possibilities, raany a psycho-
logist has become obsessed with collecting data without
knowing exactly what theoretical preraise and what
social objectives they were meant to serve. As we
mentioned earlier, this has resulted in a mound of
(mini)facts which provide us with no further understan-
ding of human development whatsoever- The methods of
the natural sciences, at least the caricature of them
that penetrated the social sciences, were imitated
miadlessly. Because this created the illusion of exacti-
tude, the making of a-theoretical measurements and
empirical generalizations became highly respected
activities. And these activities continued, even long
after the students of the history of science (Kuhn,
Lakatos) had deraonstrated that the natural sciences
followed an entirely different course. This research
demonstrated that the basis of scientific progress lay
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not in the accumulation of as many and as "hard" facts
as possible, but in the competition between theories
and research programs. In fact, "hard" facts proved to
have a lower status within the natural sciences than
within a psychology calliug itself "positivistic". It
is to the credit of the different critical schools that
they have pointed out this weakness. It is these very
schools that have continually urged for a radical
upgrading of theory in psychological research. In doing
so, paradoxically eaough, these critical schools are
following the actual developments in the natural scien-
ces better than the "traditional" schools, which as yet
have remained unsuccesful in shaking off their carica-
ture of such developments.
Practically speaking, the upgrading of theory
means that critical psychology goes to great lengths to
arrive at a satisfactory definition of the research
subject: the changing and changeable huraan being in a
changing environment. Following the ideas of the Cul-
tural-Historical School, the Berlin School developed
hypotheses relating not to the arbitrary notion of an
individual researcher, but directly to phylogenesis and
social history. Despite the universally held notion
that the context of discovery precedes the use of any
scientific approach, critical psychology attempts, in
fact, to make this context rational. Critical psycho-
logy can therefore be looked upon as a persistent
attempt to have the scientific approach also apply to
the context of discovery and, in so doing, to demand
greater attention for theory development as the first
step in the research process. In that way, unconscious
and ill-considered influences of social interest groups
can be avoided. It should no longer be a matter of
course that researchers allow themselves to be used by
the industrial and political powers that be; they
should be able to direct their efforts at the very
emancipation of underprivileged groups. An attempt
should be made to expand the application of the know-
ledge obtained in this process by an orientation to-
wards such new methods as action research (see chapters
II and III) and by developing eduational research (see
chapter I).
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VIVIFICATION
But critical psychology does not oaly lead to a
different view of the context of discovery, but also to
a different function for empirical research in the
context of justification. As we mentioned earlier,
critical psychology in all its variants continues to
make use of the existing arsenal of research methods.
The results of this research, however, do not have the
fuactions of testing a theory by verification and
falsification. Unlike traditional psychology, critical
psychology is extremely sceptical about the determina-
tive value of the results of empirical research. In the
Berlin Critical Psychology, this scepticism is express-
ed in the principle of exhaustion (see chapter II) and
as often as not, American Dialectical Psychology ap-
pears to ascribe no more than an illustrative value to
empirical research. Gergen called this the "vivifi-
cation" of a theory through research, and we believe
that in doing so, hè has drawn the proper conclusions
from the recent methodological discussions on the
relationship between theory and facts (see chapter II).
To avoid any misunderstandings, we emphasize here that
critical psychology does not join the advocates of
methodological dadaisra or anarchy. Feyerabend's motto,
"anything goes", finds no support in critical psycholo-
gy. The latter's desire to, indeed, maintain a number
of universal criteria for the value of knowledge can be
described with the term "intersubjective replicabili-
ty". The line between journalism and political propa-
ganda on the one hand, and scientific pursuit on the
other is drawn by the (im)possibility for an "outsider"
to tracé and principally replicate the process result-
ing in a particular conclusion or theory. Only inter-
subjective replicability can guarantee a meaningful
critical discussion of research results. Therefore,
qualifying the determinative power of research results
does not at all result in anti-empiricism; in all the
critical schools, empirical research plays an indis-
pensable role in reviving and solidifying theoretical
discourse.
"Vivification" of a theory through enpirical re-
search points to the fact that during the research
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process, theories gain in complexity and detail. Theo-
rists are forced to so articulate their theoretical
points of departure that it should be possible to
satisfactorily operationalize the concepts they uti-
lize. At the saroe time, they are forced to reconsider
thoroughly the consistency and completeness of their
theoretical model. Indeed, entpirical research nearly
always demands accounting for possible intervening
variables, and a prior and thorough consideratioa of
the relative value of all these variables is imperative
(see chapter II). In addition, the results of research
may compel the researcher to adjust and supplement the
original theoretical model; it is possible that the
connections between phenomena are stronger or weaker
than was originally indicated. If in such a case the
arrangement of the theoretical arguments is not logi-
cally compelling - and obviously this is usually not
the case - there is no reason not to further delineate
the theoretical model on the basis of empirical expe-
riences. The results of empirical research may also
lead to the qualification of theoretical conclusions,
for example due to it becoming clear that a theory only
applies to a limited field or a limited population. In
this way, instead of being simply an instrument testing
the (in)validity of a conclusion or proposition, empi-
rical research becomes an extremely important means of
enriching theory development. In this view, the ques-
tion of validity will be the subject of a theoretical
discussion between scientists aspiring to a (tentative)
consensus concerning the "validity" of a theoretical
interpretation (supported by empirical arguments) of a
particular state of reality (cf. Habermas, 1973b).
CRITICISM OF CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
To our mind, critical psychology has numerous
merits and is a necessary supplement to traditional
schools, in particular because it is modelled along
more modern methodological lines than "positivistic"
psychology. And yet in the preceding chapters, we have
been very critical of a variety of aspects of the
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several different variants of critical psychology,
convinced as we are that these schools, too, can only
progress if they are criticized constructively. Among
other thiugs, critical psychology is affected by the
following problems and shortcomings. Firstly, it sever-
ely lacks conveyable and intersubjectively replicable
heuristic and ideology-critical methods. We are forced
to conclude that while the Berlin School did offer a
pretentieus alternative for modern and computerized
heuristics, they proved unable to provide assurances
for the conveyability of the functional-historical
method. The same applies in fact to Dialectical Psycho-
logy 's ideology-critique. In this school, an equivocal
ideology-concept corresponds to a method confusing
divergent levels of analysis with divergent analytical
perspectives. As a result, dialectical ideology-criti-
que makes an arbitrary and irreplicable impression.
This does not alter the fact that like the functional-
historical approach, this method has produced a number
of original suggestions. But the question is whether
their application should of necessity be limited to a
scieatific elite possessing the "intuition" and "sensi-
tivity" to make responsible use of the method. This
cannot possibly be the standard of a psychology whose
intention it was to promote deraocracy through science.
Secondly, critical psychology must still bridge
the large gap between its pretentions and its research
practices. To our mind, despite all the criticism of
traditional empirical research, there remains a glaring
absence of critical-psychological research projects
capable of illustrating the range of its theoretical
points of departure. With the exception of the elegant
but extremely simple empirical studies contained within
the Cultural-Historical traditiou, critical psychology
has actually had hardly any experience with empirical
research. In addition, the examples cited as good
alternatives by Dialectical Psychology are not parti-
cularly convincing. In general, even at first glance,
they do not meet a number of essential criteria cri-
tical psychology itself has established. There is an
urgent need for critical research which puts the idea
of vivifica^ion into practice. This, in turn, is also
related to the conveyability of critical psychology: it
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must be possible to introducé prospective researchers
to this material by means of "exemplars" (Kuhn) of
succesful research projects. If these are uot avail-
able, such training will continue to take place at an
abstract level. A third problem the critical schools
within psychology, and in particular the Berlin School
and Dialectical Psychology, have to coatend with is a
lack of social relevance, despite their pretenses to
practicability. As yet, these schools have been less
succesful than their Soviet Russian equivalent, the
Cultural-Historical School, in serving the interests
of education. In the Berlin School and in Dialectical
Psychology, there is the danger that their re-emphasis
of theory will run off in a counterproductive direc-
tion. Both Holzkamp and Riegel seem to be mesmerized by
the theoretical problems connected with studying human
behavior in an historical-social context, with the
commensurate danger of losing sight of the very objec-
tive of critical psychology, i.e. serving the goal of
human emancipation. These schools are, of course, of a
relatively recent vintage, and the munters of research-
ers contributing to thera are limited. Still, it would
be appropriate that more attention should be paid to
the problem of bridging the gap between theory and
practice. A better consideration of the method of ac-
tion research might very well provide an impetus to do
so.
But despite all its shortcomings and drawbacks, we
still regard critical psychology as an appealing and
unorthodox attempt to eraphasize the more human, and at
the same time more social side of the study of human
development. Within the philosophy of the natural
sciences, the position of "positivism" has long been
rendered out of date and the time has come for the
behavioral sciences to change their course as well. As
a source of inspiration, critical psychology can play
an important role in this shift away from "positivism".
In this regard, its attempts at providing a more ratio-
ual basis for the context of discovery, its re-emphasis
of theory and its vivificational view of the function
of empirical research are of particular interest. For
these very reasons, the ma in currents of critical
psychology, more than ever before, merit attention and
appreciation within mainstream psychology.
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